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 Introduction  
Republican perspectives on freedom’s other in philosophy, 
history, and literature 
CHRISTIAN DAHL AND TUE ANDERSEN NEXØ  
 
 
Spearheaded by John Pocock (1971, 1975) and Quentin Skinner (1978), the last 
four decades have seen a large and hugely successful attempt to unearth a repub-
lican strand within the long history of European political ideas. During the 1990s 
this historical interest became the starting point for several attempts to revive re-
publicanism not only as a phenomenon of the past, but as a viable political theory 
with its own distinct conceptual structure and normative claims about the organi-
zation of contemporary society. Absolutely central to this attempt was and is the 
work of the political philosopher Philip Pettit, especially his book Republi-
canism: a Theory of Freedom and Government (1997, see also 2006, 2012), as 
well as Quentin Skinner’s book Liberty before Liberalism (1998). 
The titles alone assert that the concept of freedom lies at the heart of both 
Skinner’s and Pettit’s attempt to revive the republican tradition. For both think-
ers, it is a specific idea about what freedom is – and what it is not – which makes 
the republican tradition attractive today; neither has shown much interest in re-
viving some of the tradition’s other key normative ideas such as patriotism or 
civic virtue (as opposed to Sandel, 1996; Viroli, 1995). And despite some minor 
differences (see Pettit, 2002), their arguments are very similar. The republican 
concept of freedom, they argue, is distinct from a positive concept of freedom 
understood as self-realization through the active participation in the self-
governance of the political community, but it is also distinct from a liberal con-
cept of freedom understood as the absence of interference – the dichotomy 
which in political theory had been codified by Benjamin Constant (2010) and 
Isaiah Berlin (1958). Instead, they propose to think of freedom as the absence of 
domination. 
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Since discussions of freedom have presupposed that negative freedom should 
be understood as non-interference for so long, it has been important for both 
Skinner and Pettit to show how non-domination and non-interference differ from 
each other. At its core, their argument has been both very simple and very con-
vincing. A wife can be dominated by her husband, a slave by his master, a poli-
tical subject by an almighty king without the husband, master or king actually  
interfering in the wife’s, slave’s or political subject’s life. These are all instances 
of unfreedom, Pettit and Skinner argue, since the mere fact that someone can in-
terfere in your life with impunity is enough to make you unfree, not least be-
cause this possibility in itself will modify your behaviour. The wife (or slave, or 
subject) could very well choose to behave in such a way that that the husband (or 
master, or king) has no reason to interfere. Thus, domination is not the same as 
interference. Conversely, laws that are contested and decided through democratic 
procedures do not reduce our freedom, Pettit argues, even though they do inter-
fere in our lives, since they are not instances of domination. Thus, absence of 
domination is not the same as absence of interference. 
Many consequences stem from the distinction between freedom as non-
interference and freedom as non-domination. For instance, while interference is 
most often thought of as an act or at least a specific event, domination is a state 
of being. Hence, freedom as non-interference refers to the freedom to act as one 
pleases, but both Skinner and Pettit are adamant that freedom as non-domination 
has less to do with a freedom to act than it has to do with a specific social status, 
the status of living as a citizen among one’s equals. At the same time, the exam-
ple shows how Pettit’s and Skinner’s distinction between a liberal and a republi-
can concept of freedom – and many of the consequences they draw from it – are 
in reality premised on conflicting understandings of what it means not to be free.  
In a sense, this is not surprising, since non-interference and non-domination 
are both negative freedoms; they describe freedom as the absence of something. 
Yet the meaning of unfreedom has not been a major theme in Skinner’s and Pet-
tit’s work. What happens, one could ask, if one changes the conceptual focus, 
and discusses different forms of unfreedom instead of different concepts of free-
dom? This book, To be Unfree, is an attempt to answer – or propose many an-
swers to – that question. As a collection of essays, it contains contributions from 
a series of academic fields – literary and cultural history, political science, philos-
ophy and law – united through a keen interest in the republican tradition and at-
tempts to revive that tradition today. Though differing in their methodologies, 
they are also united in their examination of what it means to be unfree. 
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CONCEPTUAL VARIETIES OF UNFREEDOM 
 
Discussions of the conceptual varieties of unfreedom fill the first part of this 
book. Several of these actively challenge Pettit’s and Skinner’s focus on non-
domination. They do so by introducing a somewhat strange question, namely: 
What is the opposite of freedom understood as self-governance? If self-
governance is the state of collective autonomy, of participating in articulating the 
laws under which one lives, its opposite could be understood as heteronomy, the 
state of having to live under a law not formulated by yourself. Heteronomy is not 
unconnected to domination or interference – if you are dominated, you are un-
able to freely participate in the articulation of the laws of the polity; such a law 
would of course interfere with your choices – but it is also not identical with 
them. As Pettit has argued, freedom as non-domination does not lead to an ideal 
of self-governance, but rather to the ideal of a contestatory democracy. It leads to 
a constitutional ideal where the right to protest against laws that do not ade-
quately track your interests is of central concern, rather than the right to actually 
participate in the formulation of these laws (Pettit, 2012). In that sense, hetero-
nomy is not in itself a form of domination. It has specific semantic contours. 
Furthermore, not all political participation has to do with the articulation of 
laws. Participation in the governance of one’s polity can also be understood as 
participation in decisions which are inherent in the administration of laws or 
concern other types of questions: Should we go to war? Do we consider this man 
guilty or not? A polity not only makes law, but also exercises political power  
according to historically specific and particular situations. To be a free citizen 
thus entails not only a direct or indirect say in the making of laws, but could also 
entail – for instance – the right to be judged by a jury of one’s peers, and the 
right to be a member of such a jury. Within this broader perspective, the answer 
to the question “What is the opposite of self-governance?” is exclusion rather 
than heteronomy. More precisely, heteronomy is one form of exclusion from 
self-governance, but not the only one. It might be that you are unfree when you 
are excluded from the institutions of political life as such, or perhaps excluded 
from the polity as such.  
The relationship between domination, heteronomy and exclusion is a starting 
point for several essays in the first part of this book. In different ways they each 
argue that absence of domination might be an important political goal – and an 
important aspect of freedom – but that this absence is inadequate to under-
standing and securing political freedom. In “Statelessness, Domination, and Un-
freedom: Arendt and Pettit in Dialogue” Christian Rostbøll compares the figure 
of the slave in Philip Pettit’s work with Hannah Arendt’s writings on the plight 
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of the stateless. Working through paradigmatic figures of the unfree in Pettit’s 
and Arendt’s thinking, Rostbøll shows how the figures’ semantic differences in-
form the two thinkers’ conception of freedom, but also argues that they should 
be seen as complementary rather than incommensurable. Just as domination and 
non-domination are to be understood as forms of social status in Pettit’s think-
ing, for Arendt the stateless is also the status-less, someone accorded no status at 
all in a polity. Rostbøll argues that the opposite of this state is not so much self-
governance, but simply the right to be given full status as a member of society, 
which is also the right to participate in the governance of the polity. There is a 
difference between having a right to participate and actually participating.   
Focusing on freedom’s other thus lends a keener sense of the positive aspects of 
freedom, but also shows that the positive aspects of freedom can be considered 
from multiple perspectives. 
The exclusion discussed in Robin Celikates’s “Freedom as Non-Arbitrariness 
or as Democratic Self-Rule? A Critique of Contemporary Republicanism” is of a 
different kind – not from the polity as such, but from the processes of govern-
ment. Celikates argues that one can be unfree within a polity whose laws are 
formulated to track the interests of its citizens – even though such laws suppo-
sedly are non-dominating. How can that be? If we are not allowed to participate 
in the formulation a law, it will feel as an alien imposition upon us. Furthermore, 
the implicit distinction between those who formulate the laws and those who on-
ly have legal resources to protest against them after the fact reintroduces a fun-
damental inequality into what is supposed to be a society of free and equal citi-
zens. Because of this, Pettit’s focus on non-domination needs to be supple-
mented with the more positive conceptions of freedom found in a different 
strand of the republican tradition, which runs from Machiavelli to Claude Lefort.  
Even more radical is Amnon Lev’s proposal in “The Unlikely Claimant.   
Sovereignty and Republicanism in Hobbes.” Looking at republicanism – and es-
pecially at attempts to revive it today – within a history of the secularization of 
sovereign political power, Lev argues that the focus on non-domination fails to 
account for the novelty in Hobbes’s argument regarding how a modern polity 
constitutes itself through a primordial act of exclusion from self-governance and 
submission to the sovereign – as well as the kinds of freedom a Hobbesian so-
vereign must eventually extend to its subjects. With this in mind, how big of a 
difference is there between a liberal and a republican form of government, espe-
cially if republicanism leads to the ideal of a contestatory democracy, but forfeits 
the ideal of self-governance? Not much, Lev answers polemically. 
The two last contributions in the first part of this book discuss reflections  
upon unfreedom within the history of republican thought. In “Materially Unfree. 
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Corruption as a Societal Diagnosis and the Political Forms of Unfreedom in Ma-
chiavelli, Davenant, and Bolingbroke,” Tue Andersen Nexø argues that the con-
cept of corruption, so dear to the republican tradition from Machiavelli onwards, 
should be understood as a specific kind of unfreedom: one endemic in the tissue 
of society – what Machiavelli calls the material of the polity – rather than one 
that is encoded within a constitutional blueprint. But, whereas corruption in Ma-
chiavelli is tightly interwoven with his analysis of how a free republic decays 
and changes into an unfree tyranny, for the 18th century neo-Machiavellians it 
becomes a preferred term to diagnose social life under the aegis of a new, fiscal-
military state. No longer part of a vocabulary to analyze the fate of the republic 
in secular time, it instead designates a permanent tension between the form and 
the material of society. 
Focusing on the political debates surrounding the establishment of the first 
French republic, Ruth Scurr highlights how the specific meaning of republican 
freedom was, in reality, under constant debate. Rather than the conceptual struc-
ture of freedom – should it be understood as self-governance or non-domination? 
– it is the ways freedom and unfreedom were intertwined that these debates cen-
tered on, Scurr argues, and on the ways that freedom in one area of life might en-
tail lack of freedom in another. A rhetoric of political freedom might lead to 
economic restrictions or legitimize laws restricting social mores. Thus, the idea 
of the free republic, so easy to defend when contrasted to the unfree Ancien 
Règime, quickly became a much more complicated phenomenon. 
 
 
CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS OF UNFREEDOM 
 
The second part of To Be Unfree focuses on how lack of freedom has been rep-
resented in European, mainly French, literature and culture in the 17th, 18th and 
19th centuries. Some of the essays cite explicit dialogues or lines of influence be-
tween the republican tradition within the history of political ideas and works of 
literature, while others use a republican concept of unfreedom – here understood 
to encompass both domination and exclusion from self-governance – as an ana-
lytical tool to refine our understanding of writers and works which are not typi-
cally understood to be part of a republican tradition.  
These ways of conceiving a lack of freedom prove to be fruitful in the ana-
lysis of literary and cultural history, and certainly more fruitful than a conception 
of unfreedom as interference. We don’t think this is a coincidence. As Quentin 
Skinner (2008, p. 127cc) has convincingly shown, Hobbes’ polemical redefi-
nition of what it means not to be free – where the lack of freedom simply means 
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physical interference – enabled him to counter the republican distinction 
between the free citizen and the unfree subject. It allowed him to declare the citi-
zens of a republic as unfree as the subjects of a tyrant, since the law of the repub-
lic interferes as much as the will of a tyrant in peoples’ lives. But there is another 
consequence of Hobbes’ redefinition: effectively, he reifies the concept of free-
dom. This is abundantly clear from Leviathan itself: 
 
“Liberty, or Freedom, signifieth (properly) the absence of opposition; (by opposition, I 
mean external impediments of motion;) and may be applied no less to irrational, and inan-
imate creatures, than to rational. For whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot 
move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some ex-
ternal body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst 
they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chains; and of the water whilst it is kept 
in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space, we use to 
say, they are not at liberty, to move in such manner, as without those external impedi-
ments they would.” (Hobbes, 1996, chp. 21, p. 139) 
 
As one can see, for Hobbes the paradigmatic figure of the unfree is neither the 
slave nor the stateless, but rather the prisoner – hindered in his movement not by 
other people, but by physical objects such as chains and walls. Even more radi-
cally, the state of being a prisoner is understood through the properties of flowing 
water. As a paradigmatic figure, the prisoner is thought of as a physical entity, 
blocked in his or her movement by other physical things. It is not that inter-
ference is not a state of being in Hobbes – the water is continually hindered by 
“the opposition of some external body” – rather, in the state of being unfree, the 
subject becomes understood as if he or she were a non-sentient object. 
Hobbes does more than invent a concept of freedom that makes the citizen 
and the subject equally unfree. Through his imagery he changes what in the re-
publican tradition was thought of as a relation between human beings – the social 
status of being excluded or included, of being dominated or being equal – into a 
relation between things which can then block or not block each other’s move-
ments. This reification makes discussions of freedom and its other strangely dis-
tinct from any analysis of the psychological complexities and subtle balances of 
power inherent in social life. It conceives of the lack of freedom as something 
that can be discussed independently of any understanding of intersubjectivity. It 
also makes any discussion of what it means to feel unfree, to experience unfree-
dom, seem irrelevant to an analysis of what it means not to be free. And all of 
this is accomplished in opposition to the thinkers in the republican tradition for 
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whom freedom and its other was a question of social and political status – which 
were, of course, also subjectively felt and experienced.  
Literature has probably always been engaged with the production of images 
of individual experience and of the minute ways our self-conception is connected 
to our position within the structures of intersubjectivity – be it of an intimate or 
public kind, be it informal or highly ritualized – but in early modern and modern 
literature this topic was explored with astounding variety, subtlety, and regula-
rity. Furthermore, both early modern and modern literature quite often also func-
tioned as an imaginary space – a playground, so to say – for the examination of 
philosophical concepts and their consequences, reveling in descriptions of hypo-
thetical sociopolitical situations or forms of social organization whose serious-
ness would always be up for debate. It is not surprising, then, that a surprising 
number of literary works from the 17th, 18th and 19th century can be understood 
as examinations of what it means to be unfree and how being unfree produces its 
own specific kinds of subjectivity. It is also not surprising that the republican 
vocabulary of unfreedom as domination and/or exclusion is a much more fruitful 
beginning point for an analysis of this literature than Hobbes’ and the later, liberal 
tradition’s reified understanding of freedom as non-interference.  
Conversely, the subtlety and complexity of literary works often shed light 
back upon a republican tradition and especially upon the current attempts to    
revive it. They complicate an account of freedom and its other which too often 
simply notes that lack of freedom has subjective and existential, as well as poli-
tical, implications, but rarely examine these implications or how the existential 
and the political interact. This interplay – between literature and political philo-
sophy, between theories of unfreedom and representations of being unfree – is at 
the core of Oliver Arnold’s “Occupy Rome: Citizenship and Freedom in Early 
Modern Political Culture, Recent Political Theory, and Coriolanus.” First sho-
wing that theories of citizenship – understood as participation in the common-
wealth – and theories of freedom were almost inextricable from each other in 
Elizabethan and Jacobean England – thus complicating any neat distinction 
between freedom as self-rule and freedom as non-domination – Arnold then dis-
cusses two very different attempts to make sense of the relationship between ci-
tizenship, freedom, and political representation in England around 1600. 
Whereas members of parliament would insist that the whole people of England 
were actually present in parliament through their representatives, Shakespeare’s 
Roman plays argue that political representation actually barred the citizens from 
active self-governance, Arnold contends. Shakespeare’s works do not elaborate 
upon any political position circulating in Elizabethan England. Rather, his dramas 
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reshuffle components of existing arguments, resulting in a radical and – for his 
time – strikingly original proposition about freedom and its other. 
The genre which has most consistently explored the intersubjective structure 
generated by the primary social institution of unfreedom, household servitude, is 
without doubt classical comedy and its modern descendants. Skinner (1998) and 
Viroli (2012) have already discussed the clever slaves of Plautine comedy as 
agents who are free according to the liberal concept of freedom as non-
interference, but remain unfree according to a republican definition of freedom as 
non-domination. In “Unfreedom, Servitude, and the Social Bond” Susan Maslan 
presents Marivaux’s comedy The Slave Island (1725) as a fable that first reveals 
servitude as an institution without moral and political legitimacy, and subse-
quently seeks to demonstrate the impossibility of transcending the intersubjective 
relations of domination servitude, granted that servitude is synonymous with 
society itself. Marivaux’s comedy can hardly be called republican but, as Maslan 
demonstrates, it anticipates Rousseau’s anti-foundationalist theory of social in-
equality where the social sphere, not nature, becomes the source of heteronomy. 
The dichotomy between natural freedom and political unfreedom uncovered 
by political theorists of the French Enlightenment is also the topic of Ingvild  
Hagen Kjørholt’s essay “Naturally Free, Politically Unfree: The Quakers in Vol-
taire’s Lettres philosophiques”. Kjørhagen challenges the widespread association 
of Voltaire’s political philosophy with early modern liberalism by unfolding 
Voltaire’s highly ambiguous portrait of the British Quaker society. On one hand, 
the Lettres portray the Quaker society as a utopian realization of natural liberty 
and praise the Quaker’s evasion of political interference. On the other hand, Vol-
taire reveals the futility of the Quakers’ quietist attempt to realize their natural 
liberty at the expense of political participation. Voltaire’s Lettres also suggests 
that the mere absence of political dominance does not relieve the Quakers from 
their political unfreedom, however self-imposed their political exclusion may be. 
As it will be clear from the contributions of the first part of this book, this is a 
view that would divide contemporary republican theorists.  
With Anne Fastrup’s essay “Dependency, Corruption and Aesthetics in 
Denis Diderot’s Le neveu de Rameau”. we return to the question of servitude. If 
Marivaux’s The Slave Island displayed servitude as an inescapable but arbitrary 
social condition, Diderot’s satire reveals an aesthetics of servitude, according to 
Fastrup. Diderot, a pioneer of aesthetic theory and criticism in the 18th century, 
develops his social criticism of servility into an aesthetic critique of a variety of 
performing arts from pantomime to opera. In sharp contrast to later romantic ce-
lebrations of artistic freedom, Diderot sees an intimate, but troubling, connection 
between heteronomy and artistic creativity. 
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Fastrup’s discussion of Diderot’s satirical novel and its relation to his aes-
thetic criticism is consonant with a small, but significant, number of attempts to 
recover the long forgotten republican impulses behind 18th century aesthetic 
theory. This recovery also comes to the fore in Christopher Prendergast’s discus-
sion of Baudelaire’s writings on criticism and aesthetics, which in many ways 
continue discussions begun by Diderot. Baudelaire, the apogee of post-romantic 
and post-revolutionary disillusion, came to see poetic imagination not as a 
source of aesthetic education and liberation, as Friedrich Schiller and Immanuel 
Kant would have it, but as a despotic power: a source of aesthetic heteronomy. 
Disillusioned by the revolution of 1848 and the compromised Second Republic, 
Baudelaire saw how aesthetic concepts associated with republican freedom had 
been tainted by the liberal individualism of romanticism. As Prendergast points 
out, this rejection of the aesthetics of liberation is fundamental not only for Bau-
delaire’s critical writings but for a whole current of reactionary thought in mo-
dernist writing and art throughout and beyond the 19th century. 
Finally, Christian Dahl compares Philip Pettit’s theory of freedom to a body 
of literature which is concerned with unfreedom in its most radical form: slave 
autobiography from the Antebellum period in the United States. In his essay 
“Unfreedom and the Crises of Witnessing” Dahl argues that the slave narratives 
not only served to document and oppose slavery but also to assert the same as-
pects of freedom that are central to the republican theory of non-domination. 
Special attention is paid to the importance of discursive control which was not 
only central to the slave narrators but also to Philip Pettit’s theory of freedom 
and his criticism of competing philosophical theories which focus only on ratio-
nal and volitional control. 
 
Most of the contributions in this collection were originally presented at the con-
ference “To Be Unfree” held at the University of Copenhagen 4th to 6th of March 
2010. We would like to thank all contributors and participants at the conference. 
In particular our thanks go to Professor Isak Winkel Holm, head of the research 
network Cultures of Republicanism, which funded the conference and thus made 
it possible for us to let this varied group of academics meet and enter into dia-
logue with each other – in Copenhagen as well as in this book. Special thanks al-
so to Professor Christopher Prendergast. Without his advice and help this book 
would not exist. 
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 Part 1 
Conceptual Varieties of Unfreedom
 
 Statelessness, Domination, and Unfreedom 
Arendt and Pettit in Dialogue 
CHRISTIAN F. ROSTBØLL 
 
 
Historical struggles for freedom are often portrayed as born of the unbearable 
experience of oppression and, therefore, as a matter of casting off a yoke, of 
freeing oneself from something. This image, even if it does give some insight into 
the meaning and importance of freedom, gives the misleading impression that 
freedom is merely the absence of something, and that it can be understood and 
defined in negative terms only. To avoid this impression, and to appreciate that it 
is a misleading impression, we need a deeper understanding of the experiences 
of unfreedom, of what the other of freedom is.  
The idea that freedom must be understood in relation to its opposite is pro-
minent in the republican tradition of political thought. Philip Pettit has become 
the most influential contemporary theorist of republican freedom, and he has 
systematically developed and defended a conception of freedom as non-
domination (Pettit, 1997; 2001; 2008). In the republican tradition, according to 
Pettit (1997, p. 31), “liberty is always cast in terms of the opposition between   
liber and servus, citizen and slave.” In another strand of republican thinking, a 
strand that Pettit (1997, p. 8) distances himself from, stands Hannah Arendt for 
whom the extreme experience of unfreedom lies in being stateless. According to 
Arendt (1979, pp. 296f.), the plight of the stateless is “deprivation of a place in 
the world,” which is different from the situation of the slave who “still belonged 
to some sort of human community.” We find in these two republican thinkers, 
then, two contrasting images of unfreedom: slavery vs. statelessness; a contrast 
that, as I shall show, has important implications for how we may understand 
freedom. Specifically, it can cast light on and contribute to challenging the 
common contrast between negative and positive conceptions of liberty. More-
over, it can help clarify the intrinsic and instrumental values of democracy in re-
lation to freedom.  
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This chapter argues that both the freedom-versus-slavery theme and the phe-
nomenon of statelessness supply important insights into the meaning and impor-
tance of freedom. We must, therefore, bring Pettit and Arendt into dialogue,  
something that is rarely done because of needless divisions in contemporary poli-
tical theory.1 Integrating Pettit’s insights into domination and Arendt’s insights 
into the plight of being excluded from a community that is responsive to one’s 
opinions and actions requires adjusting each position. The chapter analyzes dif-
ferences between Pettit and Arendt related to their respective uses of slavery and 
statelessness as freedom’s other. I find three core elements that differentiate the 
two: First, there is the question of whether unfreedom requires the presence of a 
dominator (as the slave metaphor indicates), or whether unfreedom is charac-
terized by extreme loneliness (the stateless). Second, there is the issue of whe-
ther unfreedom is best understood as a form of status (as the slave does have), or 
whether it means a lack of status (the stateless is apparently status-less). Third, 
does unfreedom involve being used as a means by someone else (the slave), or 
does it mean being superfluous in the eyes of others (the stateless)? The analysis 
and discussion of these three differences between slavery and statelessness as 
freedom’s other leads to a discussion of the relationship between freedom and 
democracy. The main question here is whether, or to what extent, or in what 
way, we should regard freedom as a positive notion. I also discuss whether free-
dom is intrinsically or only instrumentally related to democracy. I argue for regar-
ding republican freedom as having positive dimensions but in a non-Rousseauian 
sense. 
 
 
THE SLAVE AND THE STATELESS 
 
1) The free man and the slave 
 
In Pettit’s understanding of the republican tradition, and in his own conception 
of freedom as non-domination, freedom is understood in contrast to slavery. The 
condition of the slave is to live “at the beck and call of a master,” and to be “in a 
position where fear and deference will be the normal order of the day” (Pettit, 
1997, pp. 32, 64). Even the most fortunate slave, even the slave with the most 
permissive master, will live a life in unfreedom because she is “depending on 
[someone else’s] grace and favor” (Pettit, 1997, p. 33).The liberty-versus-slavery 
                                                           
1  Pettit’s work is mainly discussed among analytical philosophers, while Arendt’s work 
tends to be discussed exclusively by continental philosophers and political theorists. 
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theme implies, according to Pettit (1997, p. 32), that “the ultimate in unfreedom 
is having to live at the will of another – the arbitrary will of another – in the 
manner of the slave; the essence of freedom is not to have to endure such de-
pendence and vulnerability.” The slave is the most extreme example of this    
dependence, because she is the property of another. Pettit gives a compelling 
picture of the ills that this sort of dependence entails. 
The slave metaphor serves also the more systematic purpose of showing the 
possibility of unfreedom without interference. This is essential, because Pettit 
believes that freedom as non-domination is different from (and superior to) the 
alternative conception of freedom as non-interference, which we know from 
thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, and Isaiah Berlin. Freedom 
as non-domination is, like freedom as non-interference, a negative conception of 
freedom, but it is concerned with absence of domination rather than absence of 
interference. For Pettit, the republican tradition’s contrast between liberty and 
slavery and the possibility of living in slavery without being interfered with “is a 
sure sign of taking liberty to consist in non-domination rather than in non-
interference” (Pettit, 1997, p. 32). For “slavery is essentially characterized by 
domination, not by actual interference: even if the slave’s master proves to be 
entirely benign and permissive, he or she continues to dominate the slave” (Pet-
tit, 1997, p. 32). This proposition, of course, requires a definition of domination 
as something different than interference. Pettit suggests that A dominates B, if A 
has the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in certain choices that B is in a 
position to make (Pettit, 1997, p. 52). “Domination can occur without inter-
ference, because it requires only that someone have the capacity to interfere arbi-
trarily in your affairs; no one need actually to interfere” (Pettit, 1997, p. 23). 
Thus, the slave metaphor, via the example of the non-interfering master, is used to 
argue for the possibility of living in unfreedom without experiencing interference. 
To view unfreedom and domination as “a generalization of the case of sla-
very” (Markell, 2008, p. 11) has some important implications. I would like to 
highlight three elements for our further discussion. First, the slave metaphor 
suggests that unfreedom involves a relationship between persons akin to that of a 
master and his slave. To be dominated means “being subject to the alien control 
of others” (Pettit, 2008, p. 102, emphasis added; cf. 2010, pp. 73, 75). Domi-
nation in this view, then, involves the presence of the dominator and unfreedom 
is part of a human relationship. Second, it is interesting to note that the slave   
occupies a certain position in society. Being a slave is a form of status (usually 
one legally defined) and as such slaves have a relation to human society. This is 
not something Pettit emphasizes, but it is part of what slavery historically has  
involved, and we will see its relevance in contrast to the phenomenon of state-
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lesness. Third, slaves are used by their masters; they are used to serve the ends of 
their masters rather than their own. When this idea is generalized, it means that 
domination involves someone exploiting someone else for her own ends. Un-
freedom, in this view, means being used as a means rather than as an end. 
 
2) Statelessness, membership, and humanity 
 
We find Arendt’s description of statelessness in the second volume of The Ori-
gins of Totalitarianism (Arendt, 1979, p. 267cc). The stateless are those persons 
who do not belong to and who do not have a status in any political community. 
Arendt’s category of the stateless should not be confused with (even if it can in-
form a discussion of) our days refugees, who since the 1951 Refugee Convention 
have had a legal status in international law. The stateless in Arendt’s discussion 
are people who have no nation of their own and/or who have been excluded from 
or stripped of their citizenship and juridical status in any other nation, as the 
Jews were by the Nazis in the 1930s. Arendt’s main concern is understanding 
what makes the stateless so vulnerable, but we might also understand the situa-
tion of the stateless in terms of unfreedom. Arendt’s description of statelessness 
as freedom’s other, which pointedly differs from Pettit’s liberty-slavery theme, 
has some interesting implications for freedom’s positive dimensions. I shall con-
sider the three elements listed under Pettit above in turn. 
It is possible for a stateless person, Arendt notes, to have more freedom of 
movement than a person within a political community: a lawfully imprisoned 
criminal, for example. But this negative freedom, this absence of interference, 
experienced by the stateless “is due to charity and not to right” (Arendt, 1979, p. 
296). There is a parallel here between the situation of the stateless and the slave 
and, thus, an apparent similarity to Pettit’s contention that unfreedom does not 
require interference. Clearly, neither Arendt nor Pettit see freedom as defined by 
non-interference and, in both cases, slavery and statelessness, unfreedom has 
something to do with the lack of security against arbitrary interference. But the 
cases of the slave and of the stateless differ in terms of whether lack of freedom 
requires the presence of a dominus. What is special about the situation of the 
stateless is that there is no one (no particular other) who controls or rules her; she 
is, rather, at the mercy of any would-be dominator. The stateless is also not the 
property of anyone, as is the slave. The plight of the stateless is not that she has 
no rights against a particular master, but that she does not have anyone to whom 
she can address herself; she does not have anywhere where she can press claims. 
“The fundamental deprivation” of the rightless, according to Arendt (1979, p. 
296), “is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world 
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which makes opinions significant and actions effective.” The predicament of the 
stateless “is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for 
them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them” 
(Arendt, 1979, pp. 295c). 
“[I]n the light of recent events [totalitarianism, the holocaust],” Arendt writes 
(1979, p. 297): 
 
“[…] it is possible to say that even slaves still belonged to some sort of community; their 
labor was needed, used, and exploited, and this kept them within the pale of humanity. To 
be a slave was after all to have a distinctive character, a place in society – more than the 
abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human [which is the plight of the 
stateless].” 
 
I get back to slaves being needed and used in the next paragraph; the point I 
want to note here is that while the slave has a status, the stateless does not; the 
latter, as Arendt sees it, is status-less. Arendt suggests that the slave gets a char-
acter and place in society because of what she does or what she contributes with, 
her labor. But it should be noted also that the slave’s status is defined in legal 
terms and as such the slave is (in a sense) part of a human community. The slave 
has a place in and is part of both the socio-economic and the legal structure of 
society, even if she is excluded from the polis or the political life of the commu-
nity. The stateless, by contrast, has no place whatsoever in any of these human 
structures. I challenge and qualify this description below, but here we should 
note the important connection to Arendt’s famous idea of “a right to have rights” 
(1979, p. 296). The right to have rights is a right to membership and is prior to 
specific rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. What the stateless 
lack, as James Bohman (2008, p. 203) notes, is “the capability to have a status as 
such,” and the right to membership is “a right to the statuses and powers that 
make our freedom secure and allow us to be free to avoid the ills and evils that 
result from the loss of such a status.” The question that will occupy us below is 
whether the status of being a member can be understood merely in terms of secu-
rity against arbitrary interference or whether it also has intrinsic value. 
As we just saw, slaves being needed by other human beings is what gives 
them a place in society. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt describes how 
the Nazis saw the Jews as “superfluous” (e.g. Arendt, 1979, p. 296), and in a letter 
to Karl Jaspers she explains that “making human beings as human beings super-
fluous [means] not using them as means to an end, which leaves their essence as 
humans untouched and impinges only on their human dignity; rather, making 
them superfluous as human beings” (Arendt & Jaspers, 1992, p. 166). It is no t 
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immediately clear why Arendt thinks being used as a means keeps slaves “within 
the pale of humanity,” while the Jews under Nazism were made “superfluous as 
human beings.” Nor is the distinction between violating human dignity by being 
used as a means and undermining the essence as human beings by being re-
garded as superfluous entirely clear. Aristotle, who Arendt is so fund of citing, 
describes the slave as a “living piece of property” on par with other tools and in-
struments (Aristotle, 1992, 1253b28-32; cf. Hansen, 1999, pp. 120c). Does this 
make slaves needed as human beings? Slaves could not act in Arendt’s specific 
sense of self-disclosing action among equals in the public space (Arendt, 1958, 
pp. 175-247). And action is usually what makes us (fully) human to Arendt; if 
one only labors, as the slaves does, one does not rise above the sphere of neces-
sity and meaninglessness. How can slaves be part of humanity when they are  
deprived of the possibility of participating in the most human of human activi-
ties? I can see why being needed gives the slave a certain security that persons 
who are regarded as superfluous lack, since rational people will be inclined to 
give some protection to what they need over and above what they do not need. 
But protection based on someone else’s need does not imply making the pro-
tected part of humanity. Clearly the slave’s humanity is not respected in the Kan-
tian sense, which is why Arendt says the slave’s dignity is impinged. She must, 
therefore, have another understanding of humanity in mind when she speaks of 
what the stateless are excluded from and deprived of. I return to this other under-
standing of humanity below (in subsection three of the following section). 
 
 
FREEDOM OF THE CITY 
 
Above I have analyzed three important differences between regarding freedom’s 
other as slavery and statelessness, respectively. I have done so with little com-
ment or criticism of the two theorists. In what follows I discuss the three ele-
ments – presence/absence of dominator, status, and being used as a means vs. 
superfluousness – in more detail. This discussion will require also consideration 
of further details of the views of Pettit and Arendt. This section will form the 
background of an examination of the relationship between freedom and demo-
cracy in the section “Freedom, Politics, and Democracy”. 
 
1) Presence/absence of dominator 
 
In Pettit (2008, pp. 102cc) unfreedom requires the presence of someone who is 
in position to control certain of your choices, and freedom from domination re-
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quires security against such alien control. Moreover, the only positive dimension 
to freedom as non-domination that Pettit allows for is the requirement of the 
presence of security against interference on an arbitrary basis; the positive dimen-
sions involved in participating in politics and self-government are rejected as ex-
ternal to the conception (Pettit, 1997, pp. 51, 27cc). An obvious way to gain 
freedom on this basis seems to be to escape from the presence of other people 
who might dominate you; for where could one find more security against arbi-
trary interference than in the solitude of a deserted island? This issue does not 
arise in Arendt, it seems, for her description of the situation of the stateless 
shows not only that without rights one is in danger of arbitrary interference from 
anyone, but also – and more fundamentally – that one lacks a place in the human 
world. And lacking a place in the world means in and of itself lacking freedom. 
Actually, Pettit (1997, p. 66) denies that freedom as non-domination can be 
achieved by isolation: “Non-domination, as that is valued in the republican tradi-
tion, means the absence of domination in the presence of other people, not the 
absence of domination gained by isolation.” The question is whether seeing 
freedom as social or civil freedom – “the status associated with living among 
other people, none of whom dominates you” (Pettit, 1997, p. 66) – is compatible 
with regarding security against arbitrary interference as the only positive dimen-
sion of freedom. Why is non-domination in the city more valuable, if one rejects 
the intrinsic values of political participation, as Pettit does? 
Perhaps the experience of the stateless can point to another, additional, posi-
tive dimension of freedom than slavery does? Pettit (1997, p. 66, emphasis added) 
merely says that the non-domination “that is valued in the republican tradition 
[is] the absence of domination in the presence of other people,” but it is difficult 
to see how this can be made part of his definition of non-domination. This is par-
ticularly so when the only positive dimension allowed for in his conception of 
freedom is presence of security against arbitrary interference. Pettit’s formula-
tions entail that there could be freedom outside the city, but that this is not the 
freedom valued by republicans. Arendt’s engagement with statelessness, in con-
trast, suggests more clearly that there can be no freedom outside a political 
community. Her claim is partly a historical and contingent claim about stateless 
people lacking legal protection. But when she says that the plight of the stateless 
shows that one must be a member of a political community in order to have “the 
very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-
man” (Arendt, 1979, p. 300), her point is a deeper one. One may ask whether her 
position is the stronger one that our humanness is constituted by belonging to a 
political community or the weaker one that our humanness can appear only in 
political communities. I think the latter possibility is the more plausible interpre-
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tation. The subject that is to be free can appear only in a human world in which 
others are responsive to one’s actions and opinions. In this way there is a further 
positive dimension to freedom than mere security and protection, a dimension of 
intersubjective relationships and human responsiveness. In what sense this dimen-
sion is political is something to which we return. 
 
2) What kind of status 
 
When we see the position of the slave in contrast to that of the stateless, it be-
comes clear that the slave has a positive status that the stateless lack. As men-
tioned, the slave has a position in both the legal and the socio-economic structure 
of the society in which she lives. The slave experiences domination exactly be-
cause of her position or status in the social structure of society and not merely 
because of lack of guarantees against arbitrary interference, as Pettit says. The 
unfreedom of slaves is a product of the positive privileges that their master have 
against them. The same is true of Pettit’s other examples of dominated persons, 
the worker in capitalist society and the wife under patriarchy (Pettit, 1997, pp. 
138-143). The domination of these categories of people is the product of social 
structures and institutions, of the capitalist division of labor and the patriarchal 
family. If this is right, domination does not exist by the mere fact that someone 
has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in others’ affairs but in their accepted 
right to do so.2 We must, therefore, distinguish between the mere capacity to in-
terfere arbitrarily and the accepted right (or authority) to do so with impunity. 
At first glance, and as Arendt sometimes describes the matter, it appears that 
the situation of the stateless is to be status-less. The stateless does not occupy a  
position that gives others the right or authority to arbitrarily interfere in her affa-
irs. The stateless is entirely outside legal and also economic relations. Or so it 
seems. It is important to remember that even if masters can interfere arbitrarily in 
the lives of their slaves with impunity, there are limits to how they can treat their 
slaves. In ancient Athens, for example, masters could not, most importantly, put 
their slaves to death with impunity (Hansen, 1999, pp. 120c). With regard to the 
stateless, there are no legal limits on how they can be treated by others, as long 
as being stateless means lacking the “right to have rights.” But can we describe the 
situation of the stateless as entirely outside of and deprived of human relation-
                                                           
2  As Henry Richardson (2002, p. 34) has argued, kidnappers have the capacity to arbit-
rarily interfere with people’s lives, but we do not for that reason regard them as domi-
nating their potential victims (all of us). Cf. Rostbøll (2008, pp. 48c). 
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ships, as Arendt does? I would suggest that being stateless is still something one 
is in relation to something; it cannot be understood in negative terms only.  
As we learn from Arendt herself, the situation of the stateless in the interwar 
period should be seen in relation to the European nation state system. “Only with 
a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status 
become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether” (Arendt, 1979, p. 
297). Not having a nation state, as the Jews did not, is a deprivation in relation to 
a system that protects people on the basis of their nationality. Moreover, stateless 
was not merely something Jews (and others) were but rather something that was 
done to them. So even if the stateless have no status within any particular nation 
state, they do have a status in relation to nation states and from the perspective of 
the international system. Stateless is a status in the international political system. 
And it is a status that one is commonly pushed into. Thus, the difference be-
tween statelessness and slavery cannot be understood in terms of the dichotomy 
between having and not having status in a political community. What matters for 
freedom is what kind of status in what kind of political community. 
 
3) Superfluousness vs. being used a means 
 
The liberty-slavery theme in Pettit implies that domination and compromising 
others’ freedom is the product of self-interest and partiality and that the misfor-
tune of the unfree is similar to being someone’s else’s property, that is, being 
exploited and being used as a means. Arendt’s description of the stateless and of 
how the Jews and others were made superfluous under totalitarianism suggests, 
by contrast, that deprivation of freedom might be unconnected to self-interest 
and to some using others for their own ends. Rather, unfreedom is not to be seen 
and heard, not sharing a world with others. This difference has implications for 
the respective positive specifications of freedom that we might reach, beginning 
from either slavery or statelessness. In one, a central issue for freedom is whether 
one’s interests are neglected or not; in the other, the more fundamental issue for 
freedom is the possibility of acting among others in a shared world. This con-
trast, as we shall see below, leads to different views of the connection between 
freedom and democracy, as well as of what kind of democracy is required in or-
der to respect and/or enhance freedom. 
While it is true that the stateless discussed by Arendt were not used in the  
direct material self-interest of particular masters, as slaves are, to regard the Jews 
as utterly superfluous for the Nazis is misleading. Clearly, depriving the Jews of 
their rights did have some function for Nazi Germany, for example, as creating 
the Other of Arian identity. As argued earlier, the stateless is defined in relation 
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to something else, and not only in legal terms, but also in terms of identity. Still, 
the important insight for our further discussion is that perhaps the issue of being 
used in the interest of others is not the only or even the most fundamental dimen-
sion of unfreedom. To exploit this insight we need to become clearer on what it 
means to being made superfluous as a human being, than Arendt is. First, is it 
being made so or being so that constitutes unfreedom? Second, what does it   
mean to be (or being made) superfluous as a human being? In Kant, being treated 
as a means implies being treated as someone who does not have ends of one’s 
own, but who exists only for the sake of others’ ends. Humanity refers to the ra-
tional capacity of setting ends for oneself (Kant, 1996, pp. 74cc).  
Arendt must mean something else. Here we must, I think, bring in her notion 
of natality, the human capacity to insert oneself in the human world through 
words and deeds. Arendt (1979, pp. 438, 454c) describes the stateless as being 
deprived of their humanity by being deprived of the capacity to begin. The capa-
city to begin belongs to all of life not merely to action, but “action has the closest 
connection with the human condition of natality” (Arendt, 1958, p. 9; see also 
Arendt, 1979, p. 438). It seems that being denied the right to act politically does 
not entirely undermine the human capacity to begin something new; only the 
more radical being made superfluous does so. The ability to begin is more fun-
damental than the ability to have ends of one’s own, because it entails becoming 
somebody and being acknowledged as somebody who is welcome in a human 
community (cf. Markell, 2003, p. 180). The capacity to begin, then, requires in 
the first instance a human community that welcomes one as a member. It is this 
particular status of being welcome that the stateless lack. The slave is not a full 
member but also not entirely unwelcome; only those who are regarded as super-
fluous are not welcome at all.  
 
 
FREEDOM, POLITICS, AND DEMOCRACY 
 
I have suggested that to understand freedom properly we need a positive dimen-
sion beyond and in addition to security against arbitrary interference. This point 
leads us to a discussion of the relationship between freedom and politics, and in 
particular freedom and democracy. Now, one may think that the positive dimen-
sion of freedom that I am urging is the Rousseauian idea that in order to be free 
one must be the author of the laws to which one is subject. This is how we have 
learned to understand positive liberty by Isaiah Berlin (1969). Pettit (1997, pp. 8, 
27cc) – and before him Quentin Skinner (1983; 1991, p. 202; 1998; 2002) – has 
argued that republican liberty is not a positive conception in this sense; a point I 
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shall not challenge here, since I am concerned with a different possibility. Ar-
endt, however, might because of her critique of liberalism and negative liberty 
be seen as advocating a positive conception of freedom. But if she does so, it is 
not freedom in the sense of Rousseauian popular sovereignty (Canovan, 1992, p. 
212). Rousseau represents for Arendt, just as much as liberalism does, a wrong-
headed tradition that regards politics in terms of sovereignty and ruling 
(Rostbøll, 2006, p. 308; 2010, pp. 32cc). Thus, neither Arendt nor Pettit hold a 
positive conception of freedom in the sense of collective self-rule, nor is that the 
positive dimension of freedom that I shall explore below. 
Another way of regarding the relationship between democracy and freedom 
is to ask whether democracy is intrinsic to freedom or whether it is instrumental 
to freedom. To say that the relationship between democracy and freedom is an 
intrinsic one is to hold that democracy is an inherent part of freedom, and that 
freedom is not merely an external consequence of democratic decision making. 
On the intrinsic argument there is something in democracy that makes us free. 
By participating in (or perhaps by having the opportunity to participate in) de-
mocratic politics, citizens are free. To say that democracy is instrumental to 
freedom is to hold that the value of democracy in relationship to freedom is that 
of a means that furthers a valuable end. In the instrumental justification, demo-
cracy has no value in itself but only the value it derives from being a means to 
freedom. Now, it seems that the intrinsic argument gives a stronger foundation to 
democracy than the instrumental one, because the first gives democracy uncon-
ditional value while the instrumental connection, by its nature, is a contingent 
and conditional one. 
How can we place the republican conception of freedom in relation to the 
distinction drawn in the previous paragraph? Pettit explicitly denies that the rela-
tionship between democracy and freedom is intrinsic and notes that the impor-
tance of democratic control comes “from the fact that it is a means of furthering 
liberty” (1997, p. 30, emphasis added). Still, Pettit thinks Berlin’s famous con-
clusion that there is no necessary connection between freedom and democracy 
exhibits a shortcoming of freedom as non-interference (Berlin, 1969, p. 130; Pet-
tit, 1999, pp. 168cc). While Berlin notes that democracies might be better at  
protecting freedom (as non-interference) than non-democracies, he sees this as a 
contingent matter. Pettit, in opposition to Berlin, wants to show that demo-
cratized states represent a lesser assault on republican freedom than non-
democratic ones, and not just contingently but “just in virtue of being demo-
cratized” (1999, p. 163). His aim is to show that coercive law and government is 
not necessarily the enemy of liberty, and that democratization is what is required 
for law and government not to be dominating or hostile to freedom. What is 
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noteworthy in Pettit’s republicanism is the attempt to show such a relationship 
between freedom and democracy without appealing to the intrinsic value of de-
mocratic participation or to the idea that a law given by the people cannot domi-
nate the people. Pettit’s position, then, seems to be that the relationship between 
democracy and freedom is instrumental but nonetheless robust (Rostbøll, 2014). 
Let us look at why Pettit thinks the relationship between democracy and 
freedom is robust (yet not intrinsic). Recall that for Pettit freedom is not defined 
as absence of interference but rather as non-domination. This means, according 
to Pettit, not only that there can be domination without interference (as in the 
case of the non-interfering master), but also that there can be interference with-
out domination. The decisive question is whether the interference is arbitrary or 
not. What democratic governments do, according to Pettit, is to substitute one 
form of interference with a completely different kind. And, “interference occurs 
without the loss of liberty when the interference is not arbitrary and does not re-
present a form of domination” (Pettit, 1997, p. 35). Interference is non-arbitrary 
when it is “designed to track people’s interests according to their ideas” (Pettit, 
1997, p. 149), or more precisely, “to the extent that it is forced to track people’s 
common avowable interests” (Pettit, 2001, p. 139; cf. 1999, p. 176). Thus, demo-
cracy is robustly connected to freedom, in Pettit’s view, because it is a form of 
government that is designed and forced to track people’s interests as they see 
them and to interfere exclusively on that basis.  
One may ask here whether the emphasis showing the robust relationship con-
sist in that democracy is designed to track people’s interests or rather in the idea 
that democracy is designed to track people’s interests. The first possibility en-
tails an outcome based view of democracy that is susceptible to the criticism that 
democracies cannot provide an infallible method for making non-arbitrary de-
cisions that track and track only common avowable interests (Bellamy, 2008, pp. 
164cc). The second possibility has the tendency to turn the view into an intrinsic 
one. If what makes democracy valuable is that it is designed to treat everyone’s 
interests equally, its value comes not from the fact that democratic decisions ac-
tually do so, but rather from the equal status afforded everyone in the democratic 
process. I believe the latter argument would be the stronger one, but Pettit has 
excluded himself from endorsing this view because of his rejection of any 
intrinsic justification of democracy. He fails to see that there are other intrinsic 
justifications of democracy than Rousseauian and perfectionist ones, the first  
involving collective self-rule and the latter relying on political participation 
being the highest form of life. 
It is an assumption of Pettit’s view of the relationship between democracy 
and freedom that the core (and only) complaint one can have against one’s 
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oppressors or the government is that one’s interests are not tracked. He follows 
the classical view, which has its roots in Aristotle (1992, 1279a22-b10), that devi-
ated forms of government are characterized by the rulers governing in their own 
as opposed to the common interest. Arendt (1979, pp. 460cc), in contrast, belie-
ves that 20th century totalitarianism exploded this distinction between arbitrary 
and legitimate government because the leaders of the totalitarian movements did 
not rule in their own interest. She emphasizes over and again that the horrors of 
totalitarianism cannot be understood in terms of treating others as means or ex-
ploiting them for one’s own ends. This is relevant for understanding Arendt’s  
alternative view of the relationship between democracy and freedom. To be 
excluded from a place in the human world and from political participation en-
tails a different and more fundamental unfreedom than one’s interests not being 
tracked and incorporated in political decisions. What exactly this unfreedom 
consist in and why it is an unfreedom is complicated, but it has to do with the 
lack of possibility to speak and act, to be heard and seen. And clearly it is acti-
vely engaging in these activities, and being responded to when one does so – 
rather than any consequences that may accrue from this – that is of value and  
necessary for freedom. 
To be heard and seen is related to the capacity to become somebody, to nata-
lity or the capacity to begin. In The Human Condition, Arendt writes that begin-
ning “is not the beginning of something but of somebody, who is a beginner 
himself” (1958, p. 177). The ability to begin is a precondition of becoming so-
mebody, of gaining individuality and having and attaining status. When someone 
begins, she distinguishes herself “instead of being merely distinct” (Arendt, 
1958, p. 176). The beginner is not merely ascribed an identity by others but 
shows in word and deed, by her own initiative, who she is. This possibility of 
becoming somebody, which the stateless lacked, is prior to and existentially mo-
re fundamental than having interests or ends. Becoming somebody is a precondi-
tion of having ends at all. Having one’s interests tracked in Pettit’s sense is also 
not sufficient for becoming somebody, for in that case one is only a “what,”   
someone who has interests that she shares with many others, and not a “who,” 
which distinguishes her from “anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live” 
(Arendt, 1958, p. 8). 
Which view of the relationship between democracy and freedom is implied 
by Arendt’s view as outlined above? And what kind of democracy is required for 
freedom in this view? Freedom entails, as we just saw, becoming somebody, 
becoming a distinct individual. The stateless, the person outside politics, accord-
ing to Arendt (1979, p. 302), is “other,” but since he is “without a citizenship, 
without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and specify himself,” he 
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is merely “different in general, representing nothing but his own absolute unique 
individuality which, deprived of expression within and action upon a common 
world, loses all significance.” What is it, then, that democratic politics does for 
freedom? It organizes and guarantees a common public space in which people can 
meet each other, a space “into which each of the free men [can] insert himself by 
word and deed” (Arendt 1993, p. 148). This helps explain why the value of de-
mocracy for Arendt lies in participation, rather than in interest representation. 
For Arendt (1990, p. 235, pp. 268c) “expressing, discussing, and deciding” are 
“in a positive sense [...] the activities of freedom,” while having one’s interests 
represented through voting is not. 
We are now able to see the contours of a core difference between Pettit’s and 
Arendt’s view of the relation between democracy and freedom. The difference 
can be understood in terms of a distinction between control and involvement 
suggested by Patchen Markell (2008, p. 12). When Pettit says that democracy is 
robustly connected to freedom, because democracy secures that political decisi-
ons track common interests, this is a matter of politics being controlled by citi-
zens’ common interests. When the question of the relationship between political 
power and freedom is phrased as a matter of involvement, the question is: “what-
ever it is that’s happening, and, however it’s being controlled, to what extent is it 
happening through you, through your activity” (Markell, 2008, p. 12). Now,  
sometimes control and involvement go hand in hand, but it is also possible that 
“the mechanisms that guard against arbitrariness and subject decisions to control 
[...] displace involvement” (Markell, 2008, p. 12). While the latter possibility 
falls out of view (or is not regretted) in Pettit and explains his rather minimalist 
view of democracy, the issue of involvement is fundamental in Arendt and ex-
plains her criticism of representative democracy as “oligarchic” (Arendt, 1990, 
p. 269). 
In Arendt there are two strands of thought – perhaps two positive dimensions 
of freedom – that goes further than Pettit’s account of freedom as non-
domination: one concerns membership, and the other political participation. One 
may argue that Arendt does not sufficiently distinguish the value of being a 
member of a political community and the value of active involvement in politics. 
Actually there are two issues here. First, it is unclear whether the value in both 
cases is merely instrumental (being a means to secure life and liberty) or intrinsic 
(valuable in itself, as an expression and the essence of freedom). Second, if there 
is intrinsic value in being a member of a human community, can this be enjoyed 
only as an active participant in politics? The latter is a controversial view, which 
seems to exclude the possibility that most people find more fulfillment in the 
private sphere than in politics. While it is possible to find places in Arendt’s wri-
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tings that commit her to the latter view, I think this objection fails to see the 
force of her position. Even if most people “would rather cultivate their garden 
than the common good” (Bellamy, 2008, p. 162), it doesn’t follow that having 
the status of someone’s whose actions and opinions are responded to is not 
intrinsically valuable and part of what freedom means. It might be that this status 
is not exclusive to politics, but understanding (political) action as Arendt does in 
The Human Condition helps us understand its distinctiveness and value. 
Arendt’s celebration of political involvement should be seen as the sharpest pos-
sible contrast to being stateless, and her point might be that if we don’t under-
stand the value of political action, we may not understand the value of being a 
member of a political community, and therefore may not understand what free-
dom means and requires (Arendt, 1993, p. 148). 
Now, it is an important objection to intrinsic and noninstrumental justifi-
cations of democracy that they cannot on their own explain the importance of 
democratic procedures, for this we need also some idea of which procedures 
make for epistemically good decisions (Estlund, 2008, ch. 4 & 5). With regard to 
Arendt’s position the problem is that the intrinsic value of political participation 
might be a mere by-product of aiming at substantial outcomes; political partici-
pation requires an instrumental aim to be valuable (Elster, 1997, pp. 19cc). The 
intrinsic value of political participation is conditional upon its instrumental value. 
But this does not mean that the noninstrumental value of democracy has no 
weight of its own. As Elizabeth Anderson (2009, p. 225) has pointed out: 
 
“The proper test of the noninstrumental goodness of an activity is not whether we’d prefer 
to do it, even if it didn’t result in desirable consequences. It is rather whether we’d still 
prefer to engage in it, even if the same consequences could be brought about by other 
(passive) means.” 
 
Of course, Arendt does not think that the value of belonging to a political com-
munity could be achieved by other means, but she goes too far in ignoring the 
instrumental dimension of democratic politics (Habermas, 1985). Here Pettit’s 
idea that democratic procedures must be designed to track common interests 
comes into its own. It is an important part of the justification of democracy that 
it has instrumental value in tending to making non-arbitrary decisions that pro-
mote the interests of everyone equally. The dialogue between Pettit and Arendt, 
thus, points to the need to combine intrinsic and instrumental justifications of 
democracy. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Arendt’s understanding of the experience of the stateless highlights what it 
means to “lack common liberty held with others” (Bohman, 2008, p. 206) in a way 
that Pettit’s use of the slave metaphor and his conceptualization of non-domination 
as security against arbitrary interference does not. This difference has implica-
tions also for their view of the raison d’être of democratic politics, which for 
Pettit is to secure that interference is non-dominating by tracking common avow-
able interests, while it for Arendt is to secure the conditions of acting together in 
common liberty, creating a world where everyone can become somebody by her 
own initiative. Thus, Pettit’s concern for exploitation and control can be traced 
back to the liberty-slavery theme, while Arendt’s concern for involvement can 
be seen in light of her discussion of totalitarianism and statelessness. The argu-
ment of this chapter is that while both the use of the slave metaphor and the de-
scription of statelessness are suggestive and lead to valuable insights, they also 
result in blind spots in Pettit’s and Arendt’s respective understandings of demo-
cracy and freedom and their relationship. Neither the exploitation of the slave, 
nor the superfluousness of the stateless can stand alone as freedom’s other. 
The dialogue between Arendt and Pettit has helped us approach an under-
standing of which positive dimensions republican freedom has and does not ha-
ve. I have argued that there is a further positive dimension to freedom than mere 
security against arbitrary interference. The additional positive dimension is the 
capacity to become somebody by inserting oneself in a common world, which is 
responsive to one’s opinions and actions – and not merely to one’s interests. This 
argument has implication for how we should view the relationship between   
democracy and freedom. I have suggested some distinctions that make new pos-
sibilities apparent, for example, that one can regard democracy as robustly 
connected to freedom without seeing the connection as intrinsic, and that one can 
be committed to an intrinsic justification of democracy without this relying on a 
Rousseauian idea of collective self-rule or on the idea that political participation 
is the only truly good life. In the end, I argued for (what we might call) a dual 
justification of democracy and freedom that includes both intrinsic and instru-
mental concerns. Democracy is valuable both because it affords everyone the 
possibility of becoming somebody and holding common liberty with others, and 
because it has the instrumental value of protecting citizens against arbitrary deci-
sions and domination. And, it should be emphasized, the value of holding com-
mon liberty with others goes beyond being a means to ensuring that one’s avow-
able interests are tracked on an equal footing with others’ interests. We would 
and should, I propose, still prefer being active members of political communities 
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that welcome and are responsive to our actions and opinions, even if non-
arbitrary decision making could be secured by other means. 
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 Freedom as Non-Arbitrariness or as 
Democratic Self-Rule?  
A Critique of Contemporary Republicanism* 
ROBIN CELIKATES 
 
 
Most republicans share the general view that there is a link between the freedom 
of citizens and their participation in the self-government of the community of 
which they are members. How this link is to be conceived, however, remains 
subject to dispute, and it is this question which I will discuss in what follows. 
The argument proceeds in four steps. I will start with a quick reminder of the 
neo-republican argument for the introduction of a third concept of freedom, viz. 
freedom as non-domination (I). I will then sketch a defence of this argument 
against a recent criticism raised by the proponents of the so-called theory of pure 
negative freedom who claim that what counts is actual (and potential) interfer-
ence, not the mere fact of domination (II). In the third part I will raise a different 
objection against the neo-republican position as it is elaborated by one of its 
most prominent representatives, Philip Pettit (III), and I will end by suggesting 
the superiority of another, more democratic variety of republicanism (IV). In a 
nutshell, my claim will be that while neo-republicanism brings into view a form 
of unfreedom ignored by liberal thinkers, especially in the variant put forth by 
Pettit, it fails to sufficiently take into account a specifically political form of un-
freedom due to its problematic, and surprisingly liberal-constitutionalist, under-
standing of the link between freedom and democracy. On the one hand, neo-
republicans supply us with a radical revision of the concept of freedom, but on 
                                                           
*  I have presented material used in this article at conferences and colloquia in Bonn, 
Frankfurt/M., Copenhagen, Medellín, Jena, and Flensburg and would like to thank 
participants in these events for their comments. 
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the other hand they tend not to be radical enough when it comes to the link be-
tween freedom and participation. 
 
A THIRD CONCEPT OF FREEDOM 
 
Under what conditions can we regard ourselves as politically free? What (if any) 
link is there between freedom and democratic participation? There seem to be 
three possible answers to this question which allow us to (admittedly, in a very 
crude way) structure the theoretical landscape: i) There is no link: Being free is 
neither necessarily nor contingently related to (the possibility of) democratic par-
ticipation. ii) There is a contingent and external link: (The possibility of) Demo-
cratic participation can, under certain circumstances, be a facilitative condition 
of being free. iii) There is a necessary and internal link: (The possibility of) 
Democratic participation is a necessary and/or constitutive condition of being free. 
Proponents of classical liberalism usually hold thesis i) or ii). Here are just 
two famous quotes from the many possible examples from authors who favour 
the negative understanding of freedom as the absence of interference (while 
many egalitarian liberals, following Rawls, obviously subscribe to a much richer 
notion of freedom). The first is from Hobbes (1997, ch. XXI, p. 149): “There is 
written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word 
LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Liber-
tie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constan-
tinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome 
is still the same.” The second is from Isaiah Berlin (1969, pp. 129-130): “It is 
perfectly conceivable that a liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a 
large measure of personal freedom. [...] Freedom in this sense is not, at any rate 
logically, connected with democracy or self-government.”1 With this under-
standing, we can regard ourselves as free to the extent that the state respects our 
rights and does not interfere with our private sphere – and whether this is the 
case remains independent from the democratic credentials of the state in quest-
ion. Berlin’s statement, however, already opens the door to an instrumentalist 
understanding of the link between freedom and democratic participation, but this 
                                                           
1  Skinner (2008a) argues that Hobbes’ position should be understood as an ideological 
intervention aimed at discrediting the “democratic gentlemen”, i.e. the pro-
parliamentary critics of monarchy; Tully (2013) argues that we should understand 
Berlin’s influential article in a similar way, namely as an attempt to discredit the 
“democratic gentlemen” of his day. 
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contingent link may be rather weak and of no great theoretical or political signi-
ficance. 
Proponents of republicanism usually hold thesis ii) or iii) and I will argue 
that what kind of republican one is depends on which of these options one sub-
scribes to – what we can call constitutionalist republicans tend to hold ii), while 
democratic republicans hold iii).2 
If freedom is understood as the absence of domination, as in Pettit’s influ-
ential development of this ‘third concept’ of freedom, the nature of the link 
between freedom and participation obviously depends on the concrete under-
standing of non-domination.3 For the sake of brevity, Pettit’s view can be charac-
terized by two core theses (for the latest statement of these see Pettit, 2012, ch. 
1.3.-4.). According to the first, unfreedom as dependence and domination can 
exist in the absence of interference. This can be illustrated by the example of the 
‘lucky’ (n.b.: not ‘happy’) slave and the non-interfering master: Even if the mas-
ter is very lazy, or inattentive, or benign and does not interfere much with how 
his slaves lead their lives, they are still depending on his arbitrary will and can 
therefore not be regarded as free in any meaningful sense. According to the sec-
ond thesis, interference does not necessarily amount to domination, and can thus 
be compatible with freedom. This can be illustrated by the example of the rule of 
law: Proper laws interfere with the individual’s actions but do not dominate it 
and are thus compatible with its freedom. 
Freedom is thus still construed negatively, as an absence – not as the absence 
of interference, however, but as the absence of domination. Correspondingly, un-
freedom does not coincide with interference since there can be both domination 
(and thus unfreedom) without interference as well as interference without domi-
nation (and thus without unfreedom). In opposition to the understanding put 
forth by Hobbes and Berlin, freedom thus understood is dependent on the type of 
political system one is living in – it matters greatly whether one lives in Lucca or 
                                                           
2  This distinction overlaps but is not identical with the one made by Pettit (2012, pp. 
11-18) between the Italian-Atlantic and the Rousseauvian tradition that he characteri-
zes as communitarian and that focuses on freedom as participation rather than non-
domination. 
3  In what follows, I mainly discuss and criticize Pettit’s proposal, which in great detail 
spells out the consequences of the neo-republican position for democratic theory. Oc-
casionally I also refer to Skinner’s work, which is of course equally influential in the 
neo-republican debate, and seems to avoid some of the problems I will raise with re-
gard to Pettit’s position. For some of the differences, which I will not be able to go in-
to in any detail on, see Pettit 2002. 
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in Constantinople. In this the neo-republicans follow the lead of James Harring-
ton (1992, p. 20) who has replied to Hobbes’s quip with the observation that in 
Constantinople “even the greatest bashaw is merely a tenant of his head, liable to 
lose it as soon as he speaks or acts in such a way as to cause the sultan offence.” 
Let us now examine the two core theses in turn. There are two kinds of argu-
ment republicans put forth to support the first core thesis. The first kind is psy-
chological: Those who live in conditions of domination (or dependence) tend to 
pre-emptively adapt to the anticipated reactions of those they depend on and   
engage in acts of practical self-censorship with the aim of avoiding future inter-
ference. As Skinner (2002, pp. 256-257; see also Skinner, 1997, pp. 92-95) notes: 
“[A] mere awareness of living in dependence on the goodwill of an arbitrary 
ruler does serve in itself to restrict our options and thereby limit our liberty. The 
effect is to dispose us to make and avoid certain choices, and is thus to place 
clear constraints on our freedom of action, even though our ruler may never     
interfere with our activities or even show the least sign of threatening to interfere 
with them.” To pick just one from numerous contemporary examples, in 2010 
the German constitutional court (1 BvR 256/08) ruled that a law was unconstitu-
tional that required the monitoring and documentation of communication via 
phone and email. The defenders of the law argued that law-abiding citizens, in 
contrast to terrorists and other criminals, have nothing to worry about and would 
of course not be restricted in their freedom. As empirical surveys have shown, 
however, a majority of people said that they would refrain from using phone or 
email to contact psychotherapists or drug help agencies if the new law became 
effective. Using proto-republican terminology, the court ruled that already “the 
diffusely threatening feeling of being under surveillance” was incompatible with 
the basic liberties protected by the constitution, even in the absence of concrete 
interference (see the court’s press release 11/2010). 
It is, however, questionable whether this kind of psychological mediation – 
the psychological fact of being aware of one’s dependence on the arbitrary will 
of others – is really essential for existing forms of domination to count as forms 
of unfreedom. According to the republican position, it seems that even slaves 
who are not only lucky but also naïve and unaware of their slavery are never-
theless slaves and thus unfree. It is the mere fact of domination that counts, not 
the awareness of this fact and the behaviour that results from it. Why this is so 
can be seen from the following conceptual explication of the first thesis which 
goes beyond the psychological argument supporting it: Freedom is not just predi-
cated on individual actions, it is – essentially – a status that can be ascribed to a 
person depending on her standing in relation to other persons, and that can come 
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in degrees depending on both the intensity and extension of non-domination.4 
This status is incompatible with the mere fact of domination, independently of 
any psychological considerations. As Pettit (2007, p. 715) explains, for actions to 
count as free they must meet two conditions:  
 
“First, they must be unobstructed; second, they must be unobstructed in virtue of the status 
enjoyed by the person. Choices that are unobstructed for purely contingent reasons, not 
because of the status of the agent, will count as unfree. The choice of a free person that is 
frustrated by a contingent crime will not be free; nor will the choice of the unfree person  
– in the limit case, the slave – even when that person manages to do as he or she wishes.” 
 
As we saw, Pettit’s second core thesis holds that interference does not necessa-
rily amount to domination and is, under certain conditions, compatible with free-
dom. This is so because being dominated means being subject to arbitrary 
power. And from this it follows that if the interference is non-arbitrary (or un-
controlled, as Pettit (2012, p. 58) now says), it does not dominate me and thus 
leaves my freedom intact. Now, for Pettit, interference has to meet two condi-
tions in order to count as non-arbitrary. The first condition is procedural: The   
interference has to be the result of rule-governed procedures that minimize or 
exclude the influence of the arbitrary will of others. The second condition is sub-
stantial: The interference has to track the (qualified5) interests and opinions of 
those affected, and the claim that it does this has to be controllable and con-
testable by those affected (this gives the substantial condition a procedural 
twist). According to Pettit, these conditions are supposed to hold under the rule 
                                                           
4  See Pettit 2007 as well as Pettit 1997, p. 75: “People will enjoy more and more non-
domination both as dominators come to dominate them less intensely and as they come 
to dominate them across a smaller extent.” On freedom as status, see also Skinner 
2010, p. 98: “It is possible to act freely, they [the republicans] maintain, if and only if 
you are a freeman. If instead you live as a slave, you can never act as a free agent un-
der any circumstances. This is not necessarily because your choices and actions will 
be impeded, but rather because they will never be the product of your own auto-
nomous will. They will inevitably be a product both of what you will and desire and 
of what your dominus may be willing to permit.” 
5  Pettit uses a variety of formulations here, ranging from “interests” via “avowed inter-
ests” to “common avowable interests” – i.e. from de facto to somehow normatively 
qualified interests. See Pettit 1999, p. 176: “They are the interests that those who are 
expected to give a system of government their allegiance may reasonably expect 
government to track.” 
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of law (so imprisonment will, under these conditions, not constitute domination 
and accordingly not make the imprisoned unfree, although it will make them 
“non-free”6). 
Before turning to the discussion of this second thesis, and to my worry that it 
leads to a constitutionalist rather than to a democratic version of republicanism 
which misconstrues the link between freedom and democracy, I will address a 
critique of the first thesis that freedom consists in the absence of domination 
which has been put forth by the defenders of a more liberal, or libertarian, nega-
tive conception of freedom. 
 
 
POSSIBILITY, NOT PROBABILITY 
 
The radical and distinctive character of the neo-republican proposal becomes  
evident in an exchange in which Skinner and Pettit have been criticized from the 
perspective of the so-called theory of pure negative freedom presented by Carter 
(2008) and Kramer (2008). According to this theory, what counts when we are 
interested in freedom is actual and potential interference and not the mere fact of 
domination. It is the probability and not the mere possibility of interference that 
is of theoretical and normative significance. On this probabilistic view, “where 
A’s mere opportunity to exercise power has some degree of probability of being 
exercised, then B’s unfreedom [recte: freedom] is to that same degree limited” 
(Carter, 2008, p. 70). If, in contrast, after a reliable probabilistic assessment, a 
slave comes to the conclusion that he can act in a certain way without being inter-
fered with, he is thus free to act accordingly. Put in other words, freedom is, as 
in Hobbes, a matter of the options I have; but whereas Hobbes thought that the 
robber, who, by pointing a gun at me, confronts me with the choice ‘your money 
or your life’, still leaves me both options (although the costs of accepting one of 
them are extremely high) and thus does not take away my freedom, according to 
Kramer and Carter the robber does take away an important option, namely the 
conjunctive option of keeping my life and my money, and thus it is already his 
threat (and not only its being carried out) that, if credible, limits my freedom. In 
assessing the extent of our freedom, probability thus plays a crucial role. This  
                                                           
6  See Pettit 2002. With regard to this, Kramer (2003, p. 102) remarks: “Consequently, if 
the placement of a highly dangerous man in chains or a straitjacket is legitimate be-
cause of his uncontrollably violent behaviour, neither of those means of immobilizati-
on will deprive him of any liberties. A theory that generates such a conclusion can 
hardly claim to be cogently illuminating.” 
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also holds for the law which closes off the option to both violate the law and 
continue to act in ways that will be made impossible by the law’s sanctions (e.g. 
by imprisonment). In cases like these, interference consists in “the undoing of 
the conjunctive exercisability of many opportunities – opportunities that could 
have been exercised conjunctively in the absence of the dominant party’s sway” 
(Kramer, 2008, p. 44; see also Kramer, 2003, p. 39). Thus, in order to speak of a 
restriction of one’s “overall negative freedom” there does not have to be an actual 
interference, since a credible threat is sufficient. The focus will therefore turn on 
how credible the threat and how probable the threatened interference is. Pointing 
to the mere fact of domination is not informative. What matters is the likelihood 
with which this fact will lead to the closing down of certain options or combi-
nations of options. 
What can the republicans answer to this challenge? It seems that first of all, 
following Skinner and Pettit, they should insist that slaves are unfree regardless 
of the probability with which their masters will interfere. As Skinner (2008b, pp. 
88-89) notes: “It is the mere fact that their [the slaves’] master or ruler has arbi-
trary powers to intervene that takes away their liberty, not any particular degree 
of probability that these powers will ever be exercised.” Pettit (2008) makes a 
similar point when he speaks of “alien control” the mere fact of which, and not 
the probability with which it leads to interference, is incompatible with freedom 
as non-domination. According to the republicans, the pure negative conception 
of freedom simply misunderstands the existential situation of the slave and ig-
nores that freedom is a question of the status of the agent, and not (or rather: only 
secondarily) of their sets of options. 
Take an example that came up in this debate and imagine that there is a gentle 
giant who is reliably disposed against using his immense power and who lives 
peacefully among his fellow human villagers. According to Carter and Kramer 
the giant’s neighbours can sleep without having to worry – so why should they 
be seen as dominated and thus as unfree? To this, Skinner (2008b, p. 97) replies: 
“If it is true, as he [Kramer] claims at one stage, that there is no prospect of the 
giant’s interfering – if this has somehow been rendered impossible – then [...] the 
community is wholly free, for it is wholly free of the giant’s arbitrary power. If 
on the other hand the freedom of the community remains dependent, as Kramer 
says at another stage, on the disposition and inclinations of the giant, then a re-
publican will want to insist that the community is wholly enslaved. If the giant 
could interfere at will and with impunity, then the community remains in his 
power; and the essence of the republican argument is that living in such a state of 
subjection is equivalent to living in servitude.” 
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In order to be free it is therefore not enough to make this sort of dominating 
interference unlikely, its possibility has to be ruled out: “The point is not just to 
make arbitrary interference improbable; the point is to make it inaccessible” 
(Pettit, 1997, p. 74). However, this obviously raises a new problem, namely the 
realistic worry about how this could ever be achieved: Isn’t the minimization of 
the probability of dominating interference the only thing we can reasonably ex-
pect to achieve (see Friedman, 2008; Kramer, 2003, pp. 138-139)? The neo-
republican position seems to imply a fantastic notion of freedom that is difficult 
to reconcile with our ordinary understanding of social relationships. This chal-
lenge, however, need not worry neo-republicans too much: They can hold on to 
the (negative) claim that certain forms of dependence that are irreducible to actual 
or probable interference are cases of unfreedom – the dependence of employees 
on the arbitrary will of employers and of women on the arbitrary will of their 
husbands are paradigmatic examples – without subscribing to the unrealistic  
ideal of a state of perfect freedom. Such a state in which the possibility of depen-
dencies of this sort would be ruled out once and for all is, indeed, hardly imagin-
able. Although it might be the case that all we can do is reduce the probability 
with which agents can get into a position that allows them to dominate others, 
the existence of certain positions of this type – the slave-holder, the colonial 
master, the tyrannical husband and employer – is incompatible with the freedom 
of those subject to such forms of dependence because it is incompatible with 
their status as free citizens. 
 
 
NON-ARBITRARINESS AND DEMOCRATIC SELF-RULE 
 
After having sketched a defence of the first core thesis associated with the neo-
republican concept of freedom as non-domination as spelled out by Pettit, I now 
move on to the second thesis and a different kind of critique. As we saw, accord-
ing to the second thesis, freedom requires the absence of the possibility of arbi-
trary interference. We also saw that there are two conditions for non-arbi-
trariness, one procedural and one substantial. Correspondingly, an interference is 
arbitrary, if it depends on the will of an individual or specific individuals and 
does not track the interests and opinions of those subject to the interference. This 
means that it is not dependence as such that is the problem but dependence on 
the arbitrary will of someone else (or arbitrary dependence on the will of some-
one else). Arbitrariness thus becomes the central concern, and this concern also 
guides the search for institutional remedies that aim at preventing such forms of 
dependence from arising.  
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It seems to follow from this that I am not unfree if the norms I am subjected 
to are not the result of a political process in which I was able to participate as 
long as they are the result of a process that minimizes or excludes the influence 
of the arbitrary will of others and that tracks my (considered) interests and       
opinions in a way that is controllable and contestable. As Pettit (1997, p. 184, 
my emphasis) himself puts it:  
 
“The promotion of freedom as non-domination requires, therefore, that something be done 
to ensure that public decision-making tracks the interests and the ideas of those citizens 
whom it affects; after all, non-arbitrariness is guaranteed by nothing more or less than the 
existence of such a tracking relationship. The decision-making must not represent an im-
position of their will on us, as the citizens are likely to think about the matter. It must be a 
form of decision-making which we can own and identify with: a form of decision-making in 
which we can see our interests furthered and our ideas respected.”  
 
Pettit thus seems to assume that there is no intrinsic relation between the genesis 
and the validity of a norm beyond the demand that the procedure reduce the in-
fluence of the arbitrary will of others on the norm that is its result. In this frame-
work, the tracking of interests and the possibility of ex-post contestation take the 
place of ex-ante participation – i.e. participation in the process of norm-making 
itself. 
On this basis it is not difficult to see why Pettit’s neo-republicanism is of an 
essentially liberal-constitutionalist type. Although he understands freedom in 
terms of a status that is fundamentally relational, he tends to construe this status 
and its institutional presuppositions and implications in a way that does not 
adequately account for the strong link between freedom and democratic partici-
pation. One might respond that Pettit’s idea of control can provide an answer to 
this worry since it requires that those subject to potential interference are “in 
control.” A closer look, however, reveals that “to be in control” of an inter-
ference means, for Pettit, that this interference is guided by one’s interests and 
not by the arbitrary will of others. Without losing its efficacy and its freedom-
enhancing role, control can remain purely virtual as long as it can be activated if 
problems arise from the perspective of those who are virtually in control – or so 
Pettit claims. Control is virtual insofar as it is not activated: “It involves standing 
back while some other agency actively controls the process but assuming a dis-
position to amend what the active controller does, should the outcome not prove 
satisfactory” (Pettit, 2006, p. 302).  
This distinction between active and virtual control is mirrored in his distinc-
tion between authorial and editorial control. While an author has active control 
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over the text she is writing, the control exercised by an editor is virtual: She can 
simply accept the text or reject it, but she also has the authority to make certain 
editorial changes. Even if she doesn’t intervene at all, a good editor can influence 
how her authors write on account of her reputation as a very critical reader so 
that they try to anticipate her reactions in a way that renders her actual interfe-
rence superfluous. This analogy is supposed to suggest that the form of control 
exercised by the editor is different, yet often equally and sometimes more signi-
ficant, than the authors’ control. Applied to the realm of politics it yields the 
following picture: While initially “the people [trust] the state to ensure a dispen-
sation of non-arbitrary rule” (Pettit, 1997, p. 8), the citizens have to be watchful 
and check – presumably via some intermediary structure like a vibrant public 
sphere – whether the state lives up to the assigned task.7 If necessary, they can 
then contest the state’s claim of having acted in their common interest. Such a 
contestation consequently has to trigger a review of the policy or law in question 
by an impartial, but not necessarily democratic body. The citizens thus exert 
“editorial control […] to ensure, ideally, that only matters of common avowable 
interest have an influence on government” (Pettit 2001, p. 163; see also the    
discussion of active, virtual, and reserve influence in Pettit 2012, p. 156). Out of 
fear of public protest and sanctions in form of the loss of electoral support, re-
presentatives can be expected to aspire to govern in the way suggested by the 
criteria for non-arbitrariness: As Pettit (2006, p. 310) puts it, any reasonable 
government will make an effort “to adjust preemptively [to the interests of the 
people] in the attempt to keep the public happy.” 
From a perspective inspired by democratic republicanism, this view must 
seem surprising in several ways. One is more accustomed to hear the argument 
that the direct participation of citizens is of no great political significance and 
that what matters are “apt decisions” from critics of republicanism such as Bren-
nan and Lomasky (2006, pp. 233-234): “[I]t is not at all plausible that more par-
ticipation in setting policy is better than less. What is important is apt decisions, 
not the number of people who toss in their (more or less uninformed) opinions 
concerning how to prioritize these tasks. [...] The knowledge that currently com-
placent citizens will not inevitably remain so is itself a spur to political actors to 
moderate their activities in order not to rouse the sleeping giant. In this manner, 
                                                           
7  It is noteworthy that Pettit does not provide an extensive account of the role of civil 
society and the public sphere in his “contestatory democracy,” leaving us without a 
clear idea about the process of democratic will-formation. This lacuna might be due to 
the utilitarian underpinnings of his theory that surface in his idea that the task of poli-
tics is to “track” the interests of those affected. 
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even the apathetic and disengaged are important political actors, albeit in poten-
tia. This suggests that the availability of avenues of access to political partici-
pation is more important than participation per se.” It is of far greater impor-
tance, however, that Pettit subjects a fundamental principle of classical repub-
licanism to a radical revision: In place of the principle that the addressees of a 
law also have to (be able to) conceive of themselves as its authors we now find 
the principle that they also have to (be able to) conceive of themselves as its edi-
tors. This reformulation points to what tends to get lost here: the very idea of 
democratic self-rule.8 
As if this would not sufficiently curtail the power of the demos, Pettit (1999, 
p. 180) goes on to characterize popular editorship as the “limited and, of course, 
indirect power of editorship” which can be invoked ex post within the envisaged 
institutional fora of contestation (such as committees and ombudsmen). In a   
more active manner it is at best exercised in an advocatory way through courts 
such as the US Supreme Court and its powerful instrument of judicial review. 
Again, it is worth noting that Pettit’s position here is much closer to the liberal-
constitutionalist case for judicial review than to a democratic-republican position 
which seems to provide a rather firm basis for a critique of judicial review (see 
Waldron 2004 and Waldron 2006). Like the liberal-constitutionalist position, 
Pettit’s position seems to be motivated by a fear of the tyranny of the majority 
which he at one point even calls “the ultimate form of arbitrariness” (Pettit 1997, 
p. 8). The institutional response to this risk, however, is in danger of creating and 
heightening the risk of the opposed danger of a tyranny of a minority – a danger 
also mentioned but not addressed adequately by Pettit. As Bellamy (2007, p. viii) 
notes: “Far from guarding against a largely mythical tyranny of the majority, the 
checks imposed by judicial review on majoritarian decision-making risk under-
mining political equality, distorting the agenda away from the public interest, 
and entrenching the privileges of dominant minorities and the domination of un-
privileged ones.” All of these should obviously be great cause for concern from a 
republican perspective. 
Instead of providing a convincing republican case for judicial review and the 
kind of limited democracy he envisages, Pettit thus tends to reproduce certain 
positions advocated by liberal constitutionalists such as Ronald Dworkin (1996) 
for whom it is primarily the constitution and the institutions that protect it that 
                                                           
8  This idea should not be understood to imply a collective self that then rules itself – 
rather, it implies that the citizens are, collectively, making their own decisions and do 
not have these decisions made by others. 
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are able to realize the basic principles of democracy. Democracy in Robes, how-
ever, is not an ideal to which republicans should light-heartedly subscribe. 
Pettit’s republicanism seems to suffer from two shortcomings: On the one 
hand, it truncates the ideal of democracy by reducing participation to the parti-
cipation in the election of representatives (the only form of authorial control Pet-
tit seems to allow for) and to ex-post forms of contestation; on the other hand, it 
limits these forms of contestation to institutionalized procedures in which indi-
vidual citizens can voice their protest in very mediated ways. This trust in estab-
lished institutions and the apparent renunciation of more active forms of parti-
cipation and more activist forms of contestation (such as civil disobedience; see 
Celikates, 2014) seems to be due to the assumption that the institutions in quest-
ion are indeed independent and impartial and thus willing and able to secure the 
interests of the citizens even in the face of representatives who might be prone to 
neglect or distort them.9 One does not have to believe in the “iron law of oli-
garchy” to remain sceptical in this regard. The whole framework also seems to 
involve a rather undemocratic shift in the burden of proof as citizens are asked to 
establish in procedures determined by the state that their interests and opinions 
have not been adequately represented or translated into political decisions. Given 
the well-known procedural democratic deficits of even well-functioning re-
presentative systems such as agenda setting and framing which are compatible 
with keeping up the liberal-democratic form, one can doubt whether such a form 
of contestation is very effective when it happens on the state’s terms (see Young, 
2001). 
 
 
GENESIS AND VALIDITY 
 
In accordance with his conception of control which already implies that the gov-
ernment, as the object of control, is an institution that is distinguished from the 
citizens who have to control it, Pettit understands democracy primarily as a 
combination of electoral and contestatory elements. On this view, participation 
and democratic self-rule are neither intrinsically valuable nor do they seem to be 
essential aspects of being a citizen. The inclusion of participatory and democratic 
elements – such as the election of representatives – in Pettit’s republican frame-
work may, of course, make it more likely that individual freedom is secured, 
                                                           
9  Pettit (2012, p.138) now acknowledges that “the act of breaking the law […] may also 
count as a mode of contestation, a way of opposing laws within the system”, emphasi-
zing, however, that opposition has to be limited to “intra-systemic contestation”. 
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and, to the extent that there is a correlation between how people get power and 
how they exercise it, the first aspect matters as well. But no intrinsic link be-
tween freedom as non-domination and democratic self-rule seems to exist.    
Democracy is called for as a means for securing non-domination, and it may 
well be that in certain policy areas it is not very good at that and, perhaps, there 
are other non-participatory functional equivalents that might do an even better 
job, as Pettit seems to suggest at times when he urges the depoliticization of cer-
tain fundamental questions (i.e. the delegation of decision-making power to ex-
pert bodies that are neither democratically elected nor democratically controlled, 
e.g. to central banks) as a means of increasing the quality of decision making and 
securing non-domination (see Pettit 2004).10 Waldron (2007, p. 49) therefore 
seems to be right when he points out that Pettit tends to regard “participation in 
lawmaking [a]s an anachronistic hangover from the liberty of the ancients, […] 
that is not part and parcel of a useful modern conception of liberty as non-
domination”. 
In this sense Pettit opts for the second interpretation of the relation between 
freedom and democracy that I initially distinguished: Participation can, under 
certain circumstances, be a facilitative condition of being free but it is not a nec-
essary or constitutive part of the citizens’ freedom. This seemingly leaves open 
the possibility of a paternalistic power that correctly tracks the enlightened inter-
ests of its subjects, envisages fora in which citizens can voice their dissent, and 
thereby governs non-arbitrarily. A similar point is made by Brennan and Lo-
masky (2006, p. 241) when they observe: “Republican liberty is compatible with 
extensive paternalistic control. Because the official requirement is to consider 
the interests of citizens, not their preferences, there is no limit to the state’s au-
thority to override individuals’ preferences, just so long as it is deemed to be in 
their best interest to be deflected from the desired activity.” This might be true of 
Pettit’s constitutionalist brand of republicanism but it is certainly not true of its 
more democratic variants. 
For these reasons the neo-republican view of freedom as non-domination has 
to be complemented by a more positive, democratic conception of freedom as 
involving, essentially, the possibility of effective ex-ante participation in order to 
                                                           
10  See Rostbøll 2008, p. 55: “For Pettit, then, whether or not a policy is arbitrary, and 
hence whether or not it compromises freedom, is a factual issue that can be deter-
mined impartially by a small body of people and, hence, without the participation of 
the people who are subject to the policy.” See also Urbinati 2010. Pettit (2012, p. 235) 
does acknowledge the potential dangers from unelected authorities but argues they can 
be checked by contestatory mechanisms. 
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account for a specific variety of unfreedom that tends to get ignored or at least 
marginalized in Pettit’s framework. Whether a (basic) norm is compatible with 
the freedom of those subject to it, depends on whether the latter have had (the 
chance to have) a say in the framing of the norm (and continue to have a say in 
its continuing application), not on whether they would or could – hypothetically 
or ex post – give their consent to it. Another way to put this is to say that free-
dom and democracy have an expressive dimension: Those subject to a norm 
have to be able to understand the norm as the expression of their own activity as 
citizens, i.e. as a result of their political practice. If this turns out to be impossi-
ble, they will rightly regard the norm as alien and externally imposed, not as a 
realization of their freedom, even if it tracks their interests and even if they can 
formally contest it afterwards. This is the basis for the claim that there is an in-
ternal link between the genesis and the validity of political norms which Haber-
mas (1996, p. 121) spells out as follows, in a way that to some might seem sur-
prisingly radically democratic: “Even if each legal subject realizes, in the role of 
moral person, that she herself could have given herself certain basic rights, this 
moral approval in hindsight will not do; it by no means eliminates the pater-
nalism of the ‘rule of law’ characteristic of political heteronomy. It is only par-
ticipation in the practice of politically autonomous lawmaking that makes it pos-
sible for the addressees of law to have a correct understanding of the legal order 
as created by themselves.” 
Political freedom is thus incompatible with uncoupling the validity of norms 
from their genesis. Pettit (1997, p. 186) therefore tends to miss the core of the 
idea of democratic self-rule by understanding it “in a modal rather than a histo-
rical way” and by claiming that “the self-ruling demos or people may often run 
on automatic pilot, allowing public decision-making to materialize under more 
or less unexamined routines.” Especially from a republican perspective, how-
ever, it must seem rather unlikely that citizens who “run on automatic pilot” will 
be able to muster the necessary political energy once they find themselves in a 
situation in which this would be called for. By being the passive observers of 
politics, a topos of classical republicanism that Skinner has brought back to our 
attention insists, they will gradually loose the cognitive and practical capacities 
as well as the motivational resources necessary for an active citizenry. 
Even more worrying than this more pragmatic concern is the incompatibility 
of the outsourcing of self-determination – the reduction of democratic control to 
editorial control of norms authored by others – with the status of the citizen as 
free and equal. As Richardson (2002, p. 71) puts it: “when public decision-
making emerges from ‘more or less unexamined routines,’ something importantly 
different is going on, namely: the people are being ruled by someone else. 
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Whether one is making one’s own decisions or is simply under the sway of an-
other is always an issue pertinent to autonomy, individual or otherwise.” 
Note that the idea that freedom not only requires non-arbitrariness, but also a 
link between autonomy and democratic participation as well as self-rule does not 
imply the (confused) thesis that by participating in democratic decision making I 
am ipso facto free. If I do not belong to the majority but to a minority in a certain 
decision, it would be mistaken to say that this was, really, my decision. But it is 
not confused to say that being able to participate in these decision-making proce-
dures is a necessary part of being respected as a free and equal citizen and of col-
lective self-rule. 
Pettit’s republic comes too close to a system in which the demos only plays a 
passive and secondary role and in which political conflicts which have been    
regarded as a productive and freedom-enhancing force by republican political 
theory from Machiavelli via Arendt to Claude Lefort are domesticated and ab-
sorbed into state institutions (see Vatter, 2005, McCormick, 2011). This alter-
native, a more democratic and conflict-oriented variant of republicanism has al-
ways insisted on the fact that emancipatory progress is not the work of elected or 
unelected rulers but of the struggles of the ruled that often have to resort to non-
institutionalized forms of political practice. It is in these more intense and active 
forms of involvement and participation, and not merely in accountability and   
responsiveness plus control and ex post contestation, that the agency of ordinary 
citizens expresses itself (see Markell, 2008). 
Accordingly, this more democratic variant of republicanism also involves a 
different conception of citizenship as primarily a positive status that individuals 
have as members of a community of free and equal citizens who collectively 
govern themselves. On this understanding, “equal participation in the collective 
decision-making process [i]s constitutive of non-arbitrary rule” (Bellamy, 2007, 
p. 218). Non-domination properly understood must thus include the effective 
participation of equals not just ex post, but ex ante. Thus, “a government of laws, 
and not of men” could still be regarded as tyrannical if those subjected to it have 
no direct say in its establishment, however “apt” the laws may be when it comes 
to tracking their interests. While for Pettit being a citizen seems to consist pri-
marily in enjoying a negative status – namely not being subjected to the arbitrary 
will of another – from a democratic perspective the link between citizenship and 
having an effective say is essential: Freedom requires not only non-arbitrariness, 
but also self-rule. Correspondingly, unfreedom not only consists in not being 
able to articulate one’s interests and to give them weight in public decision-
making, it can also consist in only being able to participate under conditions that 
have been established without one’s participation and that one cannot effectively 
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control – if I can only participate on terms and in ways that others have set, this 
can make me unfree. As James Tully (2008, p. 93) puts it: “If the rules by which 
the demos are governed are imposed by someone else, and even if they have a 
range of freedoms within this other-imposed regime, they are not self-governing, 
self-determining or sovereign, and are thus unfree.” It is this form of unfreedom 
that Pettit’s neo-republicanism is not sufficiently attentive to, due to its fear of 
populism, its focus on non-arbitrariness, and its resulting problematic, liberal-
constitutionalist construal of the link between freedom and democracy. 
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 The Unlikely Claimant 
Sovereignty and Republicanism in Hobbes  
AMNON LEV 
 
 
The mantle of republican claimant does not sit easily on Hobbes’s shoulders. 
Without exception, the principal theorists of republicanism have pointed to him 
as the main culprit in the perversion or loss of political liberty which comes to 
define political modernity (Pettit, 1997, p. 37; Pocock, 1975, pp. 370-372; Skin-
ner, 2008, pp. xiv, 211-213; Skinner, 2002b, pp. 187). It is in his work that the 
liberty of the citizen is replaced by the liberty of the subject; it is here that the 
pursuit of selfish ends replaces the dedication to public life. In this reading, 
Hobbes’ political theory represents the antithesis of republicanism. However, 
lines may not be as sharply drawn as we are led to believe by the conventional 
reading. If we consider the format of sovereign power that Hobbes invented, we 
find that it takes up republican themes, albeit inverting their sense. Under-
standing how these themes are implicated in the format of sovereignty promises 
to shed light on the extraordinary success of sovereignty as a format of govern-
ment. It will also give us insight into the nature of the motive forces that are 
driving republican theory, driving it like a wedge into the format of sovereign 
power. But before we can undertake the challenges that republicanism poses to 
sovereignty, indeed to political theory, we would perhaps do well to reflect on 
the shifts in our intellectual horizon that have brought to prominence a concep-
tion of liberty which, as Philip Pettit tells us, was lost to the point of having be-
come invisible to historians of political thought (Pettit, 1997, p. 50; cf. Skinner, 
1997, pp. 117-118n29). Rather than a criticism of republicanism, what follows is 
an attempt to situate it as an event in the history of sovereign power. As we shall 
find, this attempt will in turn require us to consider the use which republican 
theory makes of history, how it uses history and how it depends upon it. 
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REPUBLICAN THEORY AND SOVEREIGN DISCOURSE 
 
Seeing republicanism as an event presupposes that there is in fact something out 
there we can identify as republicanism, a conceptual kernel or a set of basic tenets 
that we can situate in the history of discourse on how man should live together 
with his peers. However, in the face of the, at times, considerable differences be-
tween the contemporary thinkers whose work somehow revolves around repub-
lican themes, we quickly despair of finding such a conceptual kernel. Rather 
than look for a propositional content around which the different trajectories re-
volve, we prefer to speak of a shared sensibility with certain features of modern 
political thought as the thread that runs through republican theory. Explaining 
republican theory from a sensibility shared by all members of a specific group of 
theorists will obviously fall short of the structural differences between the bodies 
of work that they have produced. Indeed, what we shall have to say in the fol-
lowing will not do justice to the different aspects of republican theory. This is 
likely to invite the objection that we are being heavy-handed in our reading, but 
this is a risk we must accept. Only if we stay at the level of basic intuitions can we 
come to understand what it is that resonates in republicanism and why it is that 
republican theorists recognize each other as taking part in a common enterprise.  
Looking at the different trajectories that we group together under the heading 
of republican theory, one is struck by the fact that they all tend to oscillate 
between, on the one hand, a critique of the liberal account of political life and, 
on the other hand, a reference to past forms of government that did not revolve 
around subjection to sovereign power. This feature of republican theory which 
sets it apart from rival positions in contemporary political philosophy has 
perhaps not received the attention it merits. We fail to grasp its significance if we 
understand the use of history simply as an ornament, at best, a supplementary  
argument. The persuasive power of republican theory hinges on the nexus 
between critique and historical reference. If the point of the republican critique is 
that the liberal account of man is reductive as it focuses exclusively on the pro-
tection of life and property, it is the reference to history which shows that the   
liberal account of man, however self-evident it may appear, does not represent 
the whole truth of his social existence. It simply represents a partial view, and 
whatever patterns of subjection have grown up around it do not reflect inalter-
able features of (human) nature.  
Judging by the resonance that republican themes have had in political philo-
sophy, this two-pronged attack on sovereign discourse has been very effective. It 
strips sovereignty of its symbolic power by showing it to be a discursive forma-
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tion among others.1 But this unsettling of sovereignty cannot be the last word. If 
it is a fact that sovereign discourse is only a discursive formation among others – 
that it has no special claim to represent the truth of man’s social existence – it is 
no less a fact that it has been the dominant discourse of modernity. For almost 
three centuries, we articulated our notions of political life and political commu-
nity around it. To find out if this predominance is coming to an end and what 
that would mean we must first discover why republican theory has proven to be 
so effective against sovereign discourse. This leads us back to the question of its 
implication. A formal condition of the effectiveness of republican theory is its 
relative proximity to that against which it is directed. If republican theory can 
unsettle sovereign discourse, it is because it subscribes to the underlying account 
of political modernity that keeps it in place. It subscribes to the idea that political 
modernity revolves around a nexus of liberty and civil community, both in the 
sense that authority in a civil community must rest on and reflect liberty and in 
the sense that civil community represents the natural horizon of liberty.  
These ideas are the foundation of sovereign power and so can be used to in-
validate its normative claim. In fact, this invalidation would seem to follow as a 
matter of course. If we accept that civil community constitutes the natural hori-
zon of liberty, the demand that we subject ourselves unconditionally to a sove-
reign power appears exorbitant, absurd even.2 It is from this sense of the absurd 
that republican theory derives its explanatory force. However, there is a blind-
ness in this deconstruction of sovereignty that arises out of a displacement of 
perspective. To republican theory, these notions of liberty are at the very heart of 
political modernity, as they are to sovereign discourse; but republican theory   
                                                           
1  In the lecture series at the Collège de France that stretched from January 7 to March 
17, 1976, published under the title of Il faut défendre la société, Michel Foucault pur-
sues a parallel strategy of historicizing sovereign discourse. By assigning a position to 
the universalist discourse of law, sovereignty is to be replaced by “a new form of 
law;” a law “emancipated from the principle of sovereignty”. The problems Foucault 
unearths as he grapples with sovereignty shall in the following years lead him to the 
development of the concepts of bio-politics and governmentality. They shall also lead 
to a turn towards existence which, to some extent, parallels the trajectory of republi-
can theory. 
2  The inability to understand the point of sovereign discourse is already evident in    
Hegel’s 1802 article on natural law wherein he dismisses its concepts as having no 
value other than to satisfy our curiosity as to the history of science, despite the fact 
that his own political philosophy relies upon the domestication of liberty performed 
by natural law. 
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ignores that, to sovereign discourse, these notions were not the self-evident 
truths we take them to be. They were hard won and their apparent self-evidence 
is the result of a painstaking process of acculturation that it is the feat of natural 
law, the format of power Hobbes invented, to have accomplished. Sovereignty 
had to overcome the millennial belief that the true liberty of man was manifested 
not within political community, even if in opposition to it, but in the defiant 
refusal to acknowledge the authority of any government that was of this world.  
If we are to understand how sovereign discourse overcame this belief, how it 
succeeded in domesticating the liberty of man, we must engage with the question 
of the theological foundations of civil authority. It is here, in this dimension, that 
we find the source of the power of sovereignty. The question of political theolo-
gy is not only essential to an understanding of Hobbes’ philosophy, as the work 
of Howard Warrender and, more recently, Luc Foisneau has shown. It is also es-
sential to understanding the critique of sovereignty by republican theory: a cri-
tique that depends upon the account that republican historiography has given of 
the genealogy of political thought. Only on the basis of this genealogy can re-
publican theorists posit the nexus of liberty and civil community as an absolute, 
thus showing the absurdity of sovereignty’s claim to obedience. To assess the 
merit of this critique, we must bring into focus the continuity of medieval and 
early modern political thought that republican theory has attempted to block out 
– an effort, ironically, of a mind with Hobbes.3 The point is not simply that we 
                                                           
3  This blocking-out is reflected in Quentin Skinner’s implausible reading of a pivotal 
figure such as Marsilius of Padua who, with no textual support, is portrayed as a 
thinker of the Italian city-republic, even if the world in which he tries to articulate a 
doctrine of civil community, making him a precursor to Hobbes, is unmistakeably that 
of medieval scholastic philosophy, as recent and not so recent scholarship has estab-
lished. See Skinner (2002a), pp. 18, 22. To fit Marsilius into the republican narrative, 
one must disregard not only explain why the civitas remains subordinate to the impe-
rial order of Roman law, depending on it for its cohesion; one must also disregard the 
bulk of his treatise, more precisely, the second discourse that contains his ecclesiolo-
gy. Various attempts have been made to dissociate the first from the second discourse, 
supposedly not representative of Marsilius’ actual views (Alan Gewirth, Cary J. 
Nederman). Recent scholarship has, on the contrary, emphasized the unity of the De-
fensor Pacis, noting its Romanist tendency, to which Georges de Lagarde and Jean-
nine Quillet pointed, and drawing attention to its proximity to certain positions of me-
dieval orthodoxy. See Boureau (2006), p. 17; Garnett (2006), pp. 52-54, 68. A more 
nuanced view of the nexus of medieval and early political thought is indicated in Po-
cock (1997), pp. 66-67, but the indication is not further explored. 
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need to correct republican historiography. The point is that to understand how 
we can talk about political liberty today, we must rid ourselves of the notion that 
it is a natural fact of modern life, a structural feature of how we organize oursel-
ves as communities. Only if we come to understand how political liberty was 
created discursively, can we come to understand how discourse continues to 
condition its exercise.  
 
 
GOVERNING THE COMMONWEALTH 
 
Only recently have we thought to raise the question of liberty in connection with 
Hobbes’ treatise on the commonwealth. For centuries, it was seen as a manifesto 
of subjection, certainly not without cause. Governed as it was by the imperative 
of putting an end to war, there seemed to be no place in Hobbes’s universe for 
man’s liberty. This impression is misleading, despite having been the conven-
tional reading for centuries. Liberty is absolutely pivotal to the government of 
the commonwealth, but Hobbes can only develop a theory of liberty in the mar-
gins of his work. In a sense, he is every bit as much a victim to the spell of self-
preservation as we are. Having constructed society around the concern for sur-
vival, he cannot move beyond the primordial situation of sovereignty to consider 
the life that unfolds within the commonwealth. Consequently, he cannot develop 
the considerations that are to govern the exercise of sovereign power. But such 
considerations exist. Having brought sovereign power into existence, Hobbes 
must show how it should be exercised so as not to be lost. This requires him to 
accommodate liberty in the government of the commonwealth.4   
What is often overlooked is that liberty does not disappear with man’s pas-
sage into society. This persistence of liberty makes sense once we take into con-
sideration the theological foundations of power in Hobbes’ work. As Howard 
Warrender showed, the foundation of power proposed by Hobbes makes implicit 
reference to the voice of God, the only voice capable of commanding in the state 
of nature (Warrender, 1957, pp. 200, 207-209). God commands man to construct 
the sovereign of whom he shall henceforth be a subject. This is the passage from 
the Immortal to the Mortal God of which Hobbes speaks (Hobbes, 1994, p. 109). 
What drives man to subject himself to a sovereign power is not self-preservation, 
as we are wont to believe; self-preservation is a duty towards man’s creator, not 
towards man himself. The constitution of sovereignty rests on an obligation that 
                                                           
4  This point has been made by various scholars in recent years. See Foisneau (2000), 
pp. 116-117; Sorell (2004), pp. 191-192.  
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wends from the innermost recesses of man’s being. The indications contained in 
Warrender’s work have been developed by other scholars, perhaps most impres-
sively in the work of Luc Foisneau who has shown how Hobbes worked out the 
idea of sovereignty in a confrontation with and transposition of the scholastic no-
tion of divine omnipotence (Foisneau, 2004, pp. 215-255, especially pp. 231-
236). Republican theorists, most famously Quentin Skinner, have contested this 
reading of Hobbes. The gist of Skinner’s argument is that no-one in Hobbes’s 
own time, neither his followers nor his critics, picked up on the theological     
aspect of his theory. To impute to Hobbes a theory that was not only without 
resonance in his own time but, furthermore, he did not think to invoke in re-
plying to his critics, is, Skinner argues, so historically implausible that, for this 
reason alone, the theological reading of Hobbes’s theory of political obligation 
must stand as discredited. However plausible it may be as a reading of the Levia-
than, it comes at the price of removing “most of the points of contact between 
Hobbes and the intellectual milieu in which he lived and worked” (Skinner, 
2002b, p. 285, cf. p. 282).  
As Skinner himself seems to have retreated from this rather excessive em-
phasis on context over the last decade, there is perhaps no need to rehearse the 
argument further beyond pointing out that Skinner is unable to maintain the line 
of demarcation between secular and religious argument, as he would have to in 
order to keep in place the republican genealogy of modern political thought. In 
Skinner’s account of the event he singles out as the relevant context of Hobbes’ 
theory of political obligation – the engagement controversy – the distinction be-
tween religious and non-religious positions tends to break down. Not only did 
the “theologians” continue to take part in the controversy, even after it had sup-
posedly metamorphosed from its initial, religious phase, but “lay apologists” al-
so continued to invoke the providence of God in support of the “very different” 
arguments which they advanced in support of engagement (Skinner, 2002b, pp. 
299, 303). 
Taking into consideration the theological dimension of sovereign power in 
Hobbes’ work not only allows us to make sense of this interplay of religious and 
secular arguments. It also allows us to make sense of what happens inside the 
commonwealth where subjection is, in fact, not total. As we have seen, Hobbes’ 
foundation of sovereign power is based on a parallel between God and the civil 
sovereign, but this parallel is not perfect. The sovereign commands as of right, 
but his right is not absolute. As a subject, man has a right he does not have as a 
man, that is, as a subject of God: the right of self-defence (Hobbes, 1969, p. 88; 
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Hobbes, 1966, pp. 177-178; Hobbes, 1994, pp. 82, 204.).5 Subjection to sove-
reign power and the right of self-defence both reflect divine injunction. Man sub-
jects himself to the sovereign because God commands him to preserve his life. 
Subjection rests on the obligation of self-preservation. But as self-preservation is 
the basis of man’s political being, self-defence is not only a right of which he 
cannot be stripped; it is also an obligation he cannot shirk. It is the last vestige of 
the direct dominion that God exercised over man in the state of nature. As such, 
it reflects a religious dimension of human existence that cannot be appropriated 
by the sovereign; the only sacral dimension of human existence Hobbes recog-
nizes. A good part of his work on the citizen, De Cive from 1641, is taken up by 
arguments to show that the political teachings of the Gospel consist simply in the 
injunction to obey ones temporal lords; faith commands nothing more than belief 
in the teaching that Jesus is the Christ; an argument Marsilius already used to 
counter the political ambitions of the Roman Church (Hobbes, 1966, pp. 281-
281; pp. 420-428; Hobbes, 1994, p. 402-410; Marsilius, 1932, pp. 4-5). As the 
right of self-defence reflects God’s direct dominion, it takes precedence over all 
other legal and moral considerations. It applies even to the criminal who has 
been justly condemned to death for his crime. Not only does he have a right to 
defend himself; he even has a right to join with his like in armed combat against 
the commonwealth (Hobbes, 1994, pp. 143, 204).6  
The importance of the matter is evident: recognizing that the individual has a 
right of self-defence poses an absolute limit to sovereign power.7 Perhaps more 
                                                           
5  I cannot agree with Luc Foisneau who seems to view the original compact as being 
founded on the unlimited power of the civil sovereign over the life and death of his 
subjects. See Foisneau (1997) pp. 300-302. 
6  The opposition of sovereign power and the direct dominion of God over man can also 
arise in the shape of the martyr, who sacrifices his life for the glory of God and in de-
fiance of the civil sovereign. Hobbes renders martyrdom political insignificant by his 
insistence that only him to whom the divine precepts have been supernaturally re-
vealed must respect them as law in the proper sense of the term, in their immediate 
form (Hobbes, 1994, p. 259). As the Son of God has already come, Hobbes can thus 
limit the category of martyrs to those who have seen Christ in the flesh (pp. 340-341). 
On this point, see Kodalle (1972), pp. 126, 155-158. 
7  The right of self-defence mirrors the sovereign’s right to punish. As all sovereign 
rights arise through authorization by the subjects, we would expect the right to punish 
to be limited by their inalienable rights. But Hobbes vacillates on this point. At times, 
he extends the authorization of the sovereign to encompass the right to punish 
(Hobbes, 1994, p. 111); at other times, he conceives of the sovereign’s right to punish 
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importantly, it also draws attention to the fact that, unlike God, the civil sove-
reign does not have an unconditional claim to obedience.8 But more is at stake in 
the question of self-defence than the limits of sovereign power. As self-defence 
reflects the persistence in society of God’s dominion over man, it imports into 
society the logic that governed interaction in the state of nature. Only this time, 
the relevant interaction is not that between men but that between subject and 
sovereign. By submitting to the Leviathan, man receives assurance against the 
threat that his fellow men pose to him by their very existence; but what of the 
threat that the existence of a sovereign power poses to him?  
As man subjects himself to the sovereign in order to preserve his life, it fol-
lows that any threat to his life from the sovereign liberates him from his bond of 
allegiance and reinstates him in the unlimited right that he enjoyed prior to his 
passage into society. On first reading, we would thus incline towards seeing self-
defence as a legal safe-guard, posing a limit beyond which the sovereign cannot 
go. This is certainly the most obvious reading. But something more is going on 
in Hobbes’ text. The primacy of the obligation of self-preservation, in relation to 
which man is under the direct dominion of God, means that the very existence of 
sovereign power poses a threat to his existence. As there is no power on Earth to 
which man and Leviathan are both subject, and as man is sole judge of what is 
necessary to preserve his life where no common coercive power exist that can 
give him assurance, his interaction with the sovereign will, if it is left to run its 
natural course, invariably reproduce the oppositional patterns of the state of na-
ture. His right to self-defence cannot be limited to certain categories of sovereign 
acts, as no power exists that can give him assurance that all other sovereign acts 
will not eventually be to his detriment. On the contrary, he must perceive every 
act by which sovereign power sustains itself as a threat to his own existence be-
cause it can be used against him. Man’s right of self-defence must be, as his right 
                                                           
as an unfounded remnant of the right of nature (p. 204). The indeterminacy reflects 
the theoretical impossibility of reconciling sovereign power and the right of nature 
once they are brought into contact. Cf. Terrel (1994), pp. 243-244; Zarka (1995), pp. 
242-245. 
8  This view put Hobbes at odds with the English royalists who denied the right to self-
defence against the King. See for example Clarendon (1676), p. 87. On the relation-
ship of Hobbes to the royalist factions, see Hoekstra, (2004) pp. 37-38, 45-46; Lessay 
(1988), pp. 63-66; Sommerville (1992), pp. 35-37; Tuck (1993), pp. 312-313, 325-
326.  
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of nature is, without limits.9 The impossibility of assigning any limits is reflected 
in Hobbes’ observation that the motive for which man transfers his right of na-
ture to the sovereign is “nothing else but the security of a man’s person, in his 
life and in the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it” (Hobbes, 
1994, p. 82). The passage confers an almost hedonistic quality on a right that is 
only formally a subject of choice. Man must not only be secure in his existence; 
he must also be satisfied with it. This shifts the perspective of the construction of 
commonwealth from the existence to the perception of sovereign power. Hobbes 
cannot alleviate the fear that sovereign power inspires by somehow curtailing it. 
Within the limits that set by the right of self-defence, sovereign power must be 
absolute. Hobbes can only alleviate this fear by instituting a system of screens 
and mirrors in which man is not confronted with sovereign power. He lives his 
life in a sphere from which sovereign power seems to be absent, even if its juris-
diction is not.   
If we inquire further into Hobbes’ construction of the commonwealth, we 
find at its centre a sphere of individual action where man is free to do as he 
pleases and where the presence of sovereign power is not felt. The primary signi-
fication of this liberty is corporal liberty, the liberty from chains and prison 
(Hobbes, 1994, p. 136). This determination corresponds to the primary objects of 
the right of self-defence: life and physical integrity. It circumscribes a sphere of 
action attached directly to the individual. But as we proceed, we find that liberty’s 
domain extends beyond this narrow definition:  
 
“The liberty of the subject lieth, therefore, only in those things which, in regulating their 
actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted [omitted] (such as is the liberty to buy, and sell, 
and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their 
own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; and the like).” 
(Hobbes, 1994, p. 138)  
 
The liberty of the subject comprises more than his life and his movements. It en-
compasses a series of contingent, yet essential aspects of human life: property, 
                                                           
9  This dimension disappears from view in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for 
whom the alienation of man’s being to society comprises the whole of his former, na-
tural state, including the biological fact of being alive which, to Hobbes, is the umbili-
cal cord that tied the subject to the man. To Rousseau, the sovereign is entitled to de-
mand that a citizen lay down his life in the interest of the state. With the passage into 
civil society, biological existence ceases to be a “bounty of nature;” henceforth it is a 
“conditional gift of the state,” one that can be taken away (Rousseau, 1964,  p. 376).  
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the choice of abode, diet, trade and the up-bringing of one’s children. The rather 
off-hand manner in which Hobbes determines the liberty of the subject should 
not mislead us about its significance. The imperative of edifying and consoli-
dating a sovereign power means that Hobbes can only introduce these aspects of 
human existence in the margins of his theory of commonwealth. They are none-
theless essential to the workings of the society that unfolds under the rule of the 
sovereign. Through the cursory indications of Hobbes we begin to perceive that 
it is not mere existence but life that unfolds within the commonwealth. Around 
the kernel of natural right – life and physical integrity – a wider sphere of human 
existence lies. The activities that take place within this arena have all been “prae-
termitted” by the sovereign; in other words, they have not been made the object 
of sovereign decision. Man’s action within this sphere is not determined by law, 
not because law has lost its force, but because it is not immediately present. The 
“praetermitted” actions fall below the threshold of law: “As for other liberties 
[than the liberty to defend oneself against attack], they depend on the silence of 
the law. In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no role, there the subject 
hath the liberty to do or forbear, according to his own discretion” (Hobbes, 1994, 
p. 143). The jurisdiction of sovereign power is unchanged; its impact on human 
existence is not. Man is legally bound to obey the sovereign in all aspect of his 
existence, but sovereign power is not manifested in all dimensions of the com-
monwealth. It is hidden from view such that man feels at liberty, despite the fact 
that, as a matter of law, he is not.  
The relationship of subject and sovereign is mediated by a triadic structure 
that can be teased out of Hobbes’ text: 1) at the core, a sphere that attaches im-
mediately and directly to the individual. This sphere revolves around the life and 
bodily security of the individual and it is governed by the right of nature. 2) A 
wider sphere, in which man is free to live as he pleases, provided that the laws 
are silent. And 3) the sphere of law, seen as the expression of sovereign will. Of 
these spheres, only the first and the third, respectively the spheres of natural right 
and civil law, are engaged in the institution of the commonwealth. They are, by 
their very nature, contradictory but must nonetheless be brought to coincide in 
theory if the commonwealth is to maintain itself. In the account that Hobbes 
gives of the genesis of the commonwealth, he relies on the fiction of the state of 
nature to align the complete liberty that is the essence of the right of nature on 
the total submission that is the essence of civil law. This does not address the 
question of how men are to live together once they have made the passage into 
society. If the existence of sovereign power is a condition for peace, it is the ex-
istence of a sphere of individual liberty unchecked by sovereign power that al-
lows Hobbes to show how natural right and civil law might align in government. 
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Within the commonwealth, the coincidence between natural right and civil law 
cannot be complete because, on the terms stipulated by Hobbes, the passage into 
society is never complete. Man will always carry within himself a dimension of 
liberty that the civil sovereign cannot appropriate. But the nexus of natural right 
and civil law can be managed so that the non-coincidence is not (too) manifest. 
A balance between natural right and civil law can be struck if society is con-
structed in such a way that, for the most part, man will not have to act under a  
direct threat to his life, nor under the compulsion of civil law. If he perceives 
himself to be acting freely, according to his own will and to his own desires, the 
existence of sovereign power will not be seen to constitute a threat to his free-
dom, and the opposition between natural right and sovereignty will not be felt to 
be a problem, even if it cannot be resolved.10 
 
 
REPUBLICANISM: A PLACE IN HISTORY? 
 
Is a society where man is free only where he does not proclaim his freedom a re-
public? Surely not. But if the commonwealth is not a republic, this place where 
man is free to “do or forbear, according to his own discretion” where the laws 
are silent” (Hobbes, 1994, p. 143), is, in certain respects, indistinguishable from 
it.11 The subject is free to direct his actions towards the common good as expres-
sed in the civil laws. He is, in other words, free to be a republican. More to the 
point, the constitution of the commonwealth means that he has good, even com-
pelling, reasons to make this choice. If he does not, the distribution of liberty be-
tween social spheres around which Hobbes constructs his theory of common-
wealth will eventually collapse and ordered society with it. This, it will be ob-
jected, is immaterial. Prudential considerations on how power should be exer-
cised cannot bridge the gap that separates a republic from a society in which   
liberty is real only as a fiction might be real. And yet, the republic still moves 
within the orbit of the commonwealth. Its movement is prefigured in the format 
of the commonwealth. Hobbes renders liberty through the use of fictions because 
he knows that the idea of political that liberty he has at his disposal - the liberty 
of the Ancients – cannot be real; it cannot be realized in the modern world be-
cause political liberty cannot maintain the cohesion of society. What Hobbes   
                                                           
10  For a further analysis, see Amnon Lev, 2014, pp. 78-80.  
11  Pocock (1975) notes the singular community of spirit that unites Hobbes and Harring-
ton, the theorist of absolute sovereignty and the theorist of participatory virtue, pp. 
397-400. 
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accomplishes by his theory of commonwealth is to introduce a measure of (civil) 
liberty into a society where (political) liberty has no place. He does so by main-
taining a precarious balance between the imperatives of order and liberty. In a 
sense, the commonwealth is nothing but this precarious balance which is defined 
in legal terms as the fact that the civil laws and the laws of nature “contain each 
other, and are of equal extent” (Hobbes, 1994, p. 174).12  
Within the confines of the relationship of subjection that opens up social 
space in the theory of Hobbes, a balancing act is carried out in which contra-
dictory imperatives are aligned. Only if we take into consideration the plasticity 
of Hobbes’ format of political thought, its remarkable capacity of accommo-
dating opposites, can we make sense of the extraordinary success of sovereignty 
as a format of government. Liberalism has been so resistant to sovereign dis-
course because it refuses to trade liberty off against something else. Republican 
theory does not. On the contrary, it articulates its concept of liberty in and 
through an act of balancing that is a strict parallel to that carried out by Hobbes. 
Republican liberty is a middle between positive liberty, the liberty of the ancients, 
and negative liberty, that of the moderns (Pettit, 1997, pp. 18-19). Pettit implies, 
rather than establishes, a parallel between the republican conception of liberty 
and the city-republic as the intermediary between the ancient and the modern 
form of political organization. But if we look closer at what he actually does 
with this dichotomy, it becomes clear that while he sees positive and negative 
liberty as attributes of distinct forms of political existence, they are not tied to 
distinct forms of political organization. Rather, they are seen as aspects of modern 
political community, the polar opposites between which society exists, and, as 
such, they are simultaneously present therein: “[The republican conception of 
liberty] is negative to the extent that it requires the absence of domination by 
others, not necessarily the presence of self-mastery … The conception is positive 
to the extent that … it needs something more than the absence of interference; it 
requires security against interference, in particular against interference on an   
arbitrary basis” (Pettit, 1997, p. 51). Positive and negative are simultaneously 
present in society; they are present in the balance that is struck between them. 
                                                           
12  This relationship of mutual containment comprises two aspects: 1) the laws of nature 
only become laws in the strict sense through the commands of the sovereign power. 2) 
Obedience to civil law is itself a dictate of the law of nature. If justice, that is, the per-
formance of covenant and giving to every man his own, is a dictate of the law of na-
ture, honouring the obligation to obey the civil law which the subject takes upon him-
self as he passes into society is equally a dictate of the law of nature (p. 175). 
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Republican liberty is this balance which Pettit attempts to translate into a repub-
lican theory of government in the second part of his book. 
The structural parallel between sovereign discourse and republican theory 
does of course not cancel out the distance separating the political communities 
which they advocate. And Pettit is right to point out that the republican con-
ception of liberty could not have been articulated within the format of sovereign-
ty. However, the structural parallel means that there is no formal difference be-
tween the two discourses. As an event, republicanism unfolds within the forms 
of sovereign discourse. The point of equilibrium is elsewhere but the basic oper-
ation is the same. This explains why Pettit can leave it to the state, the form of 
political organization that has always served as the vehicle of this operation, to 
realize the republican programme (Pettit, 1997, pp. 47-48.).13 The difference be-
tween the discourse of republicanism and that of sovereignty, which sets them 
apart as formats of government, arises out of the way power is exercised in their 
respective political communities. The exercise of power that corresponds to the 
republican idea is found in the early modern forms of government to which re-
publican theory makes reference. Crucially, it also informs the theory of govern-
ment associated with sovereign power. One is hard put to indicate how a transi-
tion into a republican form of government would change our present form of   
political organization. Most of all, the contestatory democracy that Pettit advo-
cates as an alternative to our present-day democracy looks like the 19th century 
ideal of liberal democracy as described by John Stuart Mill, only with the addi-
tion of a vaguely defined institutional set-up to allow for a vaguely defined form 
                                                           
13  This confidence is also evident in Quentin Skinner’s work, as his 2008 British Acad-
emy lecture illustrates. He proposes to reinstate the fictional concept of the state, the 
origin of which he locates in Hobbes’ work, as it might serve to support a notion of 
the common good (Skinner, 2009 p. 362). Skinner does not indicate what might pro-
pel us to believe once again in this fiction. From his account, which emphasizes the 
distinctness of the Leviathan from the ruler and the ruled (pp. 345-347) it is not quite 
clear why we ever did. If the fiction of the state was able to inspire belief, it is, we 
would argue, only because of the almost palpable presence of the people in the consti-
tution of sovereignty. The people is certainly not present in the exercise of sovereign 
power, but the incomplete nature of the foundation of sovereignty which calls for con-
stant re-enactment means that, at all times, the people hovers just above sovereign or-
der. It is perhaps not irrelevant to note that the wilting away of the idea of the state 
which becomes visible in Hegel’s philosophy – an avatar of the fictional theory, as 
Skinner notes – goes hand in hand with a hardening of the fluid nexus between the 
body of the commonwealth and its representation into stark opposition.  
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of contestation distinct from that which takes place before the courts and the 
public (Pettit, 1999, pp. 179-180). It is no coincidence that the ideal of 19th cen-
tury liberal democracy provides the best match for what we might term the form 
of republican theory: a learned battle of ideas between men, and now women, of 
substance about the most substantial of matters.  
In a sense, Pettit concedes the points, arguing that the novelty of his theory 
lies not in constitutional forms but in its practice of power. If what it endorses 
are “established institutional ideals like the rule of law, the separation of powers, 
and democratic accountability,” it supports “those ideals on a distinctive basis 
and sometimes offer[s] quite unorthodox reformulations of their content” (Pettit, 
1997, p. 172). But is this not an accurate description of the modern state com-
posed of a political sphere that is governed by law and a civil society out of 
which new forms of life emerge that animate the whole? Seen in this per-
spective, there is not much to separate the republican form of government from 
that which it is supposed to replace. It is, quite literally, a matter of opinion 
whether Pettit is right when he tells us that his “unorthodox reformulations” are 
not “platitudinous.” It is a matter of whether we feel them to be so. Contestatory 
democracy differs from liberal democracy only for those who feel the need to 
engage in contestation. The reference to feeling confers a hortatory quality on 
republican discourse; it also means that republican discourse comes up short 
when seen only as theory. We may know in our hearts that republican rule would 
be different, but we cannot say wherein its difference consists. If this failure of 
language would be inconvenient for any political theorist, it is certainly not less 
so for one who claims to bring back an essential dimension of human life that 
had not only been lost to political thinkers and activists for centuries, but had 
even become invisible to historians of political thought. 
 
 
MAKING SENSE OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 
 
The prominence of history in republican theory is not unrelated to this linguistic 
short-circuit, this incapacity to show in what sense republican rule would be dif-
ferent from the sort of rule which has grown out of the history of sovereign  
power. History provides this difference. It is in and through its reference to pre-
sovereign forms of government that republican theory demonstrates that it is in-
deed different. History serves a dual purpose: it destabilizes sovereign discourse 
and it keeps republicanism from becoming entangled in the history of sovereign 
power. In the indeterminacy that attaches to republicanism, in its oscillation be-
tween what belongs to and what does not belong to the history of sovereign 
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power, we find a structural precondition of yet another feature of republican  
theory: a feature that is a cause and a reflection of what we have termed the in-
determinacy of republicanism. If the truth of republicanism is manifest only 
within our hearts, it is there that it has its locus. This is perhaps why repub-
licanism is so concerned with meaning, more precisely, the meaning we attribute 
to political thought. Whereas liberalism and communitarianism advance theories 
on the order of things, on the rights and duties of the state and citizens, republi-
canism strives to think about political community, and promote this activity. It 
reacts against the sense that political thought has become an otiose and scholastic 
endeavour. This fear is reflected in the remark with which Skinner concludes his 
lecture on Hobbes and republican liberty: that while Hobbes may have won the 
battle, it is still worth asking if he won the argument (Skinner, 2008, p. 216). 
Common sense indicates that it is pointless to pursue an argument if the battle 
has been lost, but it is precisely this seemingly self-evident reaction repub-
licanism seeks to combat. It should matter what we do when we think about the 
conditions of the life we lead in common with others. As Emile Perreau-Saussine 
(2007) noted, republican theory is not really a political proposition; it is a call to 
action, an existential appeal to engage with the questions of political life (pp. 
109-110, 119-121).   
It is by this appeal that republican inserts itself into the landscape of con-
temporary political philosophy. Liberalism stands guard over liberty to protect it 
against state intervention; republicanism enjoins us to do noble things with this 
liberty. What concerns Pettit are not the limits placed on the exercise of liberty, 
nor is it the procedures that are meant to ensure the non-arbitrary nature of such 
limitations. His primary concern is the right of each man to relate as an equal to 
others, irrespective of differences in power, wealth, or social status. These con-
cerns are shared by liberal theorists, but Pettit takes them further. Not content 
with the formal equality of the citizen, it is his material sense of equal worth that 
occupies him.  
There is something compelling about republican theory’s insistence that poli-
tical thought is not only, and not primarily, concerned with finding solutions to 
problems of communal life; that it is also about how we live our lives. Yet, for 
all its appeal, the resonance of republicanism in contemporary political theory 
should perhaps give us pause to wonder. Teaching people to walk with their 
heads held high is indeed a noble endeavour. It must be the aim of any political 
theory to enjoin us to think and to live politically. But in a world where the 
communities that define us have stretched to include individuals whose plight 
will not be ended through an ever so vigorous exercise of political liberty, there 
is quite a bit of self-indulgence in the excessive concern with the earnestness and 
70 | AMNON LEV 
the nobility of our actions. Having to “toady” to the high and mighty, an ex-
ample to which Pettit returns repeatedly, is certainly something no man or wom-
an should have to do, but a political theory that sees this as more than a marginal 
problem has perhaps shaded over into something that has more to do with care 
for oneself than with concern for the matters of the city. The possibility of this 
drift is inherent in political life. Political life is always also a matter of sense. 
Republicanism is right to remind us of this. We may need to remind ourselves 
that we loose the meaning of what a political life must be about if we become to 
concerned with the sense of it.  
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 Materially Unfree 
Corruption as a societal diagnosis and the political forms of 
unfreedom in Machiavelli, Davenant, and Bolingbroke 
TUE ANDERSEN NEXØ 
 
 
The following essay will examine a semantic change in one of the republican 
tradition’s key terms, “corruption.” This change can be traced back to opposi-
tional polemics against the political order in England in the first half of the 
eighteenth century, polemics which more often than not were articulated through 
a republican vocabulary. It occurred, I argue, as a reaction to the very gradual 
birth of the modern state in England after the Glorious Revolution. Behind this 
exercise in historical semantics run two other, more theoretical arguments. The 
first is that a republican understanding of corruption is tightly interwoven with 
an understanding of the subjective state of not being free. The second, which will 
only be hinted at, is that the diagnosis of “universal corruption”, so called by 
Lord Bolingbroke, is semantically distinct from other attempts to describe the 
social ills of modernity. As such, it might be worth retrieving again today. 
In that sense, my essay is a late addition to attempts in the past twenty years 
to make the republican tradition relevant for contemporary political debates. The 
different attempts to revive the republican tradition have also, however, almost 
exclusively focused on what one could call republicanism’s normative voca-
bulary. Michael Sandel (1996) has attempted to reintroduce a republican concept 
of civic virtue; Quentin Skinner (1998) and Philip Pettit (1997) have challenged 
a liberal conception of freedom as absence of interference, replacing it with a 
concept of freedom as absence of dependence or domination; the Italian philoso-
pher Maurizio Viroli (1995) has argued for a republican concept of “patriotism” 
as an alternative to both cosmopolitan and nationalist currents in contemporary 
political thinking. This essay instead examines the potential in a less discussed 
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term (but see Lessing, 2011; Viroli, 2012) within the diagnostic vocabulary of 
the republican tradition. 
 
 
CORRUPTION OF THE REPUBLIC IN  
MACHIAVELLI’S DISCOURSES 
 
There is a great deal of literature on the phenomenon of corruption within the 
disciplines of economy and political science, especially within the studies of de-
veloping third-world economies. But as Seumas Miller (n.d.) – one of the few 
contemporary philosophers who has written on corruption – has pointed out, this 
literature is only rarely interested in analyzing different concepts of corruption. 
Typically, it has been defined as a form of economic criminality, the paradig-
matic example of which would be the civil servant taking bribes in order to give 
someone preferential treatment. In a classic essay with the very telling title, 
“Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” J.S. Nye 
(1990) defines corruption as “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of 
a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise against certain 
types of private-regarding influence” (Nye, 1990, p. 966).1 In another classic 
study, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, Susan 
Rose-Ackerman discusses acts of corruption as examples of “unproductive rent 
seeking” (Rose-Ackermann, 1995, p.4, but see Johnston, 2005, for a partial repu-
diation of this view); it has as its primary societal consequence a clogging up of 
the smooth workings of a wealth-producing, efficient market. This definition is 
primarily legal and economic. Corruption is an illegal act performed for private 
benefit; its consequence is the hampering of economic development and the soci-
etal production of wealth. 
This is not how “corruption” was used in the republican tradition, at least not 
in one of its most important texts, Machiavelli’s Discourses.2 However, even 
                                                           
1  Nye continues: “This definition […] excludes any consideration of whether the behav-
ior is in the public interest, since building the study of the effects of the behavior into 
the definition makes analysis of the relationship between corruption and development 
difficult” (Nye, 1990, p. 966). It is clear from the essay that “development” for Nye 
means economic growth. 
2  Earlier Italian thinkers had mentioned moral corruption as a threat to a free republic, 
but the concept is developed with far more semantic specificity in Machiavelli’s Dis-
courses (Skinner, 1978, vol. 1, p. 165). One of the few attempts to systematically    
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though “corruzione” is a key concept in Machiavelli’s analysis of the historical 
examples from Titus Livius, and in the different political lessons he draws from 
this analysis, he never defines what corruption means, nor does he explicate the 
premises of its use. From the examples in Discourses it is clear, however, that 
for Machiavelli corruption does not describe single acts and is not conceived 
within a legal or economic framework. Instead he uses it as a political diagnosis. 
Drawing on the word’s etymological roots in rot and decay and, specifically,  
upon the Greek historian Polybius’ description of the decay of the different 
forms of government (Sasso, 1987), Machiavelli uses corruption to signify a 
kind of rot in the tissue of society, in the material which the political constitution 
is to give form.3 This rot is in Discourses connected to the Aristotelian distinc-
tion between having regard for the common good and only having regard for 
private gain, but it is not just to be understood as an individual moral failing, nor 
is it to be understood as a general lack of common ethos or as the simple exist-
ence of diverging opinions or political conflict. On the contrary, Machiavelli  
famously emphasizes that conflict – in Discourses between “i grandi” and “i 
popoli”, the patricians and plebeians of the roman republic – is necessary to keep 
the republic strong and vigorous. In a passage which both shows how corruption 
is a decay of the societal “material” understood as the collection of people whose 
lives the laws of the political community are to regulate, and that corruption is 
not connected to the absence of conflict, Machiavelli declares in the end of Dis-
courses I.17 that “dove la materia non è corrotta, i tumulti ed altri scandoli non 
                                                           
examine Machiavelli’s use of “corruzione” is found in Alfredo Bonadeo’s Corruption, 
Conflict and Power in the Works of Niccolò Machiavelli (1973). However, Bonadeo is 
more interested in Machiavelli’s discussions of the causes and consequences of cor-
ruption than he is in an analysis of the concept itself. For the differences between what 
is sometimes called a liberal and a republican concept of corruption, see also Sara M. 
Schumer (1979); Peter Bratsis (2003) criticizes what he calls a “bourgeois” concept of 
corruption, but does not engage with the republican tradition.  
3  The relevant passage in Polybius is this: “Just as rust is the corruption inherent within 
iron, and woodworm and grubs are the corruption inherent within timbers, and just as 
iron and wood, even if they remain unaffected by all external sources of harm, are still 
destroyed by these things that form within them, in the same way every political sys-
tem has a source of corruption growing within it, from which it is inseparable” (Polyb-
ius, 2010, p. 378). It is worth noting that Polybius’ metaphors imply an image of soci-
ety as something made out of organic material, but nevertheless created by humans; 
speaking of societal corruption does not lead to a conception of the political communi-
ty as a living organism. 
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nuocono; dove la è corrotta, le leggi bene ordinate non giovano, se già non sono 
mosse da uno che con una estrema forza le faccia osservare, tanto che la material 
diventi buona.” (Machiavelli, 1997, p. 244); “when the material is not corrupt, 
tumults and other troubles do no harm, but, when it is corrupt, good legislation is 
of no avail unless it be initiated by someone in so extremely strong a position 
that he can enforce obedience until such time as the material has become good” 
(Machiavelli, 1997, p. 159). 
How should we then understand this decay of the social fabric? I would like 
here to turn to an early essay, “Civic Humanism and its Role in Anglo-American 
Thought,” by J.C.A. Pocock. In this essay Pocock tries to articulate the meaning 
of corruption in the writings of Machiavelli and his contemporary Francesco 
Guicciardini. First of all, Pocock writes that they both understand corruption as 
the absence of civic virtue. But this absence is understood as more than the indi-
vidual citizen’s inner lack of a moral compass, his inner choice to disregard the 
common good of the republic. On the contrary, civic virtue is dependent upon 
the fact that citizens are equal to one another; its absence, correspondingly, is 
caused by relations of inequality in the social fabric of the republic: “To lose 
one’s due share of authority, or to have more than one’s due, amounted to a loss 
of virtue, and since virtue consisted in a relation between equals its loss was not 
private but mutual” (Pocock, 1971, p. 89; see also Pocock, 1975, p. 184). 
That corruption also entails a mutual loss of civic virtue can and I think 
should be understood in two ways: one weak, which regards the individual con-
sequences of intersubjective inequality; one strong, which regards the political 
consequences of it. The development of one’s “civic virtue,” understood as a 
property of the individual, is dependent upon the fact that you are enmeshed in 
relations between equals. Only then are you able to identify with your co-
citizens, only then are you free to identify with the common interests of the poli-
tical community. But, at the same time, Pocock assumes – like Hannah Arendt – 
that Machiavelli’s concept of “virtù” has as much to do with “virtuosity,” the 
ability to act quickly and adequately, to navigate difficult circumstances, as it 
has to do with moral virtue (Arendt, 2006, p. 151). A virtuous republic is not 
(just) a republic whose citizens are morally virtuous, it is also a republic which 
possesses virtuosity. Understood this way, civic virtue can be recognized as the 
ability of a political community to act adequately, to navigate difficult circum-
stances. It is the republic’s ability to uphold itself as a free political community 
within the vicissitudes of secular time. 
According to Pocock, Machiavelli thus has a threefold understanding of civic 
virtue. It is a moral compass, but it is also dependent upon the way the individual is 
positioned within intersubjective relations, and it is also connected to a diagnosis 
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of the health of the political community as such. This is mirrored in Pocock’s de-
scription of the civic humanist understanding of corruption: 
 
“[Corruption is] first, the degenerative tendency to which all particular forms of govern-
ment are prone; second, the specific cause of that degeneration, which is the dependence 
of some men upon other men when they should be depending upon all and upon them-
selves; and third, the moral degeneration of the individual who, in these circumstances, is 
prevented from developing his virtue by identifying his particular good with the good of 
all. The climax of this corruption arrives when he finds his world controlled by an irra-
tional Fortune instead of by the virtue of political man. Time, which cannot be conceptual-
ized as qualitative change, is now in command.” (Pocock, 1971, p. 88) 
 
Like civic virtue, corruption is scalable at a subjective, an intersubjective, and an 
institutional level. At each level it is the antithesis of civic virtue. Furthermore, 
Pocock gives the intersubjective level precedence – it is the cause both of the  
individual’s “moral degeneration” and of the “degenerative tendency” of the 
forms of government.  
In the ideally virtuous republic the citizens are equal in the sense that they 
are only dependent upon themselves and upon the political community in its to-
tality, Pocock writes. In the republican tradition this has often been articulated as 
the fact that the res publica should be governed not by men, but by laws, which 
the citizens themselves have chosen or at least consented to. But Pocock’s exact 
formulation does not point toward the form and structure of government. It      
relates to the tissue of intersubjective relations. This tissue is corrupt when it is 
dominated by relations of dependency, which give some men unbridled power 
over other men, and leave these other men unfree, at least if we accept the argu-
ment by Quentin Skinner (1998) and Philip Pettit (1997, p. 21cc), namely that a 
fundamental premise in republican thought is the definition of freedom as non-
dependency or non-domination. Both Skinner and Pettit understand domination 
as a consequence of unbridled inequality, of relations of dependency leading to 
situations where the powerless are forced to constantly take the interest and   
demands of the powerful into consideration. This means that they are not free to 
follow their own interests, but also that they are not free to take into regard the 
common good. However, neither Pettit nor Skinner connects this analysis of 
what it means to not be free with the republican concept of corruption. In my   
interpretation, corruption for Machiavelli is a diagnosis of political unfreedom 
understood materially, as a phenomenon regarding not the formal rights of the 
citizen or the structures and procedures of the government, but the interpersonal 
relations which in a sense precede the political forms – our laws and institutions 
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– which are, at least in the public, political realm, to be given form by our laws 
and institutions. In such an interpretation one should note that the “materia” of 
the republic is not its population understood as an aggregate of individuals, but 
its population understood as individuals always already enmeshed in intersubjec-
tive relations. To follow the vocabulary of Pettit, a republican concept of corrup-
tion entails an anthropology, which is neither collectivistic nor atomistic, but   
rather holistic (Pettit, 1993, p. 166). 
It is these relations of inequality which cause both institutional and moral 
degradation. How this happens can be seen in an example from Discourses I.18, 
where Machiavelli discusses the Roman way of choosing consuls and more gen-
erally how a corrupted material can subvert the structures of government: 
 
“Non dava il popolo romano il consolato e gli altri primi gradi della città, se non a quelli 
che lo domandavano. Questo ordine fun nel principio buono, perché e’ non gli domanda-
vano se non quelli cittadini che se ne giudicavano degni, ed averne la repulsa era ignomi-
nioso; sí che, per esserne giudicati degni, ciascuno operava bene. Diventò questo modo, 
poi, nella città corrotta, perniziosissimo: perché non quelli che avevano piú virtú, ma quel-
li che avevano piú potenza, domandavano i magistrati e gl’impotenti, comecché virtuosi, 
se ne astenevano di domandarli per paura.” (Machiavelli, 1997, p. 246) 
 
“The Roman people had never given the consulate or any other important office in the city 
except to such as had applied for the post. This institution was at the outset good, because 
only such citizens applied for posts as judged themselves worthy to fill them, and to be re-
jected was looked upon as ignominious; so that everybody behaved well in order to be 
judged worthy. This procedure, when the city became corrupt, was extremely harmful; be-
cause not only those who had more virtue, but those who had more power, applied for 
magistracies, and the powerless, though virtuous, refrained from applying through fear.” 
(Machiavelli, 1970, pp. 161-162) 
 
In the corrupted city filled with people with too much and too little power, a 
once good institution degenerates so that the powerful apply for positions they 
are not suited for and the virtuous dare not apply out of fear. As Pocock empha-
sizes, an individual enmeshed within a corrupt social tissue cannot live in any 
meaningful way, and therefore cannot see himself as a free and equal citizen. He 
cannot develop his virtue by identifying his own interests with the common 
good. Whereas those with too much power become deluded by arrogance and 
ambition, by their regard for their own particular fate, the powerless become 
fearful and servile. They are forced to constantly track the interests of those par-
ticular persons above them, and are therefore not able to act according to their 
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moral compass.4 The result is the degeneration, or, more precisely, the sub-
version of a governmental form: the procedure through which consuls and other 
magistrates are chosen. 
One can ask, however, whether Machiavelli actually insists on giving the   
intersubjective scale causal precedence. Many formulations in Discourses point 
instead to a kind of interdependence between the three levels. “Cosí come gli 
buoni costume, per mantenersi, hanno bisogno delle leggi; cosí le leggi, per os-
servarsi, hanno bisogno di buoni costume,” (“just as for the maintenance of good 
customs laws are required, so if laws are to be observed there is need of good 
customs”) Machiavelli writes in a discussion of the impossibility of rectifying 
“una città corrotissima” (1997, p. 245; Machiavelli, 1970, p. 160). In other in-
stances it seems that the degeneration of individual morality is named as a cause 
of corruption rather than its consequence. This seems to be the case, for instance, 
in Machiavelli’s discussions of luxury. It would be more precise, then, to think 
of the three scales as interdependent. It is possible for imbalances in the institu-
tional structure of a polity or corrupt moral norms to produce social inequality, 
and thus corrupt the social tissue. 
There is also something slightly misleading in Pocock’s formulation at the 
end of my quote. Superficially, its meaning is clear: just as civic virtue is an    
index of the ability to cope with secular change, corruption produces an inability 
to withstand change, an inability to be in command of one’s own fate. But that 
the subject of this inability is “political man” is simultaneously a fruitful and a 
not very precise suggestion. For even though Machiavelli doesn’t exactly ignore 
the subjective experience of life within a corrupt state – the ending of Discourses 
I.10 is as much an indictment of corruption as it is an indictment of tyranny – his 
main focus in Discourses is upon how to establish and maintain a free republic 
in secular time. Corruption, understood as a kind of rot in the tissue of society, is 
only discussed in order to analyze such a republic’s material condition of possi-
bility. In fact, rather than making all constitutional forms unstable – which is 
what Pocock with an allusion to Polybius suggests: corruption is “the degene-
rative tendency to which all particular forms of government are prone” – in Dis-
courses corruption is uniquely connected with the transition from republic to 
                                                           
4  This aspect of not being free is only hinted at by Philip Pettit in his first major discus-
sion of freedom as non-domination (see Pettit, 1997, p. 61), but is explicitly spelled 
out in his later restatement of his position in the essay “Connecting the Dots”. He also 
makes it clear why this becomes visible through a definition of freedom and its oppo-
site as non-domination and domination: it is often in order to avoid interference that 
the powerless are forced to track the interests of the powerful (Pettit, 2006, p. 306).  
80 | TUE ANDERSEN NEXØ 
monarchy or tyranny. In Discourses I.55 Machiavelli writes that the provinces of 
Naples, the Papal States, the Romagna, and Lombardy are inherently corrupt, 
both because the inhabitants are prone to idle luxury, and because many power-
ful nobles have retainers and other people who are beholden to them. Therefore, 
they are “al tutto inimico d’ogni civilità” (“entirely inimical to any form of civic 
government”): 
 
“La ragione è questa, che dove è tanto la materia corrotta che le leggi non bastano a fre-
narla, vi bisogna ordinare insieme con quelle maggior forza; la quale è una mano regia che 
con la Potenza assoluta ed eccessiva ponga freno alla eccessiva ambizione e corruttela de’ 
potenti.” (Machiavelli, 1997, p. 311) 
 
“The reason for this is that, where the material is so corrupt, laws do not suffice to keep it 
in hand; it is necessary to have, besides laws, a superior force, such as appertains to a 
monarch, who has such absolute and overwhelming power that he can restrain excesses 
due to ambition and the corrupt practices of the powerful.” (Machiavelli, 1970, p. 246) 
 
Absolute monarchy, where one man rules beyond any law, seems to be the ade-
quate political form to a corrupt societal tissue, where men are not equal, but 
everyone is enmeshed in particular relations of inequality. But would such a 
monarchy be stable? Would it be able to cope with the contingencies of secular 
time? A possible answer is given in a short discussion from Discourses I.17. The 
subject is, again, whether a corrupt people can establish a free republic: 
  
“E debbesi presopporre per cosa verissima, come che quell principe con tutta la sua stirpe 
si spenga, mai non si può ridurre libera; anzi conviene che l’un principe spenga l’altro; e 
sanza creazione d’uno nuovo signore non si posa mai, se già la bontà d’uno, insieme con 
la virtù, non la tenesse libera; ma durerà tanto quella libertà, quanto durerà la vita di 
quello.” (Machiavelli, 1997, p. 243) 
 
“It should be assumed, then, as a basic and established principle, that to a state which has 
been under a prince and has become corrupt, freedom cannot be restored even if the prince 
and the whole of his stock be wiped out. On the contrary, what will happen is that one 
prince will wipe out another, and without the creation of a new lord it will never settle 
down unless indeed the goodness of some one man, conjoined with virtue, should keep it 
free. Such freedom, however, will last only as long as he lives.” (Machiavelli, 1970, pp. 
157-158) 
 
MATERIALLY UNFREE | 81 
As the adequate form of a corrupted societal tissue, absolute monarchy – or tyr-
anny – seems to rise from its own the ashes. In that sense, it is both constantly 
changing and strangely stable. If nothing else, passages like these show how far 
from Polybius Machiavelli’s conception of the relationship between corruption 
and political decay really is. 
But, even though the introduction of “political man” seems misleading, it is 
also potentially fruitful. The experience of life as a subject within a corrupt soci-
ety might only be passed in glancing by Machiavelli, but it could be developed 
in ways that not only point to questions of fearfulness and arrogance, but also to 
questions of temporality. This is one of the semantic developments which hap-
pened in early eighteenth century England. 
 
 
ENGLAND, FINANCE, CORRUPTION 
 
It is well known that a republican concept of corruption played an important role 
for the political opposition against the English monarchy in the decades after the 
Glorious Revolution. There has been relative scarcity, however, in actual anal-
yses of what corruption meant in the polemical texts of the period. Even though 
it is generally acknowledged to be used as part of an attack against a specific set 
of governmental practices and institutional innovations, for some reason it is also 
generally assumed that grumblings about societal or political corruption in early 
eighteenth century English texts are part of a more or less nostalgic attack 
against the transformation of eighteenth century England into a wealthy, but   
socially differentiated, commercial society.5 
                                                           
5  This is the case in what is still the most thorough examination of the use of corruption 
in post-interregnum English republicanism, chapter 12-14 in J.G.A. Pocock’s The 
Machiavellian Moment. Pocock emphasizes that corruption is used to criticize the 
consequences of the establishment of the national debt and the emergence of “paper 
credit” as a regular feature of society, and also emphasizes that it is connected to an 
analysis of how paper credit allows the executive to bribe members of parliament. But 
at the same time he repeatedly connects corruption to attacks upon a commercial soci-
ety where cultural and social differentiation threatens archaic republican virtue. The 
germ of this – in my view, misunderstood – reading is found in his analysis of Machi-
avelli’s attacks upon the professional army (Pocock 1975, p. 200). But Machiavelli 
does not criticize the professional soldier simply because he is an index of societal 
specialization – in that case he might as well have attacked professional cloth-makers 
– he finds him problematic because the army is the ultimate source of political power 
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I want to challenge this last part of the argument. Drawing on an often ex-
plicitly Machiavellian vocabulary, these texts should instead be seen as attempts 
to diagnose the political problems inherent in, and the societal consequences of, 
what John Brewer (1989) coined the birth of the English “fiscal-military state” 
(see also Scott, 2000). As such, subtle, but important changes in their use of 
“corruption” can be traced. Corruption was still understood as decay in the socie-
tal tissue. The interplay between institutional form, intersubjective relations of 
dependency, and moral degradation was repeatedly stressed. But even though 
eighteenth century English writers still used corruption to diagnose how private 
relations of dependency subverted the political constitution and the nation’s abil-
ity to act forcefully, at the same time the concept gradually disconnected itself 
from tyranny and absolute monarchy as political forms. In fact, it was no longer 
used to analyze the movement from one constitutional form to the other. Instead, 
it was used to describe the consequences of a new type of power that had to do 
with the economic heft of the state apparatus. It was used to discuss how the  
administration of taxation, the establishment of salaried positions within the army, 
and the establishment of the national debt led to a kind of imbalance between the 
parts of England’s mixed constitution, and also to a deformation of the relation-
ship between citizen and government. It became, one could say, a key term in the 
diagnosis of societal life in a nation where the citizens were dependent upon a 
state which is almost, but never quite, modern. At the same time, the texts in-
creasingly glanced at the subjective experience of societal corruption. Ironically, 
Pocock’s “political man,” who was not very prominent in Machiavelli, is found 
in these later texts. 
Since questions about state finances and military power were closely con-
nected in the late seventeenth century, it comes as no surprise that references to 
corruption show up in pamphlets from the 1670s, 1680s, and 1690s whose main 
focus is the absolutist threat inherent in the establishment of a standing army  
under monarchic command. It is perhaps more surprising that there is scarcely 
any difference in the arguments of these pamphlets before and after the Glorious 
Revolution. In texts such as Andrew Marvell’s An Account of the Growth of 
Popery and Arbitrary Government (1677), Algernon Sidney’s Discourses Con-
cerning Government (1681), Robert Molesworth’s An Account of Denmark as it 
was in 1692 (1694), John Trenchard’s An Argument, Shewing that a Standing 
Army is Inconsistent with A Free Government, and absolutely destructive to the 
Constitution of the English Monarchy (1997), and in Andrew Fletcher’s A Dis-
                                                           
(See also M. M. Goldsmith, 1991; Nicholson, 1996; Pocock, 1971, esp. page 93; 
Worden, 1991, 1994).  
MATERIALLY UNFREE | 83 
course of Government with Relation to Militias (1698) the analysis of what Po-
cock has called corruption by the executive is wholly subservient to the fear that 
an English monarch will use the power of a standing army to change the English 
constitution (Pocock 1975, p. 420). Only intermittently, the army and the court are 
seen, not as the institutions of sovereign power, but rather as institutions that grant 
the monarch too much economic influence over his parliament and his subjects. 
This changes with Charles Davenant’s two satirical pamphlets, The True Pic-
ture of a Modern Whig from the summer of 1701 – which was quickly printed in 
6 editions – and Tom Double Return’d out of the Country: Or, the True Picture 
of a Modern Whig, set forth in a Second Dialogue from 1702.6 According to 
these pamphlets, the English constitution was not threatened by a standing army, 
but by a set of new financial instruments invented to administer the public debt. 
This debt exploded after the Glorious Revolution, mainly because William III 
engaged England in a protracted and costly war against France, leading to a tri-
pling of governmental expenditure in the decades following the revolution, sharp 
rises in taxation, and the introduction of new types of financial instruments to 
borrow money (Brewer 1989; Dickson 1967; see also Harris 2007, p. 491). After 
1688, the English parliament borrowed money through state lotteries and the 
selling of annuities, both of which produced paper credit, which could be resold 
thus creating a market for “paper money.” The security for these papers lay in 
the revenue from future taxation, effectively forcing the hand of later parlia-
ments. Furthermore, in 1694, the Bank of England was established in order to 
lend money to the English government. From 1695 to 1700 a group of Whig no-
blemen, Davenant’s “modern Whigs” – who had been active in the ousting of 
James II, but had now, as they held positions at William III’s court, become 
much less beholden to the principles of pre-revolution Whiggism – dominated 
the cabinet of William III. 
Tom Double, the very energetic anti-hero of Davenant’s two satirical pamph-
lets – his interlocutor Mr. Whiglove is mainly there to ask questions and listen, 
both are called “under-spur-leathers to the late Ministry” on the title page of A 
                                                           
6  Though not as well known as many of the other neo-Machiavellian writers in seven-
teenth and eighteenth century England, Davenant was one of the leading political and 
economic thinkers of his day. According to Pocock (1975, p. 436cc) economic activity 
– trade – was seen by Davenant as something that both strengthened and corrupted the 
political nation; Pocock does not, however discuss what corruption meant for Daven-
ant. Kustaa Multamäki (1997, p. 67cc) insists on the continuity between Davenant’s 
and Machiavelli’s concepts of corruption. He does not examine the semantic changes 
occurring in Davenant’s pamphlets.  
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True Picture of a Modern Whig – willingly admits to have been part of every 
corrupt practice of the government since the revolution. He has sold positions at 
court for money, clipped money as a collector of taxes, attempted to buy an elec-
tion in order to become member of parliament, and was and is deeply involved in 
the buying and selling of governmental papers of credit. Through these, he 
boasts, the whole of London – but not the countryside, alas – has been corrupted. 
They have invested in governmental debt and are now committed to defending 
the policies of the modern Whigs: 
 
“[R]esolving, as we always did, to play a corrupt Game, it was highly necessary for us to 
form to our Selves a Strength that at all times might protect us in the Thefts and Depreda-
tions we propos’d to make upon the Publick; and could we have braver or bolder Troops 
to Fight in our Defence, than as it were an Army of Men with their Pockets full of Bank-
Bills, Bank Stock, Malt and Lottery Tickets, Exchequer Bills, East India Stock, and who 
bore in their Hands Tallies instead of Staves and Truncheons?” – “having dipt London so 
deply in all these Loans; for the great Affection our Friends bear to their Tallies, Stocks, 
and Riches of the like kind in which they abound, subjects ‘em entirely to our direction, 
and makes ‘em have no more concern for the Publick of England, than they have for the 
Publick of Japan.” (Davenant, 1701, pp. 39, 42. See also Davenant, 1702, page 26.) 
 
The economic dependence of those who invest in government debt forces them 
to track the interest of those in power, and not the interests of the nation. But 
since the people are also members of the electorate, and thus not entirely power-
less – formally, they decide who should sit in parliament – it is necessary for the 
corrupt politicians to court them and track their interests, too.7 Enmeshed in cor-
rupt, interpersonal relations, not only are the powerless dependent on the power-
ful, but the powerful turn out to be dependent upon the powerless, as well, thus 
not only unwilling to, but in a sense also unable to, follow the laws of the coun-
try or, for that matter, take regard of the common good. They are also unable to 
control their own fate, something that might have to do with the fact that Daven-
ant wrote at a moment where the Whig “cabal” had just been ousted from power. 
In fact, most of The True Picture of a Modern Whig and Tom Double Return’d 
                                                           
7  See Davenant 1701, p. 34: “Every little Scoundrel got an Estate. We suffer’d ‘em to 
drink up the People’s Blood till they were out of Breath, and till their Eyes grew Red. 
In short, all Men cheated to what degree they pleas’d, which was wink’d at in hopes to 
make and secure a Party. Therefore all the busy Proling Fellows both in Town and 
Country, who hope to advance themselves, wish to see our Noble Friends restor’d to 
their former Power.” 
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out of the Country lets Tom account for the different strategies he and the other 
modern Whigs have used to keep their power and what they will do to regain it. 
But while Mr. Whiglove at the end of The True Picture of a Modern Whig seems 
to despair, Tom Double simply accepts that the future is out of their control: 
 
“[L]eave the rest to Providence: Many things may happen to relieve us, some great Calam-
ity may befall the nation; you shall see us lift up our Heads once more upon any fatal and 
publick Disaster.” (Davenant, 1701, p. 58) 
 
According to Tom Double, one strategy to regain power would be the abolish-
ment of parliament and the introduction of absolute monarchy. However, in 
Davenant’s two pamphlets the professional soldier and a standing army are not 
in themselves depicted as a threat to the English constitution. On the contrary, 
the soldiers are “brave Fellows and love their Country” (Davenant, 1701, p. 52), 
and are thus subject to Tom Double’s scorn and pity – and a source for further 
profiteering, since the English government were habitually unable to pay its     
arrears in specie. “Poor silly Rogues! their Honour forsooth led ‘em to fight for 
England abroad, but I play’d a much wiser Game, by joining with those who in 
the mean while were plundering their Country at home,” as he declares (Daven-
ant, 1701, p. 31, see also 29, 36). But just as Tom Double inverts the logic of 
public credit – one shouldn’t increase public debt in order to finance wars, one 
should start wars in order to increase public debt, he argues (Davenant, 1701, p. 
11) – he inverts the relationship between arbitrary government and corruption. 
Corruption is no longer a precondition for arbitrary government, arbitrary     
government is a means to continue the possibility of corrupt profiteering. It is, in 
fact, only because England is not yet wholly corrupted – according to Davenant, 
the countryside has not yet been entirely penetrated by the corrupt practices of 
the modern Whigs – that it might be necessary to have parliament dissolved and 
let the monarch rule “by his own will, and with a Standing-Army” (Davenant, 
1701, p. 43). 
In his polemic and highly entertaining pamphlets, Davenant argues that the 
expansion of the post-revolutionary English government and its new financial 
instruments corrupted the English polity. But his argument also produced subtle 
changes in the meaning of corruption. It made the connection between corruption 
and tyranny purely contingent: were it possible to corrupt the English country-
side, there would be no need for arbitrary government. Furthermore, the indi-
vidual consequences of living enmeshed in corrupt relations begin to change. 
Corruption seems not just to make the powerless but everyone dependent upon 
some particular other, thus forcing them to track the particular interests of  
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someone else. Corruption’s moral threat to the powerful is thus no longer arro-
gance and ambition, but the prospect of making them unfree. Machiavelli repeat-
edly asserted that a good monarch, at least for a time, could counteract the ef-
fects of a corrupt societal tissue. According the logic of Davenant, this is no 
longer a possibility. Finally, life enmeshed within a corrupt social tissue is not 
just characterized by moral degradation, but also by a certain kind of temporali-
ty. Even though Tom Double is energetic and nimble, he and his kind are utterly 
unable to control their own fate. What in Machiavelli seemed the fate of a cor-
rupt political community – its inability to sustain itself in secular time – is now 
seen as an aspect of subjective life within the corrupt polity. 
Many of these changes are also found in the polemical texts of the very vocal 
opposition against Robert Walpole, who functioned as England’s first “prime 
minister” in the 1720s and 1730s. As is well known, Walpole kept himself at 
power by using the economic resources of government to gain allies and manage 
parliament (Black, 2001). Even though he also kept England out of major wars 
and politically stable, a number of contemporary pamphlets, periodical essays – 
the most important was The Craftsman – and a series of literary satires by John 
Gay, Jonathan Swift, Henry Fielding, and Alexander Pope consistently described 
him as the orchestrator of a fundamentally corrupt society (Goldgar, 1976;      
Nicholson, 1994). At the same time these literary satires were at pains to portray 
life within the corrupt polity as utterly controlled by the contingencies of fortune, 
darkly suggesting how the English people not only willingly debased itself – 
“See all our Nobles begging to be slaves! / See all our Fools aspiring to be 
knaves!” as Alexander Pope wrote in his “Epilogue to the Satires, Dialogue I” 
(1737), a poem where the moral code of London is declared to be that “Not to be 
corrupted is the shame” – but was also, as is seen in John Gay’s The Beggar’s 
Opera and in Henry Fielding’s Jonathan Wild, driven through life by contingent, 
almost random events.  
This aspect is visible in, but not the primary concern of, Lord Bolingbroke’s 
A Dissertation upon Parties, which was published as a series of letters in The 
Craftsman from October 1733 to January 1734 and again in the fall of 1734.8  
                                                           
8  There is an unfortunate tendency to dismiss Bolingbroke’s writings as overly strate-
gic, suffused with nostalgia and/or derivative of earlier writers in the English, republi-
can tradition (See Kramnick 1968; Burtt 1992; Skinner 2002). Only Burtt emphasizes 
any semantic changes within Bolingbroke’s republican vocabulary. Bolingbroke nar-
rows the meaning of virtue down to mean support for the existing constitution, which 
are defended by Bolingbroke himself and his fellow patriots, Burtt asserts (Burtt 1992, 
p. 90). Accordingly, corruption simply means support for Walpole’s government. It is 
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Instead, Bolingbroke develops the dissociation of corruption and tyranny which 
Davenant’s text had begun. Throughout the nineteen letters, Bolingbroke struc-
tures his argument by a distinction between two types of governmental over-
reach. Before 1688, Bolingbroke writes, political conflict in England stood be-
tween those who defended the liberty of the citizens expressed – among other 
things – through parliament, and those who defended the royal prerogative and 
divine authority. This battle regarding political sovereignty and constitutional 
form, its expression open disagreement, implicitly assumed that the basis of po-
litical power was military and physical force. Now, however, the conflict stands 
between those who support the current English constitution, and those who argue 
that it is necessary for the smooth functioning of the political nation that the 
government manages parliament as well as possible (Bolingbroke, 1997, p. 95, 
186). Hence, the main threat to the English constitution is the economic power of 
the government – Bolingbroke bluntly dismisses the threat of a standing army as 
irrelevant for contemporary English politics (Bolingbroke, 1997, page 93) – and 
governmental overreach does not result in open conflict, but rather in political 
and social corruption. 
“In a word, they began to see that the foundations were laid of giving a great 
power to the crown indirectly, as the prerogative, which they had formerly 
dreaded, could give directly, and of establishing universal corruption,” Boling-
broke writes – “they” designating patriots who formerly fought the prerogative, 
and were now part of the opposition against Walpole (Bolingbroke, 1997, p. 
173). This indirect power is founded upon the institutional inventions in the de-
cades following the Glorious Revolution. Walpole’s power derives from his 
management of governmental debt, which not only allows government to grow 
larger, thus creating more salaried positions and other funds with which to cor-
rupt representatives in parliament and other politically important people, but also 
changes the nature of England’s larger economy, burdening tradesmen and farm-
ers with high taxes while letting those who place their fortunes in the papers of 
public credit earn vast amounts of money. The price for this, however, is their 
dependency upon the government, a dependency which makes them utterly un-
able to control their own fate: “The main springs that turn, or may turn, the arti-
ficial wheel of credit, and make the paper estates that are fastened to it, rise or 
                                                           
not important for my reading of Bolingbroke’s text to judge whether he was sincere or 
insincere in presenting his argument, but I do think Burtt’s misrepresents the argument 
of A Dissertation upon Parties, which pivots around the fact that corruption is a type 
of threat the existing English constitution has no safeguards against. 
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fall, lurk behind the veil of the treasury”, as Bolingbroke writes (Bolingbroke, 
1997, p. 182).  
But, like Davenant, Bolingbroke never argues that corruption will in itself 
lead to a change in the constitutional form of the nation. He does not even hint at 
the fact that it would weaken the government’s ability to act forcefully. Instead 
his two final letters continually slip into a kind of subjunctive mode, where the 
crown becomes ever more powerful and thus ever more able to manage parlia-
ment either by bribing the electorate or giving salaried positions to members of 
parliament, and where the twin threats of overtaxation and financial speculation 
lead to an ever more corrupt social tissue. It is clear that this is a threat to the 
English constitution, but it is not clear that this threat should be understood as 
the threat of constitutional change. In a somewhat confused earlier passage, Bol-
ingbroke describes the political consequences of corruption as something which 
is both like and unlike tyranny: 
 
“[F]or a prince, or his minister, to become our tyrant, there is no need to abolish Parlia-
ments; there is no need that he who is master of one part of the legislature, should endeav-
our to abolish the other two, when he can use, upon every occasion, the united strength of 
the whole; there is no need he should be a tyrant in the gross, when he can be so in detail, 
nor in name, when he can be so in effect; that for Parliaments to establish tyranny, there is 
no need therefore to repeal Magna Carta, or any other of the great supports of our liberty. 
It is enough, if they put themselves corruptly and servilely under the influence of such a 
prince, or such a minister.” (Bolingbroke, 1997, p. 95) 
 
Corruption by the executive leads to a political situation which is effectively ty-
rannical, but is not tyranny as a constitutional form. When parliament has been 
corrupted, when it willingly puts itself under the influence – makes itself depen-
dent upon – “a prince, or such a minister,” the crown can effectively reign     
supreme. But the formal protections of liberty are not destroyed: Parliament is 
not dissolved, the Magna Carta is not repealed. With Davenant, the relationship 
between tyranny and corruption had become contingent; with Bolingbroke it is 
as if corruption is the name of a different kind of unfreedom, one for which he 
has no name, but is yet not quite like tyranny. This is so because Bolingbroke’s 
tyranny of corruption is a form of dominion the subjects willingly submit to. Par-
liament willingly submits to the overtures of Walpole, the people willingly sub-
mit to the overtures of economic reward through investments in governmental 
bonds. As Bolingbroke writes in his first letter: “He that is corrupted, co-operates 
with he that corrupts. He runs to his arms at the first beckon; or, in order some-
times to raise the price, he meets him but half way” (Bolingbroke, 1997, p. 3). 
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But it is also so because corruption no longer bears any relation to changes in 
constitutional form, such as it did in Machiavelli. Instead, “universal corruption” 
is the name of a potentially permanent tension between the political form and the 
societal tissue of a polity which according to Bolingbroke is particular to the 
modern fiscal-military state. It diagnoses a governmental form which becomes 
stronger and more stable the more corrupt its citizens become. And it diagnoses 
the historical situation where we are formally free, Bolingbroke argues, if not 
materially so. 
 
 
CODA 
 
It is entirely possible to argue that Bolingbroke’s and Davenant’s polemical di-
agnoses are guided by short-sighted, polemical interests or are inadequate de-
scriptions of the changes of eighteenth century England. But taken as a semantic 
figure, their diagnosis of societal corruption does not function as an attack upon 
commercial society or social differentiation, as it has often been read. In fact, 
questions of commerce are rarely mentioned in Davenant’s pamphlets or A Dis-
sertation upon Parties; luxury is only mentioned in passing and is wholly sub-
sumed by an analysis of the consequences of the establishment of the fiscal-
military state; the problem of corruption is never that different social groups   
develop their own, particular perspective upon society. Put more generally, their    
– and the republican – use of corruption as a critical diagnosis simply does not 
relate to some degradation of the subject inherent in trade. Nor does it relate to 
any idea of homo economicus, to any idea of capitalism’s inherently degrading 
instrumental rationality. On the contrary, it presupposes that man is a political 
being – to be more precise, it presupposes what Phillip Pettit has called a “holist 
social ontology”. On this basis it designates the interplay between institutional 
imbalance, interpersonal relations of dependence, and subjective moral degra-
dation. This degradation takes on the form of having to continually track the    
interest of some particular other, to let oneself be dominated by him or her, thus 
being unable to take regard for the common good. In eighteenth century Eng-
land, it furthermore takes on the connotation of not being able to control one’s 
own fate, and to designate the state of being materially unfree, a mode of societal 
and subjective unfreedom emanating not from constitutional form, but from the 
structure of the social tissue of the polity, which undermines the freedom sup-
posedly secured by constitutional form.  
In this sense the concept of corruption might be worth retrieving today. 
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 Unfreedom and the Republican Tradition in 
the French Revolution 
RUTH SCURR 
 
 
During the French Revolution, a consensus emerged about the need for a repub-
lican form of government, even though there was little agreement as to how such 
a form of government should or could be established, and even less convergence 
on whether or not it would be necessary to introduce some forms of unfreedom 
to secure a free republic (Nicolet, 1982). Disagreement as to what exactly repub-
lican government involved – in both theoretical and practical terms – drew on a 
long established tradition of political thought, within which Montesquieu and 
Rousseau were especially important. But as the intense politics of the Revolution 
unfurled, attention shifted towards describing forms of unfreedom – constraints 
or sacrifices that might be involved in successfully instituting a stable republic.  
This article considers three approaches to the absence of freedom, or the 
presence of unfreedom, in the early republican debates of the 1790s: political, 
social and economic. In each of these spheres the question of republican exclu-
sivism (i.e. the claim that the republic is the only legitimate form of government) 
was central. Participants in the debates of the 1790s asked themselves whether it 
is possible to be free – politically, socially or economically – inside the republic 
in ways that are simply not accessible through any other form of government. 
Unsurprisingly, given the definitive collapse of the French monarchy in 1792, 
there was a proliferation of positive answers to this question. These answers 
went beyond a pragmatic acceptance of the republic as the de facto and neces-
sary form of government in the revolutionary circumstances after 1789. Mode-
rates and radicals alike drew on a rich inheritance of republican ideas to make 
sense of the practical predicament of stabilizing France and establishing a new 
constitution and government compatible with the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen.  
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In the struggle to achieve a viable form of government after 1789, fraught ques-
tions arose regarding the political, social and economic limits within which a re-
public might be secured. The Revolution began with the abbé Sieyès’s assertion 
of the inclusive nature of the Third Estate’s sovereign and constituting power, 
but before long it resolved into a series of intense disagreements about how to 
delineate restrictions to political, social and economic freedom in circumstances 
where tensions between public and individual interest were difficult to describe 
in theory and even harder to resolve in practice.  
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL UNFREEDOM: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN 
REPUBLICAN AND MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENT 
 
In 1789, no one in the National Assembly thought France could become a Re-
public. Instead, the representatives to the Third Estate, who had redescribed 
themselves as representatives of the nation, with the right to exercise constituting 
power, were aiming to establish a constitutional monarchy, in the place of the 
absolute monarchy that had existed under the ancien régime. However, between 
1789, and the execution of Louis XVI in January 1793, there was a steady rise in 
republican exclusivism. One turning point in this debate was the Flight to 
Varennes, which occurred on the night of 20th June 1791, when the National   
Assembly was still trying to finalize a new constitutional monarchy for France. 
The King and royal family who had been more or less forced to remain in Paris 
since the autumn of 1789, finally decided to try and escape to the western bor-
der, where a growing number of émigrés had congregated. The attempt failed, 
the King was recognized, and brought back to Paris in shameful silence. The 
mayor of Paris (Jean Sylvain Bailly), still hoping he could save the constitutional 
monarchy, initially tried to claim that the king had been kidnapped, but no one 
could believe it. There was uproar in the Assembly, and no one could make him-
self heard. According to Madame Roland’s contemporary account, her husband 
Roland, Robespierre, Pétion and Brissot – all by this time well established in 
their revolutionary political careers – discussed together how to react to the 
King’s attempted flight. Was this the end of the monarchy? Was a republic now 
possible – or even necessary – in France? Robespierre, with his habitual grimace, 
and bi-ting his nails, asked: “What is a Republic?” (Roland, 1821, p. 299; Furet 
and Halévi, 1996) In the circumstances, this was very far from being a simple-
minded question – it went right to the heart of the new dilemma facing France: if 
the constitutional monarchy that the National Assembly had been arguing over 
for so many months wasn’t going to work, what exactly was the alternative?  
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Thomas Paine was one of the people who tried seriously to address this ques-
tion. He did so by starting a new journal with his friend the Marquis de Condor-
cet, a journal named for, and devoted to, the Republic. In their journal, Condor-
cet published a satirical letter from a fictitious young engineer, offering to build a 
royal automaton – a mechanical king – to place at the head of government (Con-
dorcet, 1847, pp. 239-241). This mechanical King, accompanied by a me-
chanical court, would go to Mass and celebrate Easter at the appropriate time, 
would converse with foreign Kings at the appropriate level, and would cost the 
state considerably less than its actual flesh and blood monarch, Louis XVI. The 
mechanical King could sanction laws, and appoint ministers, following the advice 
of the legislative assembly. He could even be declared inviolable and infallible. 
Behind Condorcet’s mischief was his sincere belief that what was really im-
portant in politics could be rationally ordered through the principles of social 
science, and a well-designed constitution would have no place whatsoever for the 
independent or arbitrary will of a monarch (Baker, 1975; Badinter, E. and Badin-
ter, R., 1988). Condorcet envisaged that the monarch would be replaced by an 
elected executive council, responsible to the National Assembly. Interestingly, the 
famous constitutional theorist, the abbé Sieyès, saw difficulties with this way of 
reorganising executive power through an executive council. He elaborated them 
in 1791 in a public exchange not with Condorcet, but with Condorcet’s co-
editor, Paine.  
The first issue of the journal Condorcet started with Paine considered wheth-
er republican government is necessarily limited to small states. Paine thought 
not: on the contrary, the true republican system of election and representation 
was the only known, and in his view the only possible, way of establishing a 
proportion between wise government and the extent of a country (Paine, 1894, 
pp. 4-8; Claeys, 1989). He argued that the word “republic” expressed the defini-
tive idea of all legitimate government concerning a nation’s public affairs, or 
respublica. Historical examples of republics such as Holland and Venice were 
misleading and more accurately described as aristocracies: the only legitimate 
form of government was republican.  
Paine contrasted the old hereditary form of government with a new repre-
sentative form. The former was illegitimate and tyrannous in its very nature, 
whilst the latter delegated power for the common benefit of society. On this    
account, self-interested hereditary kings caused wars through their passions and 
vanity, whilst public-interested representative governments were more likely to 
transcend national prejudice, encouraging universal society as the means of univer-
sal commerce. No one could rightfully impose future rulers on later generations: 
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there was something pernicious in the very notion of personally inherited politi-
cal power.  
In the protracted discussion of a new constitution that occupied the National 
Assembly from 1789-1792, it was Sieyès who best highlighted the relation be-
tween accountability and unfreedom: i.e. the need for constraint on individual 
ministerial wills within a carefully formed executive branch of government. Sie-
yès replied to Paine in the newspaper Le Moniteur on 6 July, addressing the 
problem of monarchical government in which the king’s role is both a public 
function and an inherited position. He agreed that when the term “republican” 
was used in its widest possible sense and understood to indicate a government 
that was a respublica, (as opposed to something privately owned by a privileged 
elite), it was certainly accurate to say that all legitimate government must be re-
publican (Sieyès, 1989, vol.2, ss. 29-30) 
Yet it was equally true, Sieyès insisted, that the term “republican” could also 
be attributed a far narrower meaning than the term “representative”. In this 
sense, deciding the form of government was a matter of determining the struc-
ture of executive power. It was possible to support a monarchical rather than a 
polyarchical organisation of executive power and still be a republican in the 
broad sense of the term. Sieyès argued that the choice between a monarchical 
and a republican form of government was the choice between accountable gov-
ernment on the part of individual ministers, chosen and constrained by the will 
of an unaccountable elector (the monarch), and decisions formulated by a major-
ity who had no clear legal accountability to anyone else. There is a direct con-
nection between accountability and unfreedom in regard to individual ministerial 
wills. But beyond this there was still a question as to whether or not the role of 
the unaccountable elector could be inherited. Sieyès, like Paine, explicitly stated 
that the notion of inherited public power was irreconcilably at odds with the laws 
of true representation. It would be far preferable to find a way of electing the 
king that could combine all the advantages of inheritance (especially the avoid-
ance of civil war), with all the advantages of election. Contemporary circum-
stances, however, were too precarious to risk this type of constitutional up-
heaval. The point of Sieyès’s argument was to show the importance of homoge-
neity within the executive power. He supposed that the unaccountable elector 
could maintain unity within a plural ministerial body that was strictly accountable.  
For Sieyès, the choice between a monarchical and republican form of gov-
ernment was a choice about the nation’s use of its constituting power, and not a 
choice about the nature of that power. Sieyès thought that there was a sense in 
which Paine’s conflation of representative and republican government had ob-
scured these issues (Sieyès, 1989, vol.2, ss. 29-30). Paine had been right to    
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emphasise that the choice between a representative government and any other 
sort of government was the choice between liberty and despotism, between the na-
tion’s exercise of its own constituting power, and an unacceptable appropriation 
of that constituting power. However, the choice between monarchy and polyarchy 
was the choice between two distinct ways of structuring executive power. In this 
context, Sieyès clearly indicated his own preference for monarchical govern-
ment. In his famous exchange with Thomas Paine in 1791, he ostensibly defended 
a monarchical form of government claiming that,  
 
“Ce n’est ni pour caresser d’anciennes habitudes, ni par aucun sentiment superstitieux de 
royalisme, que je préféré la monarchie. Je la prefére, parce qu’il m’est démontre qu’il y a 
plus de liberté pour le citoyen dans la monarchie que dans la république. Tout autre motif 
de détermination me parait pueril. Le meilleur régime social est à mon avis celui où, non 
pas un, non pas quelques-uns seulement, mais où tous jouissent tranquillement de la plus 
grande latitude de liberté possible.” 
 
“It is not out of fondness for ancient customs, or any superstitious royalism, that I prefer 
monarchy. I prefer it because it seems to me that there is more freedom for the citizen in a 
monarchy than in a republic. Any other means of deciding seems puerile. The best social 
regime in my view is the one under which all enjoy the greatest possible extension of 
freedom.” (Forsyth, 1987, p. 177)1 
 
And yet, Sieyès at this time had pronounced reservations about the legitimacy of 
inherited power. He recognised that Louis XVI, following the Flight to 
Varennes, was no longer a viable component of the new constitution. And he 
was certainly aware of Condorcet’s recent, highly publicised, conversion to the 
republican cause (Forsyth, 1987, p. 177). 
Properly understood, Sieyes’s preference for a monarchical, as opposed to a 
polyarchical form of government, links his early revolutionary thought to his 
constitutional arguments in 1795 and 1799 when he experimented with a variety 
of different models for obtaining a unified chief executive inside a republican 
form of government. A remark Sieyes made in a manuscript of 1795 can be ap-
plied to the constitutional struggle in France at any point between 1789 and 1799: 
 
“Résoudre ce grand problème: comment se procurer dans un État tous les avantages de 
l’élection d’un chef sans avoir à en redouter les inconvénients, et tous les avantages de 
                                                           
1  All translations are my own unless specified otherwise. 
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l’hérédité sans aucun de ses innombrables dangers? Alors seulement votre constitution 
portera en elle-même le principe de sa proper conservation.” 
 
“Resolve this great problem: How to procure within a state all the advantages of the election 
of a head without becoming a prey to all its inconveniences, and all the advantages of he-
redity without its immeasurable dangers? Only then will your constitution carry within itself 
the principle of its own conservation.” (Forsyth, 1987, p. 182; Sieyès, 1999, vol.1, p. 514) 
 
Arguably, this was a question that Paine’s avid promotion of republican gov-
ernment, in the wake of Louis XVI’s flight to Varennes, simply failed to register 
or address.  
 
 
SOCIAL UNFREEDOM: THE DISPUTE OVER THE ROLE OF 
VIRTUE UNDER REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 
 
Montesquieu’s reflections on virtue were the starting point for the debates on 
virtue during the French Revolution. He had defined virtue within a republic as 
the love of the republic, a product of feeling rather than of knowledge. In The 
Spirit of the Laws, he described the virtues that sustain republics but are redun-
dant inside monarchies, in heroic terms:  
 
“[…] l’amour pour la patrie, du désir de la vraie gloire, du renoncement à soi-même, du 
sacrifice de ses plus chers intérêts, et de toutes ces vertus héroïques que nous trouvons 
dans les anciens, et dont nous avons seulement entendu parler.” 
 
“[…] love of the homeland, desire for true glory, self-renunciation, sacrifice of one’s dea-
rest interests, and all those heroic virtues we find in the ancients and know only by hear-
say.” (Montesquieu, 1950-1961, Part 1, Book 3, Chapter 5, p. 69) 
 
In these terms, the problem the French Revolution posed was the problem of 
finding a new definition of virtue suitable to large, modern commercial states; or 
else the problem of finding an alternative to virtue to act as the principle (or 
spring of action) in modern regimes. What constraints on individual freedom 
would be required to secure virtue inside a modern republic? Once France offi-
cially became a republic in 1792, the question of publicly orientated virtue and 
its role inside republican regimes moved to the centre of political and constitu-
tional discussion. What were the causal antecedents of public virtue? What was 
its political significance? How was virtue possible inside the modern as opposed 
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to ancient republican form of government? Did virtue have a part to play in pro-
viding a social framework within which individuals could be given both the op-
portunity to become autonomous and the opportunity to exercise their autonomy? 
How should the relation between the presence (or absence) of virtue and the ex-
istence of freedom (or unfreedom) be understood?  
In what has become the most famous of all his speeches, delivered at the 
height of the Terror on 7th May 1794 (or 18 Florèal, in the Revolutionary Calen-
dar), Robespierre set out the foundations for the worship of The Supreme Being 
in France (Robespierre, 1910, vol.10, p. 442-465). In this speech – at the climax 
of his revolutionary career – Robespierre attempted to show how the religion of 
patriotism that had been implicit in the Revolution ever since the great Festival 
of Federation on the first anniversary of the Fall of the Bastille, might now be 
developed, institutionalised and used to secure the social foundations of the still 
very precarious new Republic.  
As he spoke, Robespierre raised a question that pinpointed precisely a fun-
damental contrast between himself and those who had hoped earlier in the Revo-
lution that recent advances in moral, social and political understanding, might be 
systematically applied in designing a new form of government for France:  
 
“Le fondement unique de la société civile, c’est la morale! Toutes les associations qui 
nous font la guerre reposent sur le crime: ce ne sont aux yeux de la vérité que des hordes 
de sauvages policés et de brigands disciplinés. A quoi se réduit donc cette science mysté-
rieuse de la politique et de la législation? A mettre dans les lois et dans l’administration les 
vérités morales reléguées dans les livres des philosophes, et à appliquer à la conduite des 
peuples les notions triviales de probité que chacun est forcé d’adopter pour sa conduite 
privée, c’est-à-dire à employer autant d’habileté à faire régner la justice que les gouver-
nements en ont mis jusqu’ici à être injustes impunément ou avec bienséance.” 
 
“Morality is the unique foundation of civil society.  All associations that make war rely on 
crime: before the eyes of truth they are nothing but policed savage hordes and disciplined 
brigands.  What does this mysterious science of politics and legislation come down to, if 
not the application to the behaviour of peoples of the trivial notions of probity that every-
one is forced to adopt for his private conduct?” (Rapport du Comité de Salut public du 18 
floréal an II [7 May 1794]). 
 
These unassuming, ordinary, intuitive notions of probity first encountered and 
recognised in private life, but afterwards collectively applied, were Robes-
pierre’s direct substitute for more systematic or scientific approaches to the gen-
eral predicament of governing France at the end of the eighteenth century – and 
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the specific predicament of rescuing the Revolution. The contrast was stark. On the 
one hand, experts like the abbé Sieyès, the Marquis de Condorcet, Pierre-Louis 
Rœderer, and so on, pioneers of the social sciences who entered the Revolution 
with high hopes for what might be achieved politically through specialist 
knowledge. And on the other hand, Robespierre arguing that goodness in human 
beings is easy, not difficult, to recognise – and that such simple goodness is all 
there ever is to hope for or rely upon in collective life. 
After the fall of the Constitutional Monarchy in 1792, Robespierre became 
closely associated with Saint-Just whose conception of society vacillated be-
tween virtual anarchy and a schoolmaster state (Hampson, 1988, 1991). Saint 
Just affirmed the emergence of individual rights inside the modern republic, in 
contrast to their marked absence in the ancient republics of Athens and Sparta. 
But he also lamented the decline in patriotism and the rise of self-love, egoism or 
private interest, concomitant with individual rights. Saint-Just was fascinated by 
the role of political institutions in reconciling individual with public interest. Be-
fore the nature and implications of Saint-Just’s plethora of republican institutions 
for the moral education of the people became apparent in practice, his enthusi-
asm was greeted with excited approval by more moderate, liberal-minded theo-
rists. Pierre-Louis Rœderer, for example, friend and intellectual associate of the 
abbé Sieyès, commented that Saint-Just was someone who had outlined at last to 
the National Convention (in April 1793), the need to insert something between 
precepts and powers in the forthcoming republican constitution (JP, 25 April 
1793; Forsyth, 1989). Between the Declaration of Rights and the constitution, 
between principles and laws, there was a widely acknowledged need for institu-
tions that would shape the wills and habits of citizens in accordance with the 
general interest.  
However it very soon became clear that behind Saint-Just’s proposals for   
republican institutions, there lay a model of what society ought to be that departed 
radically from the expectations of Rœderer, Condorcet, Sieyès, Brissot and oth-
ers. Saint Just, echoing Montesquieu, argued that government should rely on a 
principle or spring of social harmony. But he also invoked Rousseau’s argument 
in the Social Contract that the Legislator should mould Man as he needed him to 
be (Rousseau, 1962, vol.1, p. 478). And during the summer of 1793 he claimed 
that if the people who had been given a patrie were not happy with it, there must 
be something wrong with them (Hampson, 1988). There was a surprising and 
shockingly short step between the view that social harmony could not exist inde-
pendently of political institutions, and the view that individuals should be altered 
to fit with the institutions they had acquired. By February 1794 Saint-Just was 
claiming: “Il s’est fait une révolution dans le gouvernement; elle n’a point pé-
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nétré l’état civil” (“There has been a revolution in the government, but it has not 
penetrated into civil society”. Saint Just, 1834, p. 215). But the penetration of 
government into civil society in any directly authoritarian sense was the precise 
inverse of the schemes for enhancing co-operation and spontaneous social har-
mony that Sieyès Condorcet, Brissot, Rœderer, and many others had tried to de-
velop before the outbreak of the Terror. 
Another way of seeing Robespierre’s decisive dismissal of social science 
during the Terror recognises the strength of his claim that the sole resources for 
securing the new republic were virtue and terror: “virtue without which terror is 
destructive; terror without which virtue is impotent” (Robespierre, 1910, vol. 10, 
p. 357). Early practitioners of social science were convinced that there were 
more reliable institutional alternatives to Robespierre’s alarmingly narrow       
account of society and politics. Sieyès and others thought that carefully designed 
representative institutions would minimize the importance of good men in poli-
tics and make even a government of fallible and potentially corrupt human be-
ings wholly compatible with the pursuit the of the common good. Robespierre’s 
fierce rejection of any such grounds for reassurance might have made good polit-
ical sense in far more peaceful times, but in revolutionary circumstances its 
power was overwhelming. What it lacked was an answer to the urgent questions: 
when (and how) could the Terror ever hope to end and the reign of virtue begin? 
How, in short, could virtue be reliably generated or constructed inside the new 
republic if it did not already exist as a demonstrable capacity among citizens? It 
is in the struggle to answer this question that the problem or reconciling Robes-
pierre the “man of virtue” with Robespierre “defender of the Terror” arises. On 
Furet’s analysis it is the language of moral politics that effects the reconciliation, 
linking the aspirations of 1789 to the later bloodshed (Furet, 1978). Older Marx-
ist interpretations looked to the embattled circumstances of the Revolution to  
explain Robespierre’s acceptance of the Terror as political necessity. These 
judgments each have some force. But Robespierre’s rejection of the standing and 
self-sufficiency of early social science, and its aspiration to minimize the role of 
virtue in politics, also played a significant part in his defense of the Terror.  
 
 
ECONOMIC UNFREEDOM: THE DISPUTE OVER FOOD AND 
REPUBLICAN RIGHTS TO SUBSISTENCE 
 
On 21 September 1792, prompted by Danton, the Convention decreed that prop-
erty rights would be “eternally maintained” (AP(51), p. 71). On 18 March 1793, 
the death sentence was imposed on anyone who dared to propose a law subver-
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sive of territorial, commercial or industrial property (AP(60), p. 292). And once 
again, on 21 September 1793 as the Terror swept over France, the threat of arbi-
trary land redistribution was repudiated. These were unequivocal rejections of 
social levelling and radical redistribution of wealth. However, the status of  
property rights was persistently questioned, and like the Constituent Assembly 
and the ancien régime governments before it, the Convention was beset by de-
mands to regulate the grain trade and prevent hunger. Those who opposed gov-
ernment intervention in the supply and demand of subsistence goods, premised 
their arguments on the view that fear of famine was both unnecessarily alarmist 
and the major cause of shortages in the grain supply. In doing so they drew on the 
long history of demands to liberalise the grain trade in France, and echoed the 
established economic concept of une disette factice (AP(53) p. 130; Kaplan, 2013). 
In November 1792, the Convention heard Fabre d’Eglantine read a report on 
behalf of the committees for agriculture and commerce, which recommended 
significant government intervention in the trading of subsistence goods (AP(53), 
pp. 130-132).2 Acknowledging the importance of property rights, the report     
argued that subsistence goods were a special case with a unique relation to pub-
lic order (AP(53), p. 131). All those in possession of grain should declare the 
amount currently at their disposal to specially appointed district commissioners. 
Working from these lists, municipal authorities could demand the immediate sale 
of grain in specified markets whenever this was judged necessary. Exportation of 
grain from France should be prohibited under all circumstances, but circulation 
of grain inside France should be unhindered. The government should take steps 
to purchase a substantial quantity of grain from abroad. This report prompted a 
protracted debate that called into question the relation between government and 
society in the new republic.  
In keeping with the history of the grain trade debate, opinion was split over 
the question of free trade. On 3 November, the Convention formalised this divi-
sion by decreeing that all those concerned about subsistence should be divided 
into two groups: those in favour of unlimited freedom of trade, and those who 
proposed restrictions on the grain trade. One side appealed directly to the argu-
ments of the économistes (or Physiocrats), Turgot and Adam Smith, whilst the 
other highlighted concerns over public order in the tradition of the abbé Terray 
                                                           
2  Fabre d’Eglantine, (Philippe-Nazaire-François) 1750-1794; poet and Jacobin member 
of the Paris Commune; elected to the Convention; a key figure in the creation of the 
Revolutionary Calendar (adopted by the Convention on 5 October 1793 and abolished 
on 1 January 1806); associated with Danton and turned over to the Revolutionary Tri-
bunal on 17 January 1794. 
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and his predecessors. The revolutionary context affected both sides of the debate 
without altering its central point of contention: the theory and practice of free 
trade. Féraud, for example, quoted Turgot’s seventh letter to the abbé Terray  
opposing the revocation of the 1764 edict on liberalising the grain trade, and ar-
gued that attempts since 1790 to regulate the domestic grain market and supple-
ment it by importation, must be abandoned before the revolution could be 
brought to a satisfactory conclusion. He embellished his argument with the rhet-
oric of violence: “Je maintiens donc qu’en décrétant des entraves, vous décrétez 
la famine, vous assassinez le peuple” (“I maintain that in decreeing barriers, you 
decree famine, you kill the people,” (AP(53) p. 435). 
On the other side, Beffroy countered the claim that the subsistence problem 
was produced by the Revolution itself. In real terms, genuine and imagined food 
shortages had identical effects, he argued, and the good of society must be up-
held over the interests of liberty and property (AP(53), p. 438).3 In rejecting the 
freedom to export grain he quoted Montesquieu’s distinction between the fruits 
of the earth and manufactured commodities: “Les richesses de la terre appar-
tiennent à chaque État; toutes les autres sont au monde entire” (“The riches of 
the earth belong to each state, and all others to the whole world,” AP(54), p. 669).  
Beffroy challenged the credibility of appeals to the économistes, since their 
theories were tailored to benefit the treasuries of antiquated despotic govern-
ments. Indignantly, he claimed that the économistes offered a system for increas-
ing the wealth of a minority when what was needed was the means of providing 
subsistence for all. If the price of grain could be kept as low as possible, farmers 
and landowners would not become rich, but this was a small price to pay for nat-
ural justice: “Les mœurs y gagneront: le riche aura quelques plats de moins sur 
sa table, mais le pauvre mangera du pain. Tout le monde vivra.” (“Mores will 
gain: the rich will have fewer dishes on the table, but the poor shall eat bread. 
Everyone will live,” AP(54), p. 670) 
Fayau went further in claiming that speculators on the value of subsistence 
goods must be eradicated from the republic.4 For him, the rich and poor were 
two separate nations at war in France: 
 
                                                           
3  Beffroy (Louis-Etienne, de Beauvoir) 1755-1825; elected to the Convention from the 
Aisne; voted for the King’s death.  
4  Fayau (Joseph-Pierre-Marie) 1766-1799; elected to the Convention from the Vendée; 
a Montagnard who voted for the death of the King; later sent on mission back to the 
Vendée.  
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“Je vous demande, législateurs, si vos armées campaient dans un pays où des hommes 
riches auraient des grains sous les verroux, si vos soldats, après la victoire, avaient encore 
faim, respecteriez-vous cette prétendue liberté des propriétés?”  
“I ask you, legislators, if your armies camped in a country where rich men have grain un-
der lock, if your soldiers after the victory were still hungry, you would respect this alleged 
freedom of properties?” (AP(53), p. 660) 
 
Saint-Just’s intervention was a generalised indictment of the entire economy, and 
a demand for better laws (Soboul, 1908, vol. 124). Arguing for free trade in do-
mestic grain and a ban on exportation, he insisted that inflation must cease and 
the public debt must be repaid, before the market in grain could be properly sta-
bilised. It was Robespierre, however, who offered the most emphatic characteri-
sation of the government’s role in guaranteeing subsistence for all. On 3 Decem-
ber 1792, he argued that the food shortages afflicting France were the result of 
administrative mismanagement (AP(54) p. 45; Mathiez, 1958, p. 118). He aimed 
to turn the arguments of those in favour of liberalising the grain trade against 
free trade itself: 
 
“Dans tout pays où la nature fournit avec prodigalité aux besoins des hommes, la disette 
ne peut être imputée qu’aux vices de l’administration ou des lois elles-mêmes; et les mau-
vaises lois et la mauvaise administration ont leur source dans les faux principes et dans les 
mauvaises mœurs.” 
 
“In any country where nature provides lavishly for human needs, scarcity can only be at-
tributed to defects in the administration or the laws themselves, and bad laws and malad-
ministration have their source in false principles and immorality.” (AP(54) p. 45) 
 
Robespierre associated the Constituent Assembly with the reviled policies of the 
ancien régime: 
 
“J’ai vu naître la législation de l’Assemblée constituante sur le commerce des grains; elle 
n’était que celle du temps qui l’avait précédée; elle n’a pas changé jusqu’à ce moment 
parce que les intérêts et les préjugés qui en étaient la base n’ont point changés.” 
 
“I saw the birth of the legislation of the Constituent Assembly on the grain trade, it was 
only that of the time which had preceded it, and it has not changed until now because the 
interests and prejudices upon which it was based have not changed.” (AP(54) p. 45) 
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In Robespierre’s view, liberty of commerce had been defended to the absurd and 
disgraceful extreme of using violence against the people. He raised two major 
objections against the advocates of free trade. The first of these objections was 
that trade in subsistence goods must be treated differently from trade in non-
subsistence goods, since the former was essential for the survival of the people. 
The second objection was that even if the arguments for free trade in subsistence 
goods made some sort of sense in times of public order, they did not do so under 
revolutionary circumstances. Robespierre formulated his argument in terms of 
the rights of man living in society:  
 
“La première loi sociale est donc celle qui garantit à tous les membres de la société les 
moyens d’exister: toutes les autres sont subordonnées à celle-là; [...] Il n’est pas vrai que 
la propriété puisse jamais être en opposition avec la subsistance des hommes.” 
 
“The first social law is that which guarantees all members of society the means of exist-
ence: all others are subordinate to that; […] It is not true that the property can never be in 
opposition human subsistence.” (AP(54) p. 45) 
 
The conclusion of this argument was that subsistence goods must be the common 
property of society; private property must be composed only of what was surplus 
to fundamental human requirement. Robespierre proposed that legislation re-
garding trade in subsistence goods should guarantee all members of society 
enough food to sustain their existence; should guarantee proprietors and culti-
vators of the land their returns; and should allow any surplus to be freely traded. 
He appropriated the term “circulation” for the economic system that he pro-
posed, arguing that proprietors have no right to hoard their grain since this was 
dis-ruptive of the desiderated circulation of subsistence goods inside the nation. 
His proposals for avoiding secrecy, unlimited liberty and impunity in the con-
duct of those involved with the grain trade were recommendations for the type of 
poli-cing which existed under the ancien régime. Robespierre’s appeal to the patri-
otism of the people, his request for calm and sacrifice in the face of subsistence 
shortages, was a clear echo of the eighteenth-century grain trade debates.  
On 8 December 1792, the Convention finally adopted a decree in favour of 
unlimited freedom of trade, with an important codicil banning exportation of 
grain until the domestic price was comparatively low. This project was a con-
scious imitation of the English system to which the économistes had referred so 
often. Before passing its decree, the Convention heard a long summary of the 
history of the grain trade from Creuzé-Latouche, who presented the case for    
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unlimited freedom.5 He pointed out that the attempt to dismiss the doctrines of 
the économistes on the grounds that these were invented to serve the ancien ré-
gime, could also be turned against those who proposed policing the grain trade. 
There was not a single new policing strategy that the Convention had been in-
vited to consider which had not already been tried and abandoned before the 
Revolution. In making his case, Creuzé-Latouche tried to overcome the Conven-
tion’s tendency to discuss the grain trade in terms of property rights. There was 
no doubt that if all the grain in France was owned by a minority who refused to 
sell it, le salut public would require an overthrow of property rights (AP(54) p. 
685). But this was far from being the current situation.  
Rœderer adopted the Convention’s division between those favouring un-
limited freedom of trade in subsistence goods, and those who proposed restric-
tions. He extrapolated from these polarised positions two distinct approaches to 
social organisation and the problem of inequality. The économistes represented 
theories constructed in terms of production; and the niveleurs represented theo-
ries constructed in terms of distribution:  
 
“On peut réduire tous les systèmes connus à deux: celui des économistes, qui n’ont vu que 
les dangers provenant de la nature; celui des niveleurs, qui n’ont vu que les dangers pro-
venant de l’état social.” 
 
“One can reduce all known systems to two: that of the economists, who see nothing but 
the dangers arising from the nature, and that of the Levellers, who see nothing but the 
dangers from the social state.” (Rœderer, p. 144, vol.8, 1853-59) 
 
Physiocracy was a system that focused on production and left distribution undis-
turbed. It argued that questions of distribution and inequality could be resolved 
by restructuring the production side of the economy in line with the natural order 
of things. The niveleurs, in contrast, proffered no elaborate theory of production 
but focused on agitating for changes in distribution. In his lectures Rœderer 
hoped to provide an alternative interpretation of the principle of equality that 
would be less disruptive of property. There was no doubt in his mind that the 
principle of equality had decisively buried Physiocracy’s outmoded political 
agenda: 
 
                                                           
5  Creuzé-Latouche (Jacques-Antoine) 1749-1800; Poitevin magistrate with strong inter-
est in political economy and legal ethics. See his publication of 1793, Sur les Sub-
sistances.  
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“Le système des économistes ne doit pas nous occuper un moment; encore qu’il ait été dé-
coré du titre imposant de physiocratie, de gouvernement de la nature, de principes de 
l’ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques, les niveleurs en feront justice. Ce sys-
tème tombera sous leurs coups, car leurs principes sur l’égalité sont excellents; ce sont les 
conséquences qu’ils en infèrent qui sont mauvais […]” 
“The system of the economists should not occupy us for a moment, even though it was 
awarded the imposing title of Physiocracy, government of nature, the principles of natural 
order and essential political societies, the levelers will do it justice. This system will fall 
under their blows, because their principles of equality are excellent, it is the consequences 
they infer which are bad […]” (Rœderer, vol.8, p.145, 1853-59)  
 
Before 1789, the Physiocratic notion of linking political rights to the ownership 
of land seemed a viable project. Rœderer, however, had already rejected it in his 
revolutionary pamphlet of 1788, De la Députation aux Etats Généraux (Rœderer, 
vol.7, pp.558-574, 1853-59). Here he argued that since investment of capital is 
necessary for the production of wealth from the land, and since capital is often 
possessed by non-landowners, investors could not justly have fewer political 
rights than landowners. He repudiated the Physiocratic tendency to define       
nationhood in terms of land. Whereas the Physiocrats had once claimed that 
small trading countries, such as Holland and Geneva, were not true nations, but 
part of the amorphous république commerçante universelle, Rœderer argued that 
the stability of these countries suggested that land was not in fact essential to the 
creation of a strong political system. Engaging the terms employed by the Physi-
ocrats, he defined propriété foncière as land and propriété mobilière as the 
land’s produce, arguing that the latter rather than the former provided the essen-
tial foundation of society. Criticising Turgot’s belief that a man without land is a 
mere traveller in the state, not a real citizen, Rœderer insisted that in such a    
system, virtue, honesty and knowledge count for nothing except in combination 
with one particular form of wealth. In his Mémoire sur les Municipalités, Turgot 
had limited his discussion of the rights of non-landowners to their eligibility for 
membership of the provincial assemblies, from which it seemed reasonable to 
exclude all but the landowners since these assemblies were exclusively designed 
to administer the direct taxes imposed on land. Rœderer argued that it was inap-
propriate to extrapolate from the provincial assemblies to a national represent-
ative body. He also dismissed the example of America, where vast expanses of 
unappropriated land offered opportunities for capital and labour investment that 
could not be matched in an old country like France. In contrast, France needed 
investment in manufacture. For these reasons, Rœderer’s De la Députation aux 
États Généraux differed significantly from the vast majority of other revolu-
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tionary pamphlets which typically argued for doubling the delegates of the Third 
Estate and voting by head. By contesting the long established connection be-
tween political rights and landownership, Rœderer hoped to find a way to represent 
all the interests of the Third Estate. His experience with tariff reform had proved 
that the Third Estate, far from being a homogeneous class, was potentially (and 
actually) divided against itself. He warned that if the delegates to the Third Es-
tate were exclusively chosen from landowners, the États Généraux would not be 
genuinely representative of the nation. 
By 1793 Rœderer was confident that the connection between political rights 
and landownership had been broken. But the design of legitimate representative 
republican government was still undecided. In this context, he was concerned to 
protect property rights against political encroachments justified in terms of 
equality. He characterised the niveleurs, or levellers, as having a conception of 
social organisation in sharp contrast to that of the Physiocrats. They understood 
the machinations of human vice, but knew nothing of the economics of farming. 
They noticed only the social danger of inequality between persons, and because 
property threatened the equality of individuals they were hostile to it. Faced with 
the objection that the retraction of property rights would diminish production, 
the niveleurs, as Rœderer characterised them, claimed: ‘Fewer riches, and more 
mœurs’. When pressed further by the argument that a lower level of production 
is an undesirable outcome because it will support only a reduced population, he 
imagined the niveleurs arguing that a smaller population will be a more content-
ed one. But he noted that even they were embarrassed by the practical reality of 
reducing an existing population, and instead resorted to claiming that, whatever 
the circumstances, the land could not be made more productive. And this, 
Rœderer pointed out, merely begs the question.  
There were two components to Rœderer’s critique of the arguments he at-
tributed to the niveleurs. The first focused on the influence of the political 
thought of Mably, and the second on the influence of Rousseau. The second was 
explicitly connected to Rœderer’s criticisms of Robespierre during the Conven-
tion’s constitutional debates. Whilst he in no way confused Robespierre with the 
more radical and anarchic opponents of property, Rœderer’s lectures were in-
tended to show how menacing any kind of encroachment on individual property 
would be for the economic foundations of modern government.  
In attacking property, he claimed, the niveleurs were contravening the funda-
mental, natural rights of man. Inspired by Mably, they were gravely mistaken in 
arguing that property is solely a social institution, subordinate to the interests and 
needs of society. He characterised this system of social organisation in terms of 
four principles: firstly, the dissolution of all wealth possessed by individuals at 
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the time of their death; secondly, the limitation of wealth to a fixed level beyond 
which all earnings should become state property; thirdly, the redivision of exist-
ing wealth between all citizens; fourthly, the transformation of privately owned 
land into public property, and the division between citizens of the produce of the 
earth by a centralised public authority. 
Rœderer’s criticism of these premises was founded on his view that to attack 
property was in fact to attack capital. It was also to attack commerce and all 
forms of work not directly focused on the common interest, (since the demand 
for equality would require the levelling of both landed and moveable property). 
The abolition of property in land, however, would be sufficient to ensure the de-
struction of all forms of capital, since it would reduce every individual to the 
possession of nothing other than his or her subsistence: there would be no sur-
plus, no capital and no exchange. 
Rœderer presented Rousseau as a defender of private property. He claimed 
that, contrary to appearances, complex societies combining agriculture, manu-
facture and commerce conformed to the principle set down by Rousseau, which 
states that the land belongs substantially to no-one in particular, because its 
products are available for the whole world:  
 
“[…] dans la réalité, la terre n’appartient qu’au travail de l’homme, elle n’est qu’en dépôt 
entre les mains de celui qui en est appelé propriétaire […]” 
 
“[…] in reality, the earth belongs only to human labor, it is merely deposited in the hands 
of he who is called owner […]” (Rœderer, 1853-1859, vol. 8, p. 155) 
 
Rœderer argued that in the state of nature a person’s labour was free; so any 
product resulting from it was the property of the labourer. To contest this was to 
contest a person’s right to live. However, whilst this argument supported the 
right to own the fruits of one’s labour (propriété mobilière ou propriété des 
fruits) it was less clear how it could support the right to own land. Rœderer in-
sisted that the need to own the product of the land generates the need to own the 
land itself, and in cases of first occupancy those who labour on the land right-
fully lay claim to it. On this account, society is not established in order to feed 
individuals, but to guarantee their opportunity for labour to secure their sub-
sistence. According to Rœderer, Rousseau’s Discours sur l’inégalité des condi-
tions, had been misinterpreted and turned into an attack on property rights 
(Roussesau, 1962, vol.1, pp. 125-220). Recent interpretations of this text had 
gone so far as to suggest that Rousseau believed property in land to be damaging 
to a well-ordered society. In contrast, Rœderer insisted that Rousseau understood 
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the ownership of land to be the key principle of civil society: the very feature that 
distinguishes civilisation from the life of the savage. In support of his interpreta-
tion, Rœderer quoted directly from Rousseau’s Discours sur l’économie politique:  
 
“Le fondement du pacte social est la propriété; sa première condition, que chacun soit 
maintenu dans la paisible jouissance de ce qui lui appartient.” 
 
“The basis of the social pact is property, the first condition is that everyone is maintained 
in the peaceful enjoyment of what belongs to him.” (Rœderer, 1853-59, vol. 8, p. 239; 
Rousseau, 1962, vol.1, p. 259) 
 
Finally, Rœderer argued that the way to recapture for civil society the best aspect 
of the state of nature, (the fact that the fruits of the earth belong to all and the 
land itself to no one), was to rely on the principle of labour. When there was a 
division of labour, there would be an abundance of produce to share out amongst 
everyone. Private ownership of land was the pre-condition for the division of  
labour, and it would result in more produce for all:  
 
“[…] ainsi, dans le régime actuel, non-seulement le travail est assuré d’obtenir, comme 
dans l’état de nature, une part des fruits de la terre, mais encore d’obtenir une part infini-
ment plus considérable, parce que ses produits sont plus abondants […]” 
 
“[…] and so, under the current system, not only is work guaranteed to get, as in the state 
of nature, a part of the fruits of the earth, but also to obtain a much more considerable part, 
because its products are more abundant […]” (Rœderer, 1853-59, vol. 8, p. 240) 
 
Rœderer claimed that land is acquired before the social contract is formed; rights 
to it pre-date society and cannot be over-ridden. He argued that the purpose of 
society is to protect man’s ability to fulfil his needs through work, not to satisfy 
those needs directly. It was inconceivable that any society could have the power 
to fulfil individual needs in the absence of private interest to cultivate the land. 
Falling back on utilitarian justifications for private ownership, he pointed out 
that systems of common cultivation were notoriously inefficient because each 
individual tried to work as little as possible and consume as much as possible. 
Improvements in talent, power and methods of working were impossible, he    
argued, when land is commonly owned and innovations in the division of labour 
are prohibited. 
On 24 April 1793, Robespierre proposed several amendments to the new 
declaration of rights under discussion in the Convention, hoping to correct what 
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he took to be an inadequate theory of property. Like Harmand earlier in the    
debate, Robespierre decisively rejected the notion of absolute equality of wealth 
as illusory, even less beneficial to individuals than to the public good (AP(63), p. 
197; Cobban, 1971, p. 166). It was more important to render poverty honorable 
than to proscribe wealth. According to him, the comité de constitution had oper-
ated with an erroneous theory of property. When it defined liberty it correctly 
limited this by the rights of others, so why did it not do the same for property? 
Property, Robespierre insisted, was a social institution. Whilst the committee had 
drafted many articles to ensure the exercise of the right to property, there was not 
one word about the legitimacy of this right. To redress this oversight, Robes-
pierre suggested the following articles: 
 
“Art.1. La propriété est le droit qu’a chaque Citoyen de jouir & de disposer de la portion 
de biens qui lui est garantie par la Loi.  
Art.2. Le droit de propriété est borné, comme tous les autres, par l’obligation de respecter 
les droits d’autrui.” 
 
“Art.1. Property is the right of every citizen to enjoy & to have the portion of property that 
is guaranteed to him by law. 
Art.2. The right to property is limited, like all others, by the obligation to respect the rights 
of others.” (AP(63) p. 198) 
 
In both his public lectures and the Journal de Paris, Rœderer discussed Robes-
pierre’s suggestion that the Convention should apply limits to property rights. 
Against Robespierre he argued that true limits to individual freedom must be de-
fined by both the liberty and the property of others. Rœderer pointed out that the 
argument that a right to property cannot include the right to steal or usurp was 
extremely superficial and virtually self-evident. If property was the right to steal, 
how could it also be the right to possess? Rœderer concluded that Robespierre, 
perhaps without realising it, simply did not recognise the nature of the natural 
right to property. Instead, Robespierre was defending an insecure right, pre-
carious, variable and subject to the civil law and the magistrates. According to 
Rœderer the cause of Robespierre’s mistake was his view that property is a social 
institution, and therefore an arbitrary phenomenon, grounded in social contin-
gency and not in inalienable natural right. Rœderer quoted directly from Robes-
pierre’s recent speech in the Convention, arguing that it was premised on the 
principle that landowners did not have the right to starve non-landowners by 
withdrawing consumable produce from the market. The conclusion that Robes-
pierre drew from this premise was that property rights must be limited. In con-
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trast, Rœderer argued that landowners lacked both the inclination and the power 
to starve their fellow citizens. Instead they were actually and rationally inclined 
to put as much produce as possible into the market, in order to increase their 
profits.  
Rœderer’s conclusion was sharply at odds with Robespierre’s: an unlimited 
right to la propriété foncière, he insisted, was the key to securing for the proper-
tyless their rights to subsistence. Was it common to see stretches of uncultivated 
land that belonged to powerful landowners? Or to see these landowners hurling 
their grain into the rivers? Or to find them hoarding their harvests for ten, five or 
even three years? On the contrary, each year these landowners cultivated a hun-
dred times the amount of grain that they, or their families and dependants, could 
manage to consume. Why then did the landowners produce a surplus? Rœderer’s 
answer centred on man’s need for enjoyment (jouissances), that increases in    
direct relation to the development of his intelligence, and on his need to have 
something to exchange in return for the manufactured goods that could provide 
new and different sources of enjoyment. This, he claimed, was the true source of 
the security of poor labouring men who live alongside the rich. Since property 
was the means of guaranteeing the rights of those who own nothing at all, it 
should not be limited, but protected by the full and combined forces of the law, 
mœurs and public opinion.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
By the 1790s, political, or constitutional, unfreedom arising from historical prec-
edents derived from the ancien régime had been comprehensively dismissed 
through the assertion of the Third Estate’s sovereign power. Under the impetus 
of the abbé Sieyès’s argument, first the National Assembly (in 1789), then the 
National Convention (in 1792), had entered fully into the exercise of constituting 
power on behalf of the sovereign people. The legitimate exercise of this power 
did not, in and of itself, resolve the problem of designing a stable republican 
government for France; and there was a recurring tendency to focus on the de-
sign of the legislative to the neglect of the executive branch of government. The 
spectre of inherited political power – the constraint placed on the current genera-
tion’s freedom by its predecessor – that haunted Thomas Paine was no more 
welcomed by his French republican counterparts. Sieyès, however, considered 
that there were more urgent technical questions to be addressed in the difficult 
task of rendering modern government both efficacious and accountable. Most 
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importantly, the question as to how the executive power might be rendered      
accountable through the imposition of constraints on ministerial wills.  
Social unfreedom was discussed in connection with the presence (or ab-
sence) of sociability and the need for institutions to shape the manners or mores 
of a republican people. On the one hand, there were attempts to use early social 
science to delineate the extent to which society might be left to cohere freely by 
itself without intervention from repressive political institutions. On the other, 
there was widespread interest in designing institutions to encourage or nurture 
individual sentiments and habits suited to a republic. Virtue and probity were 
central to these debates. The traditional republican notion of citizens schooled in 
prioritizing the public over personal interest, needed to be reconciled with the  
reality of a large scale commercial state. Saint-Just meanwhile, with his em-
phasis on regeneration, gave new and alarming meaning to Rousseau’s maxim 
that it might be necessary for the people to be “forced to be free” under a repub-
lican government.  
Economic unfreedom – at its most extreme equating with hunger in the ab-
sence of basic subsistence – was discussed in the shadow of well-worn 18th cen-
tury debates about state responsibility and freedom of trade. Moderate repub-
licans, defending the feasibility of large-scale representative government com-
patible with the division of labour, vigorously defended property rights as the 
basis for all forms of freedom and prosperity. More radical republicans evoked 
the safety of the people as a justification for government intervention and redis-
tribution in circumstances where people were starving. In the 1790s, as in earlier 
and later epochs, hunger was the most compelling definition of unfreedom: no 
freedom without food.  
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 Part 2  
Cultural Representations of Unfreedom 
 
 Occupy Rome 
Citizenship and Freedom in Early Modern Political Culture, 
Recent Political Theory, and Coriolanus 
OLIVER ARNOLD 
 
 
The two most ambitious recent arguments about the currency of republican val-
ues in early modern England privilege either citizenship or liberty: Patrick Col-
linson’s claim that “citizens…concealed within subjects” pursued lives of mean-
ingful political participation in the “monarchical republic” of Elizabethan Eng-
land does not depend on establishing the subject-citizen’s liberty (2002, p. 412);1 
according to Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, seventeenth-century resistance to 
arbitrary power turned on a distinctly republican definition of freedom as the ab-
sence of domination that neither promoted active citizenship as a “bedrock val-
ue” nor required for its maintenance widespread participation in political life 
(Pettit, 1999, p.8). On the one hand, many monarchical republicans in Eliza-
bethan England did not link liberty and the vita activa – John Case, for example, 
defined “citizen” merely as “a participant in civil authority” – or figured active 
citizenship and obedience as continuous (Peltonen, 2002, pp. 103-104). On the 
other hand, the neo-Romanists of Stuart England believed that all the partici-
pation in the world – serving as a bailiff; sitting in the House of Commons; issu-
ing judgments from the bench – did not make a person who is under domination 
free. Put another way, Collinson’s citizen-subjects located virtue and happiness 
                                                           
1  For a lucid account of the scholarship on “monarchical republicanism,” see Peltonen 
(2002, pp. 85-107). Collinson (2002) identifies a wide range of activities as repub-
lican: the inhabitants of Elizabethan Swallowfield agreeing to constitute their town as 
a “self-governing republic”; Lord Burghley drafting plans for an acephalous one-year 
“Interreyn” between Elizabeth’s demise and the settling of the succession; engineers 
offering initiatives that serve “the public interest” (pp. 20, 32-33, 53-54). 
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in productive service to the commonwealth; the men who would not brook 
Charles I’s tyranny located dignity and happiness in the possession of liberty. 
These influential approaches to English political history haven’t paid much 
attention to one another because the first story seems to end when the second 
story begins: as James and, especially, Charles, indulged themselves in exercises 
of arbitrary power, Members of Parliament, political philosophers, and leading 
citizens from England’s towns – the kind of men who, under Elizabeth, might 
have prized the vita activa – embraced liberty as the preeminent republican val-
ue. The relation between liberty and the vita activa was, in fact, far more com-
plicated for both Elizabethan and seventeenth-century Englishmen. In De Repub-
lica Anglorum (1563-65), for example, Sir Thomas Smith’s most stirring cele-
bration of liberty is occasioned by – and never quite displaces – a commitment to 
active participation in the commonwealth:  
 
“[T]orment or question which is used by the order of the civill lawe and custome of other 
countreis to put a malefactor to excessive paine, to make him confesse of him selfe, or of 
his felowes or complices, is not used in England, it is taken for servile. For what can he 
serve the common wealth after as a free man, who hath his bodie so haled and tormented, 
if he be not found guiltie, and what amends can be made him? [...] The nature of our na-
tion is free, stout, haultaine, prodigall of life and bloud: contumelie, beatings, servitude 
and servile torment and punishment it will not abide. And so in this nature and fashion, 
our auncient Princes and legislators have nourished them, as to make them stout hearted, 
courageous, souldiers, not villaines and slaves, and that is the scope almost of all our poli-
cie.” (Smith, 1583, pp. 85-86) 
  
Earlier legal theorists had excoriated torture as barbarous and ineffective (Sir 
John Fortescue, 1997, pp. 31-34); Smith sharpens this long-standing critique by 
appealing to the most powerful brand of early modern English exceptionalism: 
the claim that the English were the freest of modern peoples, cherished liberty 
most, and abhorred bondage with unequalled passion. For Smith, not abiding 
“servile torment” is a particular manifestation of the free nature that defines  
Englishness. 
In Smith’s England, “the scope almost of all […] policie” is the cultivation 
of free men rather than “villaines and slaves.” On the one hand, then, Smith is a 
precursor of Skinner’s and Pettit’s seventeenth-century neo-Romans, who define 
liberty as the absence of domination: the “opposition between slavery or servi-
tude […] and freedom,” according to Pettit, “is probably the single most charac-
teristic feature of the long rhetoric of liberty to which the experience of the   
Roman republic gave rise”; “[c]ontrasting liberty with slavery is a sure sign of 
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taking liberty to consist in non-domination” (Pettit, 1997, p. 32). On the other 
hand, Smith is a monarchical republican: princes and legislators work collec-
tively for the common good; and he values service to the commonwealth (at 
least) as highly as freedom. “[W]hat can” the victim of torture “serve the com-
mon wealth after as a free man”? The answer is “nothing.” Torture is bad be-
cause it deforms the victim’s capacity for active participation: if such a man “be 
not found guiltie,” he will regain the legal condition of “free man” – he will once 
again be sui iuris – but he will be disabled from serving the commonwealth. 
If Smith, a key figure in Collinson’s story, entangles freedom and active    
citizenship, so too does the MP Thomas Hedley, an important protagonist in 
Skinner’s intellectual history of liberty. In a 1610 speech in the House of Com-
mons, Hedley warned that James I’s assertion of an absolute prerogative to levy 
impositions in the absence of Parliament’s consent would transform England in-
to a slave state:    
 
“But it is not so much to lose all a man’s wealth as the power of holding it, for that is 
nothing else but bondage, or the condition of a villein, whose lands and goods are only in  
the power of his lord, which doth so abase his mind [...] that he is neither fit to do service 
to his country in war nor peace, for the law enables him not so much as to serve in a jury,  
and the wars design him but to the galleys or the gallows. So if the liberty of the subject  
be in this point impeached […] then they are […] little better than the king’s bondmen, 
which will so discourage them and so abase and deject their minds, that they will use little 
care or industry to get that which they cannot keep and so will grow both poor and base- 
minded like to the peasants in other countries, which be no soldiers nor will be ever made  
any, whereas every Englishman is as fit for a soldier as the gentleman elsewhere.” (Foster, 
1966, p. 195)2 
 
Hedley does not define Englishness as a special relation to liberty. Rather, the 
economic and military prowess fostered by England’s “laws, liberties, and gov-
ernment” (Foster, 1966, p. 195) distinguishes her subjects from the “bondman or 
peasants in other places.” Hedley recognizes that liberty is a necessary condition 
for the active citizenship he values, but it doesn’t follow for him that liberty is 
separable from – or more important than – active citizenship.  
So far, I have tried to demonstrate that Smith and Hedley attribute equal value 
to participating in public life and to possessing liberty. The rest of this chapter pur-
sues two arguments. The first is historical: some early modern political thinkers, 
                                                           
2  For Skinner’s analysis of Hedley’s speech, see Skinner (2003, p. 14; 2002a, p. 311; 
2002b, p. 260-61). 
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I claim, figured active participation in legislation as necessary to liberty. They 
were not, however, democrats: they believed that the people of the realm were 
free because they consented, through their parliamentary representatives, to the 
laws that bound them. This apparently paternalistic republicanism, in which a  
select group of citizens actively participate in political life and secure liberty for 
all, came with a twist: an ideology that universalized participation because it 
conflated absolutely representatives and those they represent. The second argu-
ment is theoretical: I suggest that Skinner and Pettit’s shared commitment to a 
particular construction of negative liberty entails a preference for representative 
democracy over direct democracy. Shakespeare’s Coriolanus figures explicitly 
in the first argument as a rare early modern identification of liberty and direct 
participation in political life but also shadows the second argument: Shake-
speare’s radical critique of political representation troubles the ideology of re-
presentation in his time and in our own. 
 
 
I 
 
The antonym of freedom, Pettit argues, is domination: that is, “subjection to an 
arbitrary power of interference on the part of another – a dominus or master – 
even another who chooses not actually to exercise that power” (Pettit, 2002, p. 
340; cf. Pettit 1997, p. 5). Pettit thus rejects one negative construction of free-
dom – the liberal definition of freedom as freedom from interference – for anoth-
er: freedom is freedom from domination. Pettit argues that whereas non-arbitrary 
interference – for example, laws to which the governed consent – merely condi-
tions freedom, even non-interfering domination compromises freedom: if I re-
cognize that “agents and agencies […] have a power of arbitrary interference in 
[my] life,” my consciousness of that power will lead me “to make efforts to keep 
them sweet, tailoring [my] actions to their expected wishes” (Pettit, 2001, p. 
137) and make me a slave even if the dominating agent or agency never actually 
interferes with me (Pettit, 2002, p. 347; cf. 2001, p. 145).  
Skinner has traced the definition of freedom as non-domination to seven-
teenth-century neo-Roman writers such as Henry Parker, John Marsh and John 
Goodwin, who argued that “if you live under any form of government that allows 
for the exercise of prerogative or discretionary powers outside the law, you will 
already be living as a slave [even if your] rulers […] choose not to exercise these 
powers, or […] exercise them only with the tenderest regard for your liberties” 
(Skinner, 1998, pp. 68-69). We can trace this ideal of freedom as non-domi-
nation, on Skinner’s account, back to Hedley’s great 1610 speech. Interference – 
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even the catastrophic seizure of all one’s weath – does not in itself enslave a man, 
Hedley argues; rather, the monarch’s arbitrary power to interfere in the subject’s 
life and the subject’s recognition of that power make him a slave: “it is not so 
much to lose all a man’s wealth as the power of holding it, for that is nothing 
else but bondage, or the condition of a villein, whose lands and goods are only in 
the power of his lord, which doth […] abase his mind” (Foster, 1966, p. 195).  
Pettit, too, argues that for seventeenth-century English republicans domi-
nation, rather than interference, compromises freedom: a citizen subject to the 
interference of non-arbitrary laws is free; to be subject to domination, even in the 
absence of interference, is to be a slave (Pettit 2002, p. 344). For example, 
Harrrington’s “contrast between someone who lives in Turkey, subject to arbi-
trary rule […] and the citizen of republican Lucca,” Pettit claims, turns on the 
neo-Roman ideal of freedom: 
 
““the greatest bashaw is a tenant, as well of his head as of his estate, at the will of his lord, 
[but] the meanest Lucchese that hath land is a freeholder of  both”. […] The crucial phrase 
here is “at the will of his lord”: no matter how permissive the lord is, the fact of depending 
on his grace and favor, the fact of  living under his domination, entails an absence of  
freedom.“ (Pettit, 1999, pp. 32-33). 
 
The great bashaw who must keep the sultan sweet and the humble Lucchese sub-
ject to a non-arbitrary rule of law exemplify what Pettit identifies as “the two 
themes that distinguish the ideal of political freedom” in “the republican tradi-
tion”: “the non-interfering master takes away the subject’s freedom [but] the 
non-mastering interferer does not” (Pettit, 2001, p. 145; cf. 2002, p. 345).  
To be free is to not be a slave; that is, not to be under domination; that is, as 
Pettit puts it, not to “live at the will of another – the arbitrary will of another – in 
the manner of a slave” (Pettit 1999, pp. 32-3).  If we are tempted to supply a pos-
itive definition of freedom, we will likely find ourselves listing those actions that 
only free citizens in free states may pursue: dispose of his or her labor as he or 
she sees fit; speak his or her mind without fear of punishment; advocate for poli-
tical policies; vote; run for office; petition elected officials; organize a social 
agency; and so on. Before long, we will have come back round to Collinson’s 
citizen-subjects and the Ciceronian ideal that “vertues holle praise consisteth in 
doing.” (Grimaldi, 1566, fol. 8.v). According to Pettit and Skinner, however, 
leading political actors and recluses alike are free or unfree only as a function of 
their relation to domination. Pettit explains that the republican tradition with 
which he, “Skinner, Sunstein, and Braithwaite […] identify is not that sort of tra-
dition – ultimately, the populist tradition – that hails the democratic participation 
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of the people as one of the highest forms of good and that often waxes lyrical, in 
communitarian vein, about the desirability of the close, homogeneous society 
that popular participation is often taken to presuppose” (Pettit, 1999, pp. 7-8). 
For Pettit, participation is not a “bedrock value”; rather, “[d]emocratic parti-
cipation may be essential to the republic” only in so far as “it is necessary for 
promoting the enjoyment of freedom as non-domination, not because of its inde-
pendent attractions” (Pettit, 1999, p. 8, my emphasis).  
Skinner attributes far more value to widespread participation in political life, 
but he, too, argues that the opportunity to exercise rights – rather than the actual 
exercise of rights – defines freedom. Seventeenth-century neo-Romanists, Skin-
ner argues, didn’t believe that “liberty consists in membership of a self-
governing state” or that “individual freedom” could be “equated with virtue or 
the right of political participation” (Skinner, 1998, p. 74 n.38; cf. Skiner 2002a, 
p. 212). Moreover, the theory that domination – rather than interference – causes 
unfreedom requires that the actual exercise of rights be forcefully put in its 
place: for if “it is possible to enjoy your liberties to the fullest degree without  
being a free-man,” then we must always be on guard against the misrecognition 
that to exercise liberties – to be free from interference – is to be free. What 
makes a person free is the absence of a dominating agent or agency with the 
power to interfere arbitrarily in his or her life and the recognition, the secure be-
lief that no such power hangs over him or her. 
 
 
II 
 
Looking for the neo-Roman ideal of freedom in Elizabethan England may seem 
quixotic, but the queen’s subjects routinely claimed that they were not under 
domination. For example, in a 1593 speech defending the Commons’ right to 
advocate for a more perfectly reformed ministry, James Morice reminded his fel-
low MPs that they were the free subjects of a monarch rather than the slaves of a 
tyrant: 
 
“Behold with us the sovereign authority of one, an absolute prince, great in majesty, ruling 
and reigning, yet guided and directed by principles and precepts of reason which we term 
the law. No Spartan king, or Venetian duke, but free from account and coercion of any, 
equal or superior; yet firmly bound to the commonwealth by the faithful oath of a Christ-
ian prince, bearing alone the sharp sword of justice and correction, yet tempered with 
mercy and compassion; requiring tax and tribute of the people, yet not causeless, nor 
without common assent. Wee again the subjects of this kingdom are born and brought up 
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in due obedience, butt far from servitude and bondage, subject to lawful authority and 
commandment, but freed from licentious will and tyranny; enjoying by limits of law and 
justice our lives, lands, goods and liberties in great peace and security, this our happy and 
blessed estate.” (Hartley, 1995, p. 35) 
    
Morice is no rebel: Parker admires the Venetians for curbing the power of their 
dukes; Morice is glad that Elizabeth, unlike a “Venetian duke,” is an “absolute 
prince.” Morice, however, does anticipate Parker’s definition of freedom as the 
absence of domination: to live under a prince merely “guided” – rather than 
“guided and directed” – by law, to rely merely on the prince’s “mercy and com-
passion” would leave the subject entirely dependent on her will (and thus a sla-
ve); but Elizabeth’s power to interfere in the lives of her subjects is limited by 
law and requires their “common assent.” To enjoy one’s “liberties in great peace 
and security” is precisely to recognize that one’s liberties are not subject to arbi-
trary acts of interference. 
Morice’s Englishman is only modestly involved in securing his “happy and 
blessed estate”: he “assent[s]” to the laws he obeys and the taxes he pays. By 
contrast, Speaker Christopher Yelverton, in his speech to Elizabeth I at the closing 
of Parliament in 1598, attributes the subject’s freedom to active participation in 
fashioning laws: 
 
“If that comon wealth (most sacred and most renowned Quene) was reputed in the world 
to be the best-framed, and most likely to flurishe in felicities, where the subjects had their 
freedom of discourse, and their libertie of likeing, in establishing the lawes that should 
governe them; then must your Majestie’s mighty, and most famous realme of England (by 
your most gracious benignity) acknowledge it self the most happie of all the nations under 
heaven, that possessth this favour in more frank and flowing manner than any kingdome 
doth besides. Singuler was the commendation of Solon that set lawes among the Athe-
nians; passing was the praise of Licurgus that planted lawes among the Lacdemonians and 
highly was Plato extolled that devised lawes for the Magnesians: but neither yet could the 
inconveniences of the state be so providently forseene, nor the reason of lawes be so 
deeply searched into, were they never so wise, nor the course of them be so indifferent, or 
so plausible; nor the people be so willing to put themselves under the dutie of them, as 
when the people themselves be agents in the frameing of them. And where the rules of 
government in some comon wealths have been setled only by some fewe magistrates, there 
divers varieties of mischeifes have allso many times befallen them.” (Hartley, 1995, p. 197)  
 
Yelverton offers two reasons for preferring collective lawmaking to lawgiving 
by a singular titan or “some fewe magistrates.” The first is pragmatic: the wisest 
126 | OLIVER ARNOLD 
individuals – Solon, Lycurgus, Plato, and Elizabeth – are incapable of foreseeing 
all “the inconveniences of the state.” Yelverton’s account of parliamentary legi-
slation institutionalizes Smith’s reconciliation of monarchism and republicanism: 
“Smith described the queen as ‘the life, the head and the authorite of all things 
that be done in the realme of England,” Collinson observes, and “defined Eng-
land, politically, as ‘a society or common doing of a multitude of free men col-
lected together” (Collinson, 2002, p. 36). Yelverton’s England is the “best-
framed” commonwealth because its head and body legislate collaboratively: “the 
whole state of [the] kingdome […] assemble[s], consult[s], and resolve[s] uppon 
some fewe petititons”; Elizabeth’s assent “geve[s] full life and essence unto” 
those parliamentary bills and makes them laws (Hartley, 1995, p.198).3 Elizabe-
than MPs had long argued that the queen, in fact, depended on the collective do-
ing of the entire political nation. In a 1566 speech, an MP argued the necessity of 
the Commons from the monarch’s natural limitations: because “his eye and eare 
cannot be in every corner of his kingdome and dominions at one instant,” he 
must rely on the “counsel” of MPs who come from “everie part of the same ab-
sent from the king’s eye and eare” (Hartley, 1981, p.129-30; cf. a similar speech 
from 1571 in ibid., p. 227). In The order and usage of the keeping of a Parlia-
ment in England (1571), John Hooker figures the MPs as a whirl of collective 
doing: they “are as it were one body, having many eyes to se, many feet to go, 
and many heads to labour withal, and so circumspect they are for the govern-
ment of the commonwealth that they see all things, nothing is hid or secret, no-
thing is straunge or new” (Hooker, 1977, p. 117). Collective lawmaking, then, is 
simultaneously more effective than monarchic lawgiving and is the collective 
product of princely wisdom, parliamentary knowledge and activity, and the 
“consent of the whole bodie” of the realm.  
Yelverton’s second reason for preferring collective legislation returns us to 
the neo-Roman ideal of freedom: the English people owe their exceptional hap-
piness to their “libertie of likeing, in establishing the lawes that should governe 
them.” Like Morice, Yelverton defines freedom as non-domination: if a man is 
bound by laws to which he does not consent, then he is not free; if, by contrast, 
the people consent to the laws that they are bound to obey, then they may be said 
to be the authors (the “framers”) of the non-arbitrary interference those laws visit 
upon their lives and thus free men (See Skinner, 2007, p. 237; Skinner, 2005, pp. 
156-157). The same principle – the neo-Roman ideal that “each law must be   
                                                           
3  Parker, of course, would argue that the necessity of Elizabeth’s assent to parliamenta-
ry legislation made Yelverton, his fellow MPs, and all the men and women they re-
presented slaves: her veto power made all law-making dependent on her will.  
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enacted with the consent of those who will be subject to it” (Skinner, 2007, p. 
205) – runs through almost all orthodox Elizabethan political philosophy, from 
Smith to Richard Hooker, who argued that 
 
“the lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men belongeth 
so properly unto the same entire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind so-
ever upon earth to exercise the same of himself, and not either by express commission 
immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at the first 
from their consent upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere tyran-
ny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not made so.” (Hooker, 
1989, p. 93) 
 
Morice and Hooker recognize “common assent” and “public approbation” as 
sufficient guarantors of the subject’s liberty, but Yelverton’s emphasis on the 
people’s role in “establishing” and “framing” the laws that govern them seems to 
suggest that active participation in lawmaking secures freedom.  
“Framing” is an especially resonant description of the people’s agency.  
From the beginning, “to frame” named a high order of making: the earliest 
meanings refer not simply to building and carpentry but to uniting parts into the 
frame of a ship or house (OED II.4). “To frame” quickly acquired meanings 
proper to intellectual and artistic endeavors – for example, to perfect something 
(a law, a poem) by bringing it into proper balance; and by the 1580s, many of 
these meanings had coalesced in the “framing” of pictures and miniatures. 
“When the people themselves be agents in the frameing of” the laws that govern 
them, then, they secure their own freedom by participating in an exalted kind of 
fashioning.4  In Yelverton, we finally have an early modern who not only values 
active participation – perhaps as highly as liberty – but claims that active parti-
cipation produces freedom. The subject’s obedience and freedom depend on his 
recognition that he is not under domination because he is himself the author of 
the laws that condition his freedom.  
 
 
III 
 
Yelverton was not a populist. The “people themselves be agents in the frameing 
of” law, but their agency, Yelverton acknowledges, is mediated by representation: 
                                                           
4  See Skinner (2005), pp. 162-3 for a very keen discussion of the way the political and 
aesthetic intersect in “representation.” 
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“According […] to your Majesty’s most wide and princely commandment, and 
according to the ancient and well-ruled freedome of the subjectes of England, 
hath the whole state of your kingdome (represented here by Parliament) assemb-
led, consulted, and resolved uppon some fewe petitions, thought fitt for lawes to 
them by your Majestie to be established” (Hartley, 1995, pp. 197-98). The Eng-
lish subject enjoyed an “ancient and well-ruled freedome” not to participate di-
rectly in the making of law but to empower representatives who did so on his 
behalf. In this respect, Yelverton’s position – an entirely orthodox Elizabethan 
account of parliamentary representation (see, for example, Smith, 1583, pp. 34-
35; Hooker, 1989, p. 182) – fits neatly into the neo-Roman tradition that Skinner 
has recovered.5  Parker, Milton, and Nedham argued that to be free one “must 
live…under a system in which the sole power of making laws remains with the 
people or their accredited representatives” (Skinner, 1998, p. 74, my emphasis). 
Thus, to say that a state is free only when “all individual members of the body 
politic […] remain equally subject to whatever laws they choose to impose upon 
themselves” (ibid., my emphasis) is “not to say that individual freedom […] can 
in some sense be equated with virtue or the right of political participation”:      
rather, Skinner cautions, the “writers [he is] discussing merely argue that parti-
cipation (at least by way of representation) constitutes a necessary condition of 
maintaining individual liberty” (1998, p. 74-5 n38).  
Skinner’s work on representation is often wonderfully illuminating, but he 
misses something here: representation does not minimize the importance of par-
ticipation; rather, it makes universal participation the positive condition of free-
dom because the ideology of representation in early modern England insists that 
there is no “or” between “the people” and “their accredited representatives,” be-
tween “participation” and “participation […] by way of representation.” Skinner 
himself argues that some “English political writers” in the 1640s conflated “the 
people” and their MPs: Parker, for example, insisted that Parliament is “vertually 
the whole kingdom it selfe’” (see Skinner, 2005, pp. 155 and 164). Given the full 
original force of “virtually” (“[i]n respect of essence or effect” [OED 1]), to “say 
that Parliament is virtually the people,” Skinner observes, “is to say that, so far 
                                                           
5  Thus, Richard Hooker argues that only “public approbation” legitimates a law, but 
“approbation not only they give who personally declare their assent by voice sign or 
act, but also when others do it. […] As in parliaments, councils, and the like assem-
blies, although we be not personally ourselves present, notwithstanding our assent is 
by reason of others agents there in our behalf. And what we do by others, no reason 
but that it should stand as our deed, no less effectually to bind us than if ourselves had 
done it in person” (Hooker, 1989, p. 93). 
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as its essential qualities and powers are concerned, Parliament is no different 
from the people in any way at all. Its voice can be regarded as strictly equivalent 
to ‘the voice of the whole Kingdom,’ and its recommendations” (2005, p. 164).  
Skinner has shown that Charles I’s defenders sought to delegitimize the 
Commons’ authority on the grounds that MPs only imperfectly represented the 
people: Digges pointed out that women did not vote; even among men, Spelman 
remarked, Parliament was elected by “a miner number of the people” (qtd. in 
Skinner, 2006, p. 160). Digges and Spelman, then, do not question the efficacy 
of representation per se; rather, they merely claim that limits on the franchise 
leave many men and women unrepresented. Long before the crisis of the 1640s, 
Charles I’s father articulated a vastly more devastating critique of parliamentary 
representation. As he brought the first session of his first parliament to a close, 
James I admonished the MPs: “This house doth not so represent the whole com-
mons of the realm as the shadow doth the body but only representatively. Impos-
sible it was for them to know all that would be propounded here; much more all 
those answers that you would make to all propositions” (“Speech at the proroga-
tion of parliament, July 7, 1604,” Kenyon, 1966, p. 36). “[B]ut only representa-
tively”: James insists on the very difference between real and representative 
presence that Parker aims to efface. 
James was reacting to Jacobean MPs who, like their Elizabethan predeces-
sors, sometimes attributed to political representation a kind of secular magic that 
matched the mysticism of divine kingship. In 1593, for example, Francis Bacon 
argued that every man in England was personally present in the Commons’ 
chamber in St. Stephen’s Chapel. During the Commons’ consideration of a bill 
to settle the countess of Cumberland’s jointure, Sir Thomas Heanage reported 
that Francis Clifford, a party with an interest in the proposed settlement, had as-
sured him that he “was contented” that it pass. A few MPs objected that 
Heanage’s report of Clifford’s speech was immaterial, but Bacon successfully 
persuaded the House that reported speech introduced into Commons’ proceed-
ings could not be considered hearsay: “Mr. Francis Bacon in this pointe shewed 
there was a difference betwixt this Courte [...] and other inferiour courtes [...] for 
there they are not to credit report or information, but the party to be bound must 
be brought coram and be present. But in this Court representatively all men are 
present, wherfore this scruple needs not that the party to be bound should be here 
seene, for all men are here present representatively. So this bill passed currant” 
(Hartley, 1995, p. 122). How can the claim that “all men are here present repre-
sentatively” answer the charge of hearsay? The juridical “scruple” of disregard-
ing hearsay rests entirely on a distinction between actual presence and repre-
sentative presence. Bacon dismisses the distinction between direct testimony and 
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reported speech because the magic of political representation has effaced the dif-
ference between being present in one’s own person (coram) and being “present 
representatively.”6 Bacon does not exempt Parliament from hearsay rules; he 
claims that such rules are irrelevant to Parliament because political representa-
tion produces something like the “real presence” of the people of the realm in 
their parliamentary representatives.  
What we might think of as conservative critiques of political representation 
per se could be found even among MPs. For example, Arthur Hall, who fre-
quently disparaged the body in which he served, mocked the Commons’ claims 
to represent the entire realm: “your number of Parliament men you see in your 
house are fewe to the huge multitude of them whose consents are bounde by 
your agreemente.” (Hall, 1576, Eiir). Was there a radical critique of political rep-
resentation in early modern England? Occasionally, even MPs who promoted the 
Commons’ importance tacitly allowed that there was a difference between the 
MPs and the people themselves. During the 1572 debates over the fate of Mary, 
Queen of Scots, Robert Snagge proposed that the entire realm be canvassed: “He 
would have every man which is absent likewise to declare their consent as we 
have don, and therefore requireth a generall oath” (Hartley, 1981, p. 392). Out-
side of St. Stephen’s, a few voices argued that customs were as good as statutes 
because they more perfectly expressed the people’s consent (Anon., 1584, pp. 3-
6). The crises of the 1640s tended to confirm rather than pressure the fundamen-
tal soundness of political representation as the proper mechanism by which the 
subject secured his freedom. For example, Parker argued that direct democracy 
not only was impractical – the “reall body of the people, is too cumbersome and 
irregular in its movements to be capable of acting for itself” (qtd. in Skinner, 
2005, p. 163) – but also unsound: “by virtue of election and representation, a few 
shall act for the many, the wise shall consent for the simple, the virtue of all shall 
be reduced to some, and the prudence of some shall redound to all” (ibid. p. 
164). Even Rainsborough was on board: when he famously claimed at Putney 
that “the poorest he […] that is to live under a government ought first by his own 
consent to put himself under that government,” he was arguing for a wider fran-
chise rather than questioning the legitimacy of representation per se (Firth, 1891, 
p. 301).  
 
 
                                                           
6  The Latin preposition “coram” means “before” and was widely used to indicate per-
sonal presence before a juridical body. Richard Huloet and John Higgins define “co-
ram” as “In my presence. Ante oculos. Coràm me, Sub oculis” (Higgins, 1572, kkijr). 
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IV 
 
Did anyone in early modern England believe that in order to be free, a citizen 
had to participate in political life in his own person? It would seem not: from 
Smith to the Levellers, English champions of freedom accepted voting – or, 
even, the condition of being represented – as sufficient. For critiques of repre-
sentation as an impediment to liberty, we have to look beyond England to Rous-
seau, to some of the anti-Federalists, to Robespierre. With one exception: in Cor-
iolanus, Shakespeare, that most English of writers, posits a necessary relation be-
tween freedom and mass participation; Rome’s common citizens win true liberty 
through collective action, and they lose it when they cease to act for themselves 
but act instead through – and under the dominion of – political representatives. 
In the first scene of the play, Rome’s starving citizens – outraged by rampant 
usury and exorbitant grain prices – rebel against the Senate. Although these   
plebeians enjoy the status of citizens, they do not have any effective political 
rights; instead, they depend wholly on the “mercy and compassion” of the patri-
cians: “What authority surfeits on would relieve us,” the First Citizen complains 
in the unmistakable rhetoric of early modern charity; “if they would yield us but 
the superfluity, while it were wholesome, we might guess they relieved us hu-
manely” (1.1.12-15).7 The rebellion is necessary, the First Citizen tells the patri-
cian Menenius, precisely because the Senators regard the plebeians not as rights-
bearing citizens but as “poor suitors” spouting words: “Our business is not un-
known to the senate; they have had inkling this fortnight what we intend to do, 
which now we’ll show ‘em in deeds. They say poor suitors have strong breaths: 
they shall know we have strong arms too.” (1.1.50-51). The revolt ends when the 
besieged Senators grant the citizens the right to elect tribunes who will make 
their voices heard in Rome’s political sphere. Prior to the rebellion, then, “citi-
zen” is worse than an empty title: it is a veil of servitude. Indeed, because the 
senators exercise absolute control over the distribution of grain, the plebeian citi-
zens’ very lives depend on their masters’ wills.8 
The tribunate seems to secure for the people both real freedom and the op-
portunity to participate actively in political life. To be sure, the tribunes fear that 
their “office may […] go sleep” if Coriolanus has his way (2.1.209), but the sus-
pension of the tribunate would now be a coup rather than the exercise of an      
already constituted prerogative: the citizens are not under domination because 
                                                           
7  All quotations from Coriolanus follow Shakespeare, 1986. For the rhetoric of relief, 
distribution, superfluity, and sufficiency, see Smith, 1592, A5 v, A6 v. C2 r, C1 r. 
8  For the master’s power over the slave’s life, see Skinner, 2002a, p. 9-10. 
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the Senate no longer possesses an arbitrary power to interfere with them. Thus, 
when Coriolanus seeks to reduce the people to their former status, the tribunes 
accuse him of treason: “We charge you, that you have contrived to take / From 
Rome all seasoned office and to wind / Yourself into a power tyrannical; / For 
which you are a traitor to the people” (3.3.66-68). Despite the seeming provo-
cation of “seasoned” (the tribunate is still in its infancy), even Coriolanus’ 
friends offer no defense against the charge of innovation. 
Shakespeare departs from North’s Plutarch, his principal source, to forge an 
exceptionally clear link between revolutionary political action and the transfor-
mation of Roman citizenship. In Plutarch, the plebeians rebel after the Senators 
break their promise to restrain rapacious creditors; the Senate finally begins to 
debate measures against usury only after the plebeians refuse to help defend the 
city against its enemies; the people, tired of waiting for a do-nothing Senate to 
act, leave Rome, encamp themselves on Mons Sacer, and contemplate the possi-
bility of permanently abandoning Rome for greener pastures. The citizens return 
to Rome after Menenius, acting on behalf of the Senate, agrees to the establish-
ment of the tribunate. In Plutarch, revolutionary violence fizzles, but a walk-out 
brings victory. Shakespeare, by contrast, makes the citizens’ attempt to occupy 
the Capital the effective cause of change. The citizens we see in Act 1 mock 
Menenius’s Fable of the Belly – he assures the citizens that the Senatorial belly 
selflessly distributes nourishment to the plebeian members – and, as they prepare 
to resume their assault on the Capitol, we learn that the senate has acceded to the 
demands of another mass of rebelling citizens (1.1.39). 
Shakespeare’s model for citizenship is revolutionary action: the citizens win 
rights by acting, and only active participation will maintain their rights. If we’re 
hoping to see in the rest of the play a kind of institutionalized revolutionary citi-
zenship, we’ll be disappointed. As soon as the tribunate is created, the citizens 
are transformed into passive and mostly mute pawns of their representatives. The 
tribunes Sicinius and Brutus muster the people when they need muscle to back 
up their proclamations against Coriolanus, but they seek to exclude the people 
from political participation as much as possible: “Go home,” they urge the citi-
zens again and again (see, for example, 4.2.1-8); and they congratulate them-
selves on creating a Rome in which “tradesmen,” rather than “pestering [the] 
streets,” stay in “their shops […] going / About their functions friendly,” a Rome 
in which the citizens no longer run “about the streets, / Crying confusion” (4.6.5-
9 and 4.6.29-31). The tribunes, the relieved patricians come to realize, are the 
new “masters o’th’people” (2.2.51; cf. 2.2.77); and, indeed, the citizens now 
submit themselves on bended knees before the men whom they have empowered 
(see 2.1.67-76; 4.1.22-27). 
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Even when the citizens do reappear on the political stage, they no longer con-
ceive of themselves as agents capable of autonomous action: when Coriolanus 
defies the tribunes’ authority, the First Citizen warns that the intemperate general 
“shall well know / The noble tribunes are the people’s mouths, / And we their 
hands” (3.1.270-72). The First Citizen, who once wittily thwarted Menenius’   
attempts to figure the plebeians as the extremities of the body politic, now fig-
uratively incorporates the people as the tribunes’ hands and acknowledges that 
the people depend on the tribunes to speak for them. Thus, in the great scene of 
Coriolanus’s expulsion from Rome, the tribunes make the people their puppets: 
 
Sicinius: [...] in the name o’the’people, 
  And in the power of us the tribunes, we 
  E’en from this instant banish him our city 
  In peril of precipitation 
  From off the rock Tarpeian, never more 
 To enter our Rome gates. I’th’ people’s name 
 I say it shall be so. 
All: It shall be so, it shall be so! Let him away! 
 He’s banished, and it shall be so! 
[…] 
Brutus: There’s no more to be said, but he is banished 
 As enemy to the people and his country. 
 It shall be so! 
All: It shall be so, it shall be so! 
[…]  
Aedile: The people’s enemy is gone, is gone. 
All:  Our enemy is banished, he is gone. Hoo-hoo. 
Sicinius: Go see him out at gates, and follow him, 
As he hath followed you, with all despite. 
Give him deserved vexation.  Let a guard 
Attend us through the city. 
All:  Come, come, let’s see him our at gates. Come. 
 And the gods preserve our noble tribunes! Come. (3.1.103-09, 120-23, 140-47) 
 
Before they trade their own voices for political representation, the people deli-
berate amongst themselves (1.1.1-29), collectively resolve a course of action 
(1.1.30), and counter patrician ideology with their own entirely coherent analysis 
of inequality (1.1.15-17 and 70-76). “Hoo-hoo”: if the citizens can speak only 
words supplied by their tribunes, they have no voice of their own; if they can  
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only participate in political affairs by way – and on the say so – of the tribunes, 
they have lost their capacity for active citizenship; if the citizens are a hand 
moved by the will of others, they have lost their freedom.  
 
 
V 
 
In Coriolanus, Titus Andronicus, and Julius Caesar, political representation    
invariably monopolizes participation for the representing class and necessarily 
diminishes the freedom of the represented.  On Shakespeare’s account, political 
representation is incompatible with an ideal of freedom as non-domination be-
cause political representation – as a practice and as a mystification – makes those 
who are represented dependent on those who represent them. Skinner shares 
some of Shakespeare’s anxiety about representation: 
 
“It is […] open to us to meditate on the potential relevance of a theory which tells us that, 
if we wish to maximise our own individual liberty, we must cease to put our trust in 
princes, and instead take charge of the public arena ourselves. It will be objected that this 
is the merest nostalgic antimodernism. We have no realistic prospect of taking active control 
of the political processes in any modern democracy committed to the technical complexities 
and obsessional secrecies of present day government. But the objection is too crudely for-
mulated. There are many areas of public life, short of directly controlling the actual execu-
tive process, where increased public participation might well serve to improve the account-
ability of our soi disunt representatives […] unless we place our duties before our rights, 
we must expect to find our rights themselves undermined.” (Skinner, 1986, pp. 249-50)
    
Skinner is kin to those republicans who recognize representation as, at least po-
tentially, a threat to liberty, who would nod their heads to the American poli-
tician Al Smith’s great prescription that the “cure for the defects of democracy is 
more democracy.”9 
Pettit, by contrast, suggests that the ills of representative democracy can be 
cured by more representation. Pettit is a Madisonian in so far as he believes that 
democracy is both impractical and undesirable: “I assume that the prospect of 
plebiscitary government is infeasible and indeed that it would be wholly inimical 
to the cause of deliberation, so that democratic government is inevitably re-
presentative government” (Pettit, 2004, p. 52).  Pettit, then, simultaneously de-
nies the possibility of democracy and (unconvincingly) redefines democracy as 
                                                           
9  Smith’s remark was first recorded in 1923; I quote here from Smith, 1932, p. XX2.  
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representative government: “Systems of representative government, I shall as-
sume, are designed to give control over government to the people. Far from 
being an alternative to democracy […] they embody an institutional framework 
or rather a family of frameworks for realizing the democratic ideal of giving 
kratos to the demos, power to the people” (Pettit, 2010, p. 61; Pettit, 2004, p. 59).  
Pettit tames democracy by subsuming it within a system of representation, 
but he wants to defang it further because too much democracy – at least of the 
Athenian sort – is inimical to fostering deliberation. Deliberative democracy di-
verges from “the most familiar conception of the role of democracy…as the me-
ans whereby a people as a whole asserts its collective will” and instead embodies 
“an alternative conception [that] represents democracy, not as a regime for the 
expression of the collective will, but rather as a dispensation for the empower-
ment of public valuation” (Pettit, 2004, p. 58). Deliberative democracy requires, 
first of all, that we institute the most mediating form of political representation: 
 
“Indicative representers stand for the representees in the sense of typifying or epitomizing 
them; how they act is indicative of how the representees would act. Responsive  repre-
senters act for or speak for the representees, playing the part of an agent in relation to a 
principal; how they act is responsive to how the representees would want them to act. 
Both sorts of representation, so I shall assume, have to be authorized by the representees. 
Authorized indicative representers I describe as proxies, authorized responsive  represen-
ters as deputies. Deputies divide, in a traditional distinction, into delegates who are more 
or less explicitly directed by representees and trustees who have interpretive discretion in 
determining how to construe their representees.” (Pettit, 2010, p. 65) 
 
To serve the aims of deliberation and depoliticization, Pettit argues, “all public 
deputies will have to be interpretive trustees rather than directed delegates” 
(ibid., p. 78).  
Pettit’s preference for “interpretive trustees” further qualifies the limited role 
he assigns the demos. Democracy, Pettit argues, has “two dimensions”: “First, 
democracy has to orient government to all common, recognizable interests of its 
people. And, second, it has to orient it only to such common, recognizable inter-
ests” (Pettit, 2000, p. 114).  Pettit suggests that we think of these two dimensions 
as, respectively, authorial and editorial. The authorial dimension is positive:  
“ordinary people” participate by “searching out and generating a rich supply of 
presumptive common-interest policies” (ibid., p. 116). However, Pettit’s citizens 
will not directly articulate such policies; rather, the “authorial role has to be im-
plemented, clearly, by electoral institutions whereby policies and policy-making 
agencies are thoroughly discussed” (ibid., p. 116). Thus, the people are “the indi-
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rect, electoral authors of […] policies” that achieve articulate form only when 
“interpretive trustees […] construe their representees.”10  
Mediating the people’s authorial role is still an insufficient containment of 
the dangers of democracy in its “familiar” form: if “deliberation is to predomi-
nate, then the power of those representatives must be passed on in various areas 
to appointed boards and officials” (Pettit, 2004, p. 59). Editorial control – the 
“negative scrutinize-and-disallow dimension” of democracy – “cannot be exer-
cised collectively, in the manner of electoral, authorial control” because “what-
ever problems arose in the first dimension will recur in the second. The editorial 
control that democracy requires […] has got to be exercised by individuals or 
groups at a noncollective level” (Pettit, 2000, p. 118).11 All of the ills of Pettit’s 
Republic can’t be cured by more representation; some ills require the more radi-
cal cure of granting to non-elected “individuals and groups” something very like 
a negative voice in the legislative process. In 1642, Henry Parker claimed that 
Charles’ power to veto bills passed by the Lords and Commons “subjects [the 
English people] to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will, as any   
Nation under Heaven ever suffered under”; when, in 1649, Charles doggedly re-
fused to part with the negative voice, the champions of liberty parted his head 
from his body.12 
 
 
                                                           
10  Pettit believes that the people can trust that their own ideas will survive the mediation 
of representation because their representatives “have an incentive to enhance their 
chances of election and reelection by promoting any cause that can attract general 
support” (Pettit, 2000, p. 125). 
11  It is not particularly important to Pettit that such bodies be established by collective 
consent (ibid., p. 119). 
12  For Skinner on Charles’ “Negative Voice,” see Skinner, 2007, p. 238. Pettit insists 
that his non-elected editors would not possess a negative voice: “while editorial con-
trol must operate at noncollective levels, it cannot plausibly take the form of a veto” 
(Pettit, 2000, p. 118). But the editorial agencies that Pettit envisages could indeed 
thwart the will of the elected bodies whose purpose it is to generate policies for edito-
rial consideration. Such agencies would not resemble the Supreme Court – a check, 
that is, on the legislative branch; rather, they would be part of the legislative process 
and could prevent collectively generated “policy ideas” from becoming law (ibid., p. 
120). 
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 Unfreedom, Servitude, and the Social Bond 
SUSAN MASLAN 
 
 
“L’homme fut toujours dependant; par conséquent jamais libre, dans le sens de 
l’illustre citoyen de Genève,” declares P.L de Bauclair in his 1765 refutation of 
Rousseau’s On Social Contract (“Man has always been dependent and conse-
quently, man has never been free in the sense of the illustrious citizen of Geneva,” 
n.p. [p. 3]).1 Because human beings reproduce sexually and because the impulse 
to reproduce is an essential need, Bauclair explains, each human being neces-
sarily depends on another. Sexual reproduction creates a society; the force of life 
propels human beings into society and society is unfree since it is coextensive 
with dependence: 
 
“L’intérêt de la multiplication lui ayant suscité une campagne qu’il dut envisager comme 
une autre lui-même, ses besoins naturelles exigerent bientôt qu’il devint esclave, si cepen-
dant l’esclavage peut consister dans les égards qu’on rend aux individus de son éspèce [...] 
On conçoit aisément que la femme n’est pas plus maitresse de son sort: ses besoins et ses 
affections voluptueuses, sa faibless, ses infirmités lui firent sentir qu’elle n’était que la 
moitié d’un tout dont l’autre partie avantages.“ (Bauclair, 1765, pp. 3-4) 
 
“The desire to multiply provoked him to acquire a companion that he must have had to 
consider as a second self; his natural needs soon required that he become a slave, if, that 
is, slavery can be said to consist in the consideration that one owes to individuals of one’s 
species […] We can easily conceive that woman is even less mistress of her destiny: her 
needs and her voluptuous longings, her weakness, her infirmities caused her to feel that 
she was half of a whole whose other part lay outside her. She accepted the yoke with 
considerable pleasure since she perceived its many advantages to her.“ 
 
                                                           
1  All translations are my own unless specified otherwise.  
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“Slavery” here is nothing other than the work required to obtain and keep a sex-
ual partner. The “slavery” that nature imposes on us, Bauclair writes, is the ne-
cessity to please and satisfy other human beings. And although such a necessity 
would seem to be a fundamentally social compulsion, in fact it rests on an essen-
tializing notion of human beings as, above all bodies. Any social relations or 
social obligations spring immediately from basic bodily drives. Bauclair’s vision 
is strangely egalitarian, despite its assumption of the natural inequality of men 
and women, because it proposes that unfreedom is a form of mutual self-binding 
that does not regard sex or class but instead all humans as (mere, unqualified) 
humans.  
Of course Bauclair’s opening sentence is meant to echo and overturn Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s celebrated phrase “Man is born free and everywhere he is in 
chains.” Rousseau’s assertion provokes questions immediately: if man is born 
free, why is he in chains? How did this transformation occur? Can it be made 
right? Rousseau offers answers in The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 
(1754) and in On Social Contract (1762). But to pose the question is to posit a 
story of loss – of a movement that begins with a free, autonomous individual and 
ends with a miserable slave. Bauclair’s response is simple: we do not need to ask 
for an account, or a justification, because an autonomous individual never 
existed: man’s nature is to live in society and society means unfreedom. 
Rousseau’s great text and Bauclair’s slightly silly one both emerge out of a 
profound consciousness of society as, in Keith Baker’s words, “the essential 
frame of human existence” and the “essential domain of human practice” (Baker, 
2001, p. 84). Many, although certainly not all, enlightenment accounts of 
society’s institution posited a process whereby free individuals jointly bound 
themselves to a whole. The theory, although with tremendous variation, presu-
mes a loss of individual freedom and an acceptance of constraint. The forms, li-
mits, and practices of constraint would dictate a given society’s degree of free-
dom or unfreedom. For if wholesale subjection might logically seem a necessary 
correlative of society, it was less clear why the shape and experience of that sub-
jection should be variable. Put another way, why do some (and not others) com-
mand, and some (but not others) obey? If individuals are equally free prior to en-
tering into society why should they be unequally unfree upon joining it?  
This question was posed prior to the Enlightenment – surely Etienne de la 
Boétie and Montaigne come to mind – but it was posed with increasing fre-
quency, urgency, and even with more concreteness during the Enlightenment. 
Many answers were offered. Of course, some argued that inequality in society 
was simply an extension of inequality in nature; Rousseau rejected this explana-
tion most famously in The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Others argued 
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that social inequality was a vestige of ancient conquests. No matter which ac-
count was offered, one thing was clear: if a divine explanation was “set aside,” as 
Rousseau put it, some other explanation was required. Moreover, historical de-
scription could purport at best to detail how social inequality and the servitude that 
was its corollary arose and was institutionalized; it could not lend it legitimacy. 
In this essay, I would like to explore one writer’s response to this impasse. In 
L’Île des esclaves (Slave Island, 1725) Pierre Carlet de Chamblain de Marivaux, 
one of France’s greatest comic playwrights, suggests that there is no way out. 
The social institutionalization of servitude lacks legitimacy, and yet, the play’s 
plot and its denouement appear to conclude that servitude must persist, for it is 
synonymous with society itself. Political terms, like legitimacy, cease to make 
sense in Marivaux’s world and in their place Marivaux’s characters adopt the un-
reasoned language and action of affect and sacrifice. But Marivaux’s yoking of 
unfreedom and society differs importantly from that of Bauclair. Marivaux’s 
society, the society whose preservation trumps all other values, has no natural or 
bodily basis at all. It is absolutely anti-foundational. Marivaux repeatedly intro-
duces bodies in his play in the form of hints of love or accounts of physical suf-
fering only to reject the body as an agent, cause, or origin. Instead, human beings 
are above all formed by society itself.  
Marivaux’s relentless identification of society as cause, effect, and sole aim 
of human “nature” and human action allows him to concentrate on society’s fun-
damentally unequal distribution of unfreedom and to explore some of its ramifi-
cations. Marivaux was concerned with the relation between class position and 
personal identity throughout his career. Many of his plays turn on cross-dressing 
masters and servants. But the stakes of Marivaux’s canonical plays differ drama-
tically from those of Slave Island: in The Game of Love and Chance, for ex-
ample, disguise risks but also ensures a successful, class-appropriate betrothal. 
Slave Island, however, puts at stake the problem of social cohesion and its rela-
tion to subordination. In Slave Island, Marivaux asks how social relations can be 
maintained given the fact of servitude and, conversely, how social relations can 
be maintained in the absence of servitude. In this one-act play, Marivaux seems 
to represent the fall of voluntary servitude. Given the chance afforded by the 
utopian, green world of the island, the servants, seemingly good students of La 
Boétie, declare their servitude at an end. They cease to recognize their master’s 
dominion over them. The play then presents a difficult social problem: how to 
reestablish relations of mastery and servitude in the full recognition that those re-
lations are without political or moral legitimacy or efficacy.  
Servants offer a remarkably literal example of voluntary servitude: for them 
this was no metaphor. Slavery and servitude are resonant terms in the figural 
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language of politics in eighteenth-century France. Rousseau’s great axiom – 
“man is born free and everywhere he is in chains” – is only the most famous 
example. But servants were not just figures or metaphors; they made up roughly 
one-tenth of the population of Paris and something like one-thirteenth of the po-
pulation of France. Servants were both utterly familiar and uncannily unfamiliar. 
They were emphatically visible in public and of course ever present in the home. 
Yet servants were overwhelmingly strangers: nearly all were migrant workers 
from the countryside come alone to towns and cities in search of work; turnover 
was remarkably high and a source of persistent annoyance to masters. Servants 
often stood apart from their working class fellows geographically since they 
lived with their masters; sartorially, since they often wore livery or their masters’ 
cast-off clothes; even linguistically, since they might speak a different dialect. 
They were also nearly universally unmarried. Nor was there necessarily much 
society among servants since the vast majority of them did not work in large 
multi-servant homes. In all these ways, servants’ social bonds seem more 
tenuous, more modest than do those of many other groups: artisans, for example, 
had customers, employees, landlords, guilds, and families of their own. Con-
temporaries seemed obsessively interested in the one bond into which servants 
entered: that with masters (Maza, 1983 and Fairchild, 1984).  
A wealth of writing – religious tracts, conduct books, treatises on household 
management, etc. – sought to explain the correct relation and reciprocal obliga-
tion of masters and servants. Much of that literature suggested a paternalistic   
relation. That is, the master-servant bond could be understood only by way of a 
figural assimilation to what was a putatively natural relation: masters were like 
parents; servants were like children. On this account, masters owed protection 
and servants owed obedience and fidelity. The metaphor of the family, of course, 
could be put to work to explain nearly all social structures: kings are like fathers, 
fathers are like kings; children are like servants; fathers are like masters, etc. In 
other words, all these relations could be understood as constructing and parti-
cipating in a metaphorical, rather than a natural or literal system. The presence of a 
social term like the servant in such a system simply underscores the artificiality, 
the sociality of the system as a whole even as the purpose of this figural system 
is precisely to naturalize relations. The servant relation reveals the essential truth 
of all these relations: they are all figural. There is no prior literal, natural, 
transcendent term to serve as a stable point from which to derive the metaphor. 
To propose that the relation between servants and masters was paternalistic, in 
other words, is just to reframe rather than answer the question (Maza, 1983, pp. 
7-18 and pp. 317-318; Fairchild, 1984, pp. 5-6 and pp. 137-144; Montesquieu, 
1951, bk 23, chs 1-7, pp. 682-87; and Rousseau, 1997, bk 1, ch 2). 
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If some commentators assimilated servants to the model of the family, others 
understood them in relation to slavery (Sarti, 2005). On the one hand, the racial 
nature of contemporary slavery helped clarify the difference between white do-
mestic servants in France and enslaved African servants in the colonies. On the 
other hand, slavery was still largely theorized in relation to the classical world – 
where slaves and masters might not be distinguished from one another by what 
the French revolutionaries called the “aristocracy of color” – rather than in rela-
tion to contemporary practices. That servants were not slaves seemed clear; yet 
that both groups were characterized by their state of personal servitude some-
times made this distinction less than absolute (Linguet, 1767). Nor did consent 
draw a bright line between slavery and servanthood in early modern France. Sla-
very in the classical world was often seen as having an origin in consent: people 
were enslaved when, after a military defeat, they consented to exchange their li-
berty for their life. Moreover, servants themselves understood that their own 
consent was not necessarily freely given; necessity compelled many to become 
servants. Once engaged as household servants, their freedom to leave their mas-
ters was curtailed by law and they were not legally protected from physical pu-
nishment (Fairchilds, 1984, pp. 123-124). 
The anonymous poet who gives voice to a male servant in “L’État de ser-
vitude, ou la misère des domestiques,” (“The State of Servitude, or the Servant’s 
Misery,” 1711), and who may have been a servant himself, at once assumes and 
disowns responsibility for having become a servant: 
 
“[…]  je suis un grand benais [sic], 
Je suis un grand faquin de m’être mis laquais: 
Quand un sort malheureux la cruelle inconstance 
Aurait versé sur moi sa maligne influence, 
Quand le Ciel justement irrité contre moi, 
M’aurait laissé sans bien, sans crédit, sans emploi, 
Fallait-il pour cela par un esprit de rage, 
M’empêtrer dans les fers d’un si rude esclavage, 
Et sur ce vil état fondant tout mon appui, 
M’asservir lâchement au caprice d’autrui?” (Anon., 1711, n.p. [p.2]). 
 
“[…] I am a great fool, 
I am a great idiot to have made myself a lackey: 
When a miserable fate and cruel deception 
Enveloped me with its evil influence, 
When heaven, justly angry with me, 
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Left me without property, help, or occupation, 
Was it necessary, nonetheless, that in a rage, 
I bound myself with the irons of such a brutal slavery, 
And relying for all my support on this vile condition, 
I have, like a coward, subjected myself to the caprices of another?” 
 
The servant partly blames forces beyond his control (“un sort malheureux,” “le 
ciel”) for the desperate straits in which he found himself, but he attributes his 
“vil état” to his own agency: “de m’être mis lacquais”; “m’empêtrer dans les 
fers.” The servant, then, allows that he serves a master by his own consent, and 
yet he describes his service as “rude esclavage.” To be subject to the “caprice 
d’autrui,” the servant suggests, is to inhabit a servitude no different from that of 
slavery even if one has submitted oneself to this subjection. The condition of 
being bound by the will of another, regardless of the circumstances of its insti-
tution, is sufficient to unsettle the distinction between servant and slave. And, for 
this poet, such a fate merits the language of tragedy. While this speaker is a great 
fool and of lowly position hence suitable for comedy, he is also sufficiently dig-
nified to have earned the wrath of heavens – a position usually reserved for tra-
gic, not comic figures. The tragic language, seemingly misplaced in the mouth of 
a lackey, might make the domestic servant more ridiculous – but it might also 
ennoble the suffering of servitude. If tragic heroism seems to depend on posses-
sing a self-directed will, this poet’s appropriation of tragic language to describe 
the misfortunes of heteronomy would seem to create a new kind of tragic subject 
(Arnold, 2007). 
Servants resemble slaves not only because of the type of labor they perform 
but, more significantly, because they must obey the “caprice d’autrui,” the will 
of another. Certainly this was a widely held conception of servants. When politi-
cians in the early days of the French Revolution excluded servants from the fran-
chise and from eligibility to hold office, they argued that slaves could not exer-
cise political rights because they lacked a “volonté propre,” that is, their own  
independent will. Servants act as mere means to accomplish the ends of the mas-
ter: they may act as an extension or reflection of the master, or, on the contrary, 
as the antithesis of the master performing work the master would never perform. 
In all these cases, the servant’s actions are willed and dictated by another. The 
servant is a thoroughly heteronomous subject. In a world that increasingly iden-
tifies autonomy as the chief quality and qualification of the modern subject, ser-
vants, as Sarah Maza points out, seem to be pre-modern (Maza, 1983, p. 4). 
Marivaux’s Slave Island does not focus on the political category of the will; 
Marivaux seems less interested in the problem of self-direction than in the     
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psychological and material conditions of servitude. Thus the play underscores 
the ways in which the master-servant relation denies the servant’s personhood 
and it insists on servitude’s physical suffering. Marivaux’s reflection on unfree-
dom in Slave Island is fundamentally social, not political. The play explores the 
ways in which lived experiences of freedom and unfreedom shape society and 
humanity itself. For Marivaux, modernity does not signal humanity’s throwing 
off its shackles, but rather new organizations and practices, new consciousnesses, 
and new meanings of heteronomy. In this sense, servants offer new figures of 
humanity and modernity.  
 
 
SERVITUDE AND COMEDY 
 
Servants were not only central to Old Regime France’s social order; they were 
central to its theatrical order. In so many of the period’s plays, servants 
construct, unsettle, and dismantle social bonds as they ferry messages, reveal  
secrets, articulate truths, and conspire with and against their masters. There can 
be no tragedy without the stage presence of inferior confidants to hear senti-
ments voiced or, like Phèdre’s nurse Oenone, to carry out actions beneath the 
dignity of their masters. There can be no comedy without the bumbling but truth 
revealing queries, interjections or literalisms of the servant class. While the 
number of servant characters who enable dramatic plots is legion, the degree to 
which playwrights were interested in servants is variable. And while some ser-
vants are major characters, for example, Dom Juan’s servant Sganarelle, it 
remains nearly always the case that servants act as agents of their masters rather 
than agents of their own will. The abundant presence of servant characters on the 
French stage is not only functional in nature; instead I want to suggest that in this 
most social of art forms, the representation of servants also permitted authorial 
reflection on the practical and theoretical issues the social presence of servants 
and the practices of service and servitude posed. 
In the first moments of Slave Island, a one-act play that launched Marivaux’s 
trilogy of island plays about the constitution of human society, a male servant 
Arlequin, and his master Iphicrate look about themselves in the aftermath of a 
shipwreck that has cast them up on the shores of a remote island. Soon after, 
they meet a female servant Cléanthis and her mistress Euphrosine. Soon after  
the curtain rises, then, the audience of this comedy sees before it fissionable ma-
terial that must, one would think, produce one of two dramatic resolutions: we 
might be on our way to radical couplings (the servant Arlequin and the mistress 
Euphrosine; the master Iphicrate and the servant Cléanthis) or to conventional 
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couplings (the servants Arlequin and Cléanthis and the aristocratic masters 
Iphicrate and Euphronise). But Slave Island does not end with marriages or ro-
mantic unions of any sort, although perhaps we could call the play a comedy of 
remarriage that ends with servants and masters reunited after an estrangement. 
My point, for now, is that we expect these four characters to knit themselves   
together romantically, and they do not: at the end of the play, the only relation-
ships that bind these characters are relations of servitude. Among these four pro-
tagonists, society is nothing other than the bond between masters and servants. 
And despite the term “esclave” and despite the background of a fictional Athens 
and the green world of the island, it is clear the play is set in contemporary 
society – the major preoccupation with gallantry, with vanity, and with super-
ficiality are all hallmarks of critiques of French society throughout the eighteenth 
century – it is likewise evident that the characters Arlequin and Cléanthis are 
meant to be French servants, not classical slaves.  
If Marivaux thwarts our generic expectations about comedy, our assumption 
that the two unattached men and two unattached women we meet at the outset of 
the play must pair off into two romantic couples, he also thwarts our generic and 
philosophical expectations about utopian texts and the discourse of social for-
mation. When we discover that the island our protagonists find themselves on is 
inhabited and governed by slaves (or, rather, ex-slaves who are now free), we 
know we are in the speculative, philosophical realm – one so important to Mari-
vaux’s moment – of the social blank slate. What sort of society would ex-slaves 
create? The answer, it seems, is a utopia that seeks to eradicate, rather than re-
produce in a different form, the relations of servitude under which the slaves  
once suffered. Trivelin, who is the representative of the island’s political order 
and the only inhabitant of the island we ever see, explains to the new arrivals 
that the ex-slaves have constituted themselves as a Republic of equal citizens:  
fate may have given them the opportunity to be free, but their own actions and 
choices have maintained them in freedom. The citizens of the island even have 
an unusual scheme to spread freedom: they enslave any masters whom ship-
wreck brings to their shores, but the period of enslavement is limited to three 
years and its aim is therapeutic rather than exploitive. The ex-slaves temporarily 
enslave masters only to humanize them:  
 
“Nous ne vengeons plus de vous, nous vous corrigeons; ce n’est plus votre vie que nous 
poursuivons, c’est la barbarie de vos coeurs que nous voulons détruire; nous vous jetons 
dans l’esclavage pour vous rendre sensibles aux maux qu’on y éprouve. […] Votre escla-
vage, ou plutôt votre cours d’humanité, dure trois ans, au bout desquels on vous renvoie. 
[…] Vous voilà en mauvais état, nous entreprenons de vous guérir; vous êtes moins nos 
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esclaves que nos malades, et nous ne prenons que trois ans pour vous rendre sains, c’est-à-
dire humains, raisonnables et généreux pour toute la vie.” 
 
“We no longer take revenge on you; we correct you. We no longer pursue your life; we 
seek to destroy the barbarity of your hearts. We enslave you in order to make you more 
sensitive to the sufferings felt by those in servitude. […] Your enslavement, or rather your 
course in humanization, lasts three years at the end of which we send you back . […] You 
are in a bad condition, we undertake to cure you; you are less our slaves than our patients 
and we only require three years to make you healthy, that is to say, human, reasonable, 
and generous for the rest of your lives.” (Marivaux, 1955, p. 430)  
 
Much could no doubt be said about how the two great secular discourses of im-
provement, education and medicine, have replaced Christian morality and con-
version here. Indeed, the play retains the Christian theme of suffering only to 
turn it to this secular account. Marivaux, however, was apparently dubious about 
the fruits of sentimental education: at the end of the play, Iphicrate and Euphro-
sine have not been educated out of their desire to have others serve them; the 
play does not dwell at all on the “hearts” of the masters, it does not stage a pro-
cess of “sensibilization.” For despite the importance of the language of feeling in 
this play, the characters’ interior affective states do not really matter and are not 
explored onstage. Ironically, Arlequin and Cléanthis are the ones who become 
good, sentimental subjects. They take pity on Iphicrate’s and Euphrosine’s “suf-
fering,” which is identical to their loss of status – though Marivaux, in yet 
another case of withholding, never shows us the masters serving the ex-slaves – 
and, rather than stay on the island, they sail back to civilization willingly with 
their masters, sustained by the modest hope – and it is only a hope – that their 
servitude will now be gentler. 
 To understand the play’s disappointments – no romantic unions, not even a 
glimpse of the Republic of ex-slaves, no transformation in which Iphicrate and 
Euphrosine learn to abhor subjecting Arlequin and Cléanthis to their wills – we 
have to take stock of Marivaux’s radical privileging of servitude as the foun-
dation of society and of his equally radical account of the bond between master 
and servant as the essence of the social bond. Marivaux’s entire oeuvre reveals a 
fascination with servants. In Marivaux’s most celebrated plays, masters and 
mistresses often temporarily exchange clothing and places with their servants as 
they pursue love and marriage; this theatrical probing of the fragility of class 
identity is replaced in the island plays by a more transparent meditation on the 
relation between servants and social order, on the place of servitude in the foun-
dation of society. We can see this shift in the very populations of the island 
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plays. In Marivaux’s comedies with conventional settings, the masters always 
outnumber the servants; the servants, after all, merely further the plots of their 
masters and so that servants’ other relationships – with fathers, mothers, and sib-
lings – are not represented. Those potential social bonds have been displaced by 
domestic service. In Slave Island, by contrast, humanity always appears in two, 
equally represented forms: servant and master. Thus, Slave Island stages a pri-
mal scene: with Trivelin as an onstage spectator, Iphicrate, Euphrosine, Arelquin 
and Cléanthis play out the formation of social order. How, Marivaux asks, can 
humanity – in the sense of a bond shared by all human beings – itself be pre-
served? How, in other words, can the dispersion of humanity into solitary, indif-
ferent atoms be prevented? 
Dispersion, rather than physical violence (Hobbes’ state of war), is the un-
speakable threat. When Arlequin learns that he has been washed up on the island 
of slaves, he announces that he is going to leave his master, Iphicrate. “Chacun à 
ses affaires,” he announces, “que je ne vous dérange pas,” (“to each his own, 
don’t let me bother you,” Marivaux, 1955, p. 427). When Arlequin takes his 
leave – “Adieu, mon ami,” (“farewell, my friend”) – Iphicrate pursues him 
sword in hand (ibid., p. 428). As we shall see, it is telling both that Iphicrate as-
sumes that only physical violence could enforce servitude and that the drawing 
of his sword has no effect. Arlequin does not offer any physical threat to his 
(perhaps now former) master; he simply refuses to recognize him as his master 
and, in the    absence of some external structure to enforce servitude, it seems 
that simply refusing to recognize a social bond is sufficient to efface it.  
Iphicrate’s desperate need for Arlequin’s help seems to anticipate a Rousse-
auian analysis: being a master has made Iphicrate the needy dependent of his 
servant. Moreover, that it also goes without saying that Arlequin does not share 
Iphicrate’s desire to leave the island – why give up being a citizen in a Republic 
to return to servitude in a hierarchical society? – suggests that the asymmetry 
between the master’s interest and the servant’s interest is (or should be) intole-
rable and unsustainable. Since it is clearly in the servants’ interest to remain on 
the island and the master’s interest to leave the island, resolution can be found 
only by superseding the category of interest. As we shall see, the rhetoric of sen-
timent, of the heart, of “sensibilité” is offered as just such a supercession. 
Neither the sword nor interest can produce social formations among the four 
protagonists, but feeling eventually does. This feeling is purportedly created by 
the former servant’s witnessing of the former masters’ suffering. But strangely, 
the only suffering the masters are forced to undergo on stage has nothing to do 
with the physical burdens of servitude. Rather, Iphicrate and Euphrosine suffer a 
dissolution of identity – an identity which consists solely in their status as master 
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and which therefore, ironically, is once again utterly dependent on Arlequin and 
Cléanthis. The masters suffer when they are forced to listen as their former sla-
ves describe their characters and habits.  
 
Trivelin: il est nécessaire que vous m’en donniez un portrait, qui se doit faire devant la 
personne qu’on peint, afin qu’elle se connaisse, qu’elle rougisse de ses ridicules, si elle en 
a, et qu’elle se corrige. 
[…] 
Cléanthis: Vaine, minaudière et coquette, si cela la regarde? Eh! Voilà ma chère maitresse; 
cela lui ressemble comme son visage. 
[…] 
Euphrosine: Je n’y saurais tenir. (Marivaux, 1955, p. 433) 
 
Trivelin: you must depict her character for me and you must rehearse this description in 
the presence of the person you depict so that she can come to know herself, to blush for 
her foolishness if she is foolish, and to correct herself. 
[…] 
Cléanthis: Vain, affected, a flirt, does that describe her? That’s my dear mistress, that is 
her to a tee. 
[…] 
Euphrosine: I cannot withstand this. 
 
These portrait scenes – although quite mild in their criticism – are portrayed as 
indescribably painful for the masters. Arlequin and Cléanthis describe their mas-
ters’ vanity, silliness, and pettiness. The pain these scenes produce is that of the 
destruction of the masters’ narcissistic satisfaction. Under the regime of servi-
tude, Arlequin and Cléanthis serve as flattering mirrors for their masters. By    
offering undistorted images in the portrait scenes, the servants not only dissolve 
their masters’ sense of self, they annul the bond between them precisely because 
that bond had been predicated on the servants’ distortingly reflective function. 
The portrait scenes also underscore the tight relation between servants and come-
dy itself since dramatic theorists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries con-
tinued to argue that comedy was a social mirror: comedy showed audiences their 
faults so that they might correct them.  
The relation between masters and servants supports the masters’ social iden-
tities and in so doing sustains their deepest subjectivities. But this same relation 
works to deprive the servants of any inter-subjective recognition at all. Indeed, 
the masters deny the servants what we might well think of as the most funda-
mental attribute of personhood: a name. When Trivelin asks Arlequin “Comment 
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vous appellez-vous?” (“what is your name?”) Arlequin makes clear that names 
are the property of masters alone: 
 
Arlequin: Est-ce mon nom que vous demandez? 
Trivelin:  Oui, vraiment. 
Arlequin:  Je n’en ai point, mon camarade. 
Trivelin:  Quoi donc, vous n’en avez pas! 
Arlequin:  Non, mon camarade, je n’en ai que des sobriquets qu’il m’a donné; il m’appelle 
quelquefois Arlequin, quelquefois Hé. (Marivaux, 1955, p. 428) 
 
Arlequin: Are you asking my name? 
Trivelin:  Yes, of course. 
Arlequin:  I don’t have one my friend. 
Trivelin:  What do you mean you don’t have one! 
Arlequin:  No my friend. I only have nicknames that he has given me. Sometimes he calls 
me Harlequin, sometimes he calls me Hey You.2 
 
The master, on the other hand, has a proper name just as he has property in him-
self: speaking of Iphicrate, Arlequin explains “il s’appelle par un nom lui,” 
(“him, he’s got a name”). Despite the depersonalizing practices of servitude, Ar-
lequin and Cléanthis are represented as full, morally autonomous beings: they 
know their own minds; they observe social relations accurately; they express 
their own judgments clearly and forcefully; they make decisions. The masters, 
on the contrary, are seemingly ineffective and often speechless. 
While Marivaux shows masters’ selves predicated entirely upon their mas-
tery over others, he represents slaves/servants’ selves as grounded in their huma-
nity, a humanity understood as a kind of affective self-presence and thus outside 
and beyond the seemingly closed system of servitude and hence autonomous. 
But the autonomy of this humanity is also resolutely social since it requires a 
“coeur bon” – that is, a sympathy with the sufferings of others in order to come 
into being. 
What can establish a lasting social bond? Marivaux immediately dismisses 
the notion of a legitimate, or for that matter efficacious, social bond based on 
force. Marivaux was not making his point subtly here: while Arlequin and Trivelin 
                                                           
2  Marivaux might have found inspiration for this exchange on names from the practice, 
common at the time, of servant’s employers to rename them and refer to them by the 
name of the province from which they came.  Both Maza (1983) and Fairchilds (1984) 
discuss this practice. 
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are traditional names of zani from the commedia dell’arte repertory, the male mas-
ter Iphicrate is named for an Athenian general – ironically, a man of humble birth 
– and his name literally means “rule by force.” Arlequin reminds Iphicrate repea-
tedly that his characteristic mode of relation to him has been physical violence:  
 
Iphicrate: Mais je ne te comprends point, mon cher Arlequin. 
Arlequin:  Mon cher patron, vos compliments me charment; vous avez coutume de m’en 
faire à coups de gourdin […] et le gourdin est dans la chaloupe.  
Iphicrate:  Eh! Ne sais-tu pas que je t’aime? 
Arlequin:  Oui; mais les marques de votre amitié tombent toujours sur mes épaules, et cela 
est mal placé. (Marivaux, 1955, p. 427) 
 
Iphicrate: But I do not understand your point my dear Arlequin. 
Arlequin:  My dear boss, your compliments are charming; your custom usually is to make 
them with blows from a club […] and the club is in the boat. 
Iphicrate:  But don’t you know that I love you? 
Arlequin:  Yes; but the marks of your affection always fall on my shoulders and that is a 
bad place for them. 
 
The reversal of position demonstrates the bankruptcy of the argument that might 
can make right: Iphicrate recognizes no legitimate authority in Arlequin once 
their roles are switched. Force may create servitude but it cannot create right or 
obligation and it is therefore prone to produce not only suffering but instability: 
“Tu me traitais comme un pauvre animal,” (“you treated me like a poor ani-
mal,”) muses Arlequin, taking up arguments that Montesquieu had worked 
through just a few years earlier in his tales of the Troglodytes, “et tu disais que 
cela était juste, parce que tu étais le plus fort. Eh bien! Iphicrate, tu vas trouver 
ici plus fort que toi,” (“and you used to say that that was just because you were 
the strongest. Oh well, Iphicrate, you will find something stronger than you 
here”, Marivaux, 1955, p. 427). 
But Arlequin’s quick political-philosophical awakening is more profound; he 
recognizes that his own participation, indeed his own consent, endowed Iphicrate 
with the power of mastery: “Doucement,” he warns the threatening Iphicrate, 
“tes forces sont bien diminuées, car je n’obéis plus,” (“be careful, your forces are 
greatly diminished because I no longer obey you,” Marivaux, 1955, p. 428). 
Arlequin explains, in other words, that he had delegated his own power and 
agency to his master and that Arlequin’s power was the source of his master’s 
power over him. Arlequin’s consent to his servitude constituted the bond 
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between them, and his refusal to consent to his own disempowerment dissolves 
that bond. 
If social relations maintained by coercion are neither a legitimate nor a stable 
foundation for a social order, what might produce more felicitous, more effica-
cious social cohesion? The answer Marivaux seems to entertain is the force of 
love. A new society which has overcome the obstacles of social hierarchy that 
separated its members and is newly bound by love, would seem to fulfill per-
fectly the generic requirements of comedy. Marivaux tantalizes us with the pos-
sibility that the four castaways might pair off into cross-class couples: the ser-
vants cook up a plot to order Euphrosine to marry Arlequin and Iphicrate to marry 
Cléanthis, but Marivaux then stages the unspeakable impossibility of such a re-
solution. Nor does Marivaux develop the more conventional prospect of ending 
his play with the marriage of Iphicrate and Euprosine and the marriage of the 
servants Arlequin and Cléanthis. Such a resolution would posit a sexual or ro-
mantic satisfaction as a substitute for a political one. Such a solution would ele-
vate the transcendent value of love in and for itself above worldly values of rank 
or power; such a revaluation too would seem to provide a suitable comic 
reshaping of the play’s social world. But Marivaux offers none of that. The 
play’s structure keeps reminding us of the possibility that the society of masters 
and slaves could be united by ties of love, desire, and even kinship, but Marivaux 
relentlessly presents only one social relation, only one social bond – the bond 
between master and servant, and makes the possibility of society depend upon it. 
Marivaux’s exclusive representation of the master servant bond as the sole social 
bond and the foundation of society itself begs the question of how, exactly, 
society is to reproduce itself. The exclusion of reproductive sex, indeed all sex, in 
this comedy, underscores the purely social, rather than natural, account of human 
relations. 
To achieve a resolution the play must re-establish and re-affirm a bond 
among subjects who have no bond. Marivaux rejects something like a natural  
basis for subjection: nothing that happens on the island affirms that masters are 
naturally superior to their servants. He rejects another possible natural bond 
when he rejects sexual desire as the basis for a social bond. The play goes out of 
its way to negate any basis for affection between master and servant. And yet the 
resolution to the crisis is nothing other than an explosion of sentiment: “Que 
vois-je? vous pleurez mes enfants; vous vous embrassez,” (“what do I see? You 
are crying my children, you embrace each other,” Marivaux, 1955, p. 451), Tri-
velin asks rhetorically as both servants are on their knees before their masters, 
kissing their hands, and they all embrace as the final scene begins.  
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The play makes this sentimental outpouring and resolution dependent on 
Arlequin’s unearned, unmerited and therefore absolutely freely given compas-
sion. Upon seeing Euphrosine’s unhappiness, Arlequin is moved and when his 
master Iphicrate reproaches Arlequin for his lack of affection and fidelity, despite 
Arlequin’s clear-sighted understanding that his master has never shown him any-
thing but violence and scorn – “tu disais bien que tu m’aimais, toi, quand tu me 
faisais batter,” (“sure, you used to say you loved me when you were having me 
beaten,” Marivaux, 1955, p. 447) – he is moved to accept once again his sub-
altern position, to pardon his master’s past faults, and to leave the island of the 
slaves and to return with his master to resume their former life together. When 
Cléanthis sees this reconciliation between Arlequin and his master, she follows 
the example, despite her own mistress’s lack of repentance for her cruelty. The 
masters in turn appear to be moved by their servants outpouring of sentiment: 
Iphicrate exclaims “Mon cher Arlequin, fasse le ciel, après ce que je viens 
d’entendre, que j’aie la joie de te montrer un jour les sentiments que tu me 
donnes pour toi!” (“My dear Arlequin, after what I have just heard, may heaven 
someday allow me the joy of showing you the feelings you have inspired in me!” 
Marivaux, 1955, p. 448). But Iphicrate’s “someday” seems a meager guarantee 
of change. In the final scene Trivelin congratulates the servants on their success-
ful conclusion to the social experiment and everyone on their good feelings and 
he counsels the masters to learn to be less cruel.  
For those seeking a representation of social change, this conclusion is obvi-
ously a disappointment. It is also less than compelling dramatically since it is at 
odds with all that comes before. We can, of course, read the sentimental con-
clusion as a kind of ideology, a way to mask real social conflict. But what is stri-
king is precisely the anti-foundational nature of that sentiment. No change, no 
revelation, no act inspires the servants to love their masters. For Marivaux, the 
sentiment that re-forms the bonds between master and servant is nothing other 
than the recognition that nothing links them and the recognition that such a 
nothingness is impossible. Iphicrate argues repeatedly to Arlequin that they are 
bound by affection, friendship, and love. He invokes too the ethical weight of 
duty that, he believes, should tie Arlequin to him. But Arlequin refutes all these 
claims with ease and in each case points out the pure violence of the relation 
between them. Yet, precisely because Arlequin perceives the lack of any ethical 
or affective basis for the social bond between master and servant, he is never 
convinced by his master’s claims, he alone freely chooses to resume that relation: 
 
“Tu me remontres bien mon devoir ici pour toi; mais tu n’as jamais su le tien pour moi. 
[…] Tu veux que je partage ton affliction, et jamais tu n’as partagé la mienne. Eh bien! 
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Va, je dois avoir le cœur meilleur que toi; car il y a plus longtemps que je souffre, et que 
je sais ce que c’est que de la peine. Tu m’as battu par amitié: puisque tu le dis, je te le  
pardonne. […] Je parlerai en ta faveur à mes camarades, je les prierai de te renvoyer, et 
s’ils ne le veulent pas, je te garderai comme mon ami; car je ne te ressemble pas, moi; je 
n’aurai point le courage d’être heureux à tes dépens.” 
 
“You remind me of my duty to you here but you never knew your duty to me. […] You 
want me to share your affliction and you never shared mine. Oh well, so be it! I must have 
a better heart than you do because I have suffered for a long time and because I know 
what pain is. You beat me out of friendship, since you say so, I forgive you for it. […] I 
will talk to my comrades on your behalf, I will beg them to send you back and if they will 
not I will keep you as my friend because I do not resemble you. I will not have the cour-
age to be happy at your expense.” (Marivaux, p. 448) 
 
Arlequin refutes the very idea of a shared human commonality, “je ne te res-
semble pas,” and makes this lack the basis and the engine for a social bond, “je 
te garderai comme mon ami car je ne te ressemble pas,” (“I will keep you as a 
friend because I do not ressemble you.”) Unlike Iphicrate, Arlequin cannot esta-
blish his “happiness,” that is his freedom, at the expense of the freedom of 
another--by expropriating the will of another. But the initial plan, to send 
Iphicrate back or to remain on the island with him bound by friendship, is imme-
diately and without elaboration or explanation altered. Indeed, in the very next 
exchange with Iphicrate, Arlequin abandons the familiar “tu,” resumes the hie-
rarchical “vous” along with his slave costume, and asks Trivelin for a boat so he 
and Cléanthis can go back to Athens with their masters. In other words, once the 
lack of any real social bond is recognized as fact and once that fact is rejected 
not as untrue but as unsustainable, the only way the social bond can be resumed 
is in the form of subordination and servitude. The emotional force that explodes 
onstage is the force of the simultaneous admission and refusal of the impossi-
bility of a social bond based on subordination. The libidinal source of that emo-
tional energy is the force of terror and necessity. 
Arlequin apprehends the absence of any basis for a bond; by willingly accep-
ting his subjection, he manages to stave off the terror of the absence of social 
bonds. The ability to see for humanity, as it were, while the other characters per-
ceive and act as atomized individuals, makes Arlequin the embodiment of the 
human and the founder of society. Arlequin renounces his own pursuit of happi-
ness. He willingly accepts the expropriation of his will in favor of society – “je 
n’aurai point le courage d’être heureux à tes dépens,” (“I will not have the cou-
rage to be happy at your expense.”) He accepts, in other words, that a constitutive 
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heteronomy is the norm of a social order that sees itself precisely as based on the 
will of its members – here invoked by that most political of eighteenth-century 
words: “happiness.” In a sense, Arlequin reveals by literalizing the fundamental 
and inescapable truth not only that to live with others is to be unfree, but that 
society survives only because of the consensual assumption of an unequal un-
freedom.  
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 Naturally free, politically unfree 
Voltaire’s Quakers and the modern discourse of human rights 
INGVILD HAGEN KJØRHOLT 
 
 
A recurring question echoes through the seemingly endless volumes that consti-
tute Voltaire’s œuvre: how might freedom materialize in real historical societies? 
The Enlightenment philosophe repeatedly defined “freedom” as a matter of tol-
erance. Tolerance not only ensures individual freedom; as tolerant religious or 
political authorities do not interfere in the citizens’ thoughts and actions, they 
encourage a dynamic public sphere and, consequently, tolerance also furthers 
societies’ economic as well as intellectual growth. In well-known works such as 
Lettres philosophiques (1734) or Candide (1759), Voltaire shows how religious 
and political tyranny constantly lead to conflicts while unhindered commerce 
and scientific progress are the true sources of prosperity and peace. Such an in-
clination to correlate freedom with the absence of external intervention – thus 
emphasizing a liberal concept of freedom as non-interference – becomes visible 
in the author’s representations of ideal societies, such as the legendary Eldorado 
or contemporary England. It has led, among scholars, to the generally accepted 
view of Voltaire as an early liberal thinker. 
Yet, a more thorough inquiry of the author’s notion of freedom implies that 
this view needs to be modified. Candide’s Eldorado – the incarnation of an en-
lightened society – or indeed the London Exchange scene in the sixth philo-
sophical letter – where Presbyterians and Jews cooperate to further the common 
good – each clearly illustrate that Voltaire pictures a state of non-interference in 
utopian terms. He represents both the fictional land of gold and the actual Ex-
change as communities too good to be true. From a realist point of view, both 
world history and contemporary European politics continually reveal to Voltaire 
that freedom should rather be regarded as absence of domination. This view is 
predominant in Lettres philosophiques where the author convincingly argues that 
English citizens are free due to the British constitution, while, on the other hand, 
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Frenchmen are not free as their lives depend upon arbitrary power – the will of 
the Prince.  
In defining freedom as non-domination rather than non-interference, Voltaire 
relies on classical republicanism and the Roman conception of freedom, accord-
ing to which the distinction between free subjects and slaves is of crucial im-
portance. While free men enjoy certain individual rights within a legal constitu-
tion, slaves are dependent on the will of their masters. “Unfreedom” thus means 
to be subordinated to arbitrary power (cf. Skinner, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the obvious contrast between free English citizens and unfree 
French slaves is not the only configuration of a republican notion of freedom in 
Voltaire’s philosophical letters. The kind of unfreedom that will be questioned in 
the following is not contrary to, but, rather, an inherent part of the idea of free-
dom as non-domination: i. e. the idea of “natural liberty.” More specifically, I 
will argue that the representation of the Quakers in Lettres philosophiques ex-
poses the shortcomings, or rather the unfreedom, of natural liberty. By illu-
strating how freedom necessarily follows from citizenship and the citizens’ parti-
cipation in political life, the Quaker letters reveal that non-domination does not 
necessarily equal freedom. The letters indicate that Voltaire’s œuvre touches a 
problem inherent in 18th century discourses on liberty and human rights, and that 
it ought to be discussed within the framework of classical republicanism. 
 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF FREEDOM: ANALYTICAL AND 
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy offers an analytical framework for a dis-
cussion of the notion of natural liberty and the difficulties it entails with respect 
to a political concept of freedom. In Arendt’s view, freedom is not only a question 
of domination. Taking a specific historical notion of political organisation as her 
point of reference, the city state or polis in ancient Greece, Arendt stresses the 
crucial association of freedom with politics as she emphasizes that “[t]he mean-
ing of politics is freedom” (Arendt, 2005, p. 108). Individuals gain freedom by 
fulfilling their citizen duties inside the walls of a delimited polis. Furthermore, 
she argues that freedom is what defines human beings as different from other 
creatures. In other words, it is only as a citizen, a political agent, that an indi-
vidual may achieve its humanity. Freedom thus constitutes both citizens and 
human beings, and Arendt’s critical idea is that the notion of “human rights” is 
worthless in cases where human beings lack citizenship. In order to have “the 
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rights to have rights”, one ought to be a citizen. It is only as bios politikos that hu-
man life has purpose and value beyond fulfilling biological needs (Arendt, 1998).  
How did the Greek citizen become a bios politikos? Arendt identifies three 
essential activities which describe the human condition: “labour”, “work” and 
“action”.  In ancient Greece these activities had their clearly defined purposes as 
well as distinct localizations. While labour and work primarily were located 
within the family sphere (oikos) and contributed to the provision of material ne-
cessities, action was the only activity located in the polis, which also explicitly 
involved freedom. Arendt’s (and the Greek) concept of “action” is a complex 
one. Action is first and foremost interaction, an activity conditioned by the gath-
ering of a plurality of viewpoints. Such a plurality would never exist within fa-
milies or other hierarchical or doctrinal communities, she argues, in as far as all 
the members of such groups automatically represent the same subject and thus 
hold identical viewpoints. Arendt considers the ability to “act in plurality” as the 
crucial quality that distinguishes human beings from other species. In acting, 
man exceeds the bare necessities of life by leaving his immediate existence as 
zoe, naked life, and entering the political community as a political agent, bios 
politikos (Arendt, 1998). 
This notion of politics and of man as a political being was a Greek invention 
that would soon evaporate. Even the Romans were unfamiliar with the formerly 
sharp distinctions between labour, work, and action. Consequently, the borders 
between a political and a non-political space became blurred, thus altering the 
meaning of freedom. Instead of equalling freedom with action, in other words, to 
understand freedom as the possibility to act politically, Arendt argues that free-
dom in fact soon became associated with the opposite – withdrawal from politics 
(Arendt, 1998, 2005).1 Politics thus lost its purpose as the specific space of free-
dom; it was, so to speak, deterritorialized and depoliticized. 
17th and 18th century discourses on natural law explicitly articulate this de-
politicization of freedom. They invigorate the Stoic idea that man is born free 
and, consequently, that freedom is a natural quality independent of historical and 
political conditions (cf. Hunt, 2007, pp. 117cc.). Natural law theory and its idea 
of natural freedom, or liberty, made a crucial impact on modern notions of uni-
versal human rights, as the first article of the United Nation’s 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights makes clear: “All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
                                                           
1  Cf. the notions of religious and academic freedom understood as a freedom from poli-
tics (Arendt, 2005, p. 136).  
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should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”2 Arendt emphasizes 
that the individual’s affiliation with and participation in the polis defines him as 
a citizen and bestows upon him the ability to rise above mere biological exis-
tence and, thus, that citizenship is the condition for his freedom. Human rights 
discourses, on the other hand, argue that all men are born free and consequently 
demand that freedom should be available in every circumstance. Even though 
the idea of natural liberty has greatly impacted modern notions of rights and 
politics, it has not entirely displaced the idea of political liberty. Following Susan 
Maslan (2004, 2006), I would argue, rather, that these two varieties illustrate a 
differentiation of the republican notion of freedom as non-domination, which 
emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries and became emblematic of the modern 
era’s political and judicial institutions. 
The explicit and politically potent distinction between political rights and 
human rights and, consequently, between political and natural freedom, emerged 
in the 18th century (cf. Hunt, 2007). As the name reveals, the French revolution’s 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (1789), a precursor of the UN’s 
Declaration from 1948, makes a division between “the rights of man” (natural 
rights) and “the rights of the citizen” (political rights). While all men are born 
free, that is, endowed with natural rights, not all men are citizens of France      
enjoying the freedom of the French Constitution. The 1789 Déclaration clearly 
states that some liberties are exclusively reserved for the latter, and it thus draws 
a fundamental demarcation line within the category “human being” – here, a dis-
tinction between citizens and foreigners. It emphasizes the citizen’s right to take 
part in the general will and thus in the making of the law. Additionally, it claims 
that “[t]ous les Citoyens étant égaux à ses yeux, sont également admissibles à 
toutes dignités, places et emplois publics, selon leur capacité, et sans autre dis-
tinction que celle de leurs vertus et de leurs talents” (“[a]ll citizens, being equal 
in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public posi-
tions and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except 
that of their virtues and talents”, Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen 
de 1789, article 6). Likewise, only citizens may “parler, écrire, imprimer libre-
ment” (“speak, write, and print with freedom”, Déclaration des droits de 
l’homme et du citoyen de 1789, article 11). Consequently, the citizen’s rights are 
not designated by his natural liberty due to the rights of Natural Law, but are   
instead associated with and defined by what we, following Arendt, may call the 
freedom to act politically inside a delimited political sphere – in this case: 
                                                           
2  United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), article 1.  
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France. In the Déclaration this implies the right to hold public positions and the 
right to distribute one’s thoughts within the French public space.  
The Déclaration thus activates two different significations of freedom as 
non-domination: the right not to be a slave and the right to be a citizen, to parti-
cipate in the construction and conservation of a democracy. This distinction 
within the republican concept of freedom is of crucial importance in 18th century 
discourses, as the two articles “Liberté naturelle” and “Liberté politique,” both 
signed by Louis de Jaucourt, in Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert’s 
Encyclopédie (1751-1772), signal.  
Jaucourt considers natural liberty to be human beings’ ultimate right, a kind 
of liberty given to man in his natural state: 
 
“Le premier état que l’homme acquiert par la nature, & qu’on estime le plus précieux de 
tous les biens qu’il puisse posséder, est l’état de liberté; il ne peut ni se changer contre un 
autre, ni se vendre, ni se perdre; car naturellement tous les hommes naissent libres, c’est-à-
dire, qu’ils ne sont pas soumis à la puissance d’un maître, & que personne n’a sur eux un 
droit de propriété.” 
 
“The first state that man acquires through nature, and that we esteem the most precious of 
all things, is the state of liberty; he can neither be traded for another, nor sold, nor lose his 
person; because naturally all men are born free, that is to say, they are not subject to the 
power of a master, and no one else has a proprietary right over them.” (Encyclopédie, 
Louis de Jaucourt, LIBERTÉ NATURELLE) 
 
Natural liberty ensures every individual the right to pursue happiness as long as 
he does not contradict governmental laws. It is considered a sort of premise 
based on a law given by nature and thus a matter that exists before and beyond 
any political sphere. Political liberty, on the other hand, is a question of the poli-
tical division of powers:  
 
“la liberté politique d’un état est formée par des lois fondamentales qui y établissent la dis-
tribution de la puissance législative, de la puissance exécutrice des choses qui dépendent 
du droit des gens, & de la puissance exécutrice de celles qui dépendent du droit civil.” 
 
“the political liberty of a state is shaped by fundamental laws which establish therein the 
distribution of the legislative power, the executive power in matters of public law, and the 
executive power in matters of civil law.” (Encyclopédie, Louis de Jaucourt, LIBERTÉ 
POLITIQUE) 
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While Jaucourt in line with the Roman division between slaves and free subjects 
thus defines natural liberty as non-domination, his definition of political liberty 
emphasizes that freedom originates from membership in the polis or the res pub-
lica. Finally, Jaucourt turns to history and asserts that England is the ultimate 
historical manifestation of this latter kind of liberty. 
 
 
LETTRES PHILOSOPHIQUES’ TWO ASPECTS OF 
REPUBLICAN (UN)FREEDOM 
 
Lettres philosophiques, also known as Lettres Anglaises, was first published in 
an English translation in London in 1733 (Letters Concerning the English Na-
tion), then in Paris in 1734. Voltaire’s letters on England anticipate Jaucourt’s 
articles. In a peculiar potpourri of satire, historiography, Enlightenment propa-
ganda, and personal anecdotes, the letters discuss the rather abstract notions of 
natural and political liberty within a number of specific historical contexts. 
While the English publication went unheeded, the French reception of the 24 let-
ters has become legendary: The work, published without approbation, was im-
mediately censured. Authorities confiscated the edition, arrested the publisher, 
and issued a proscription and warrant of arrest against Voltaire, who was imme-
diately recognized as the author. The Parisian parliament accused the letters of 
subverting religion and manners, as well as the government, and ordered a public 
book burning at the stairs of the Palais Justice. A Jansenist pamphlet referred to 
them as “lettres diaboliques.” The author had to flee Paris. 
The strong censure indicates that the letters were considered a threat to both 
the political and religious order. A few decades after its publication, Lettres 
philosophiques was nearly canonized as revolutionary. “Cet ouvrage fut parmi 
nous l’époque d’une revolution” (“This work would start the era of a revolution 
among us”), Condorcet stated in his biography Vie de Voltaire (1787) (Condor-
cet, 1994, p. 46), a view the French literary historian Gustave Lanson would 
adopt more than a century later, confirming that the letters were “la première 
bombe lancée contre l’ancien regime” (“the first bomb directed towards the Old 
Regime”, Lanson, 1910, p. 52). Voltaire’s work was seen as an intervention in 
an emerging and changing public space. It not only provoked public reaction, but 
also participated in the construction of the public sphere as such. Thus it was, as 
a later critic, Shirley Jones, has put it, “a political act” (Jones, 1982, p. 149). 
The Lettres philosophiques are imbued with a critical agenda. Under the pre-
text of describing the ways and customs of France’s most important neighbour 
and political opponent in the European power play, the author represents England 
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in most ways as a positive contrast to France. Voltaire introduces a comparative 
figure, and a dichotomy of freedom and “unfreedom,” that would become a leit-
motif in his works: England is, compared to France, the land of freedom. Its 
governmental system explains this freedom. Unlike France, England has not 
been subjected to an absolutist Prince. The country’s constitutional monarchy 
guarantees the freedom of its inhabitants by stimulating religious tolerance, 
commercial life, scientific progress, and intellectual achievements. In other 
words, the author represents the citizens’ freedom as founded in English politics. 
The comparative representation apparently makes England the home of the free 
while in France, in harsh contrast, unfreedom – such as religious persecutions 
and restrictions on the freedom of the press – reigns due to the absolutist regime. 
But it turns out that the dichotomy between freedom and unfreedom is not only a 
question of non-domination or domination. Even a state of non-domination, like 
the one found in England, may imply unfreedom. 
In later editions of Lettres philosophiques, the author added a 25th letter 
which complicates the work’s overall significations. I would suggest that this let-
ter is a key to get a grip on Voltaire’s discussion of natural liberty and its short-
comings. In the last letter, somewhat surprisingly entitled “On the Pensées of  
M. Pascal” (“Sur les Pensées de M. Pascal”), he leaves his main theme, England 
as France’s positive contrast, in favour of a dialogue ridiculing the Jansenist phi-
losopher’s Augustinian theory of predestination. 20th century scholars seem to 
agree that this added letter serves to emphasize the work as, first and foremost, a 
religious critique: either as a commentary to the still ongoing quarrel between 
Jesuits and Jansenists, or as a critique of the Jansenist conception of human life, 
or finally as an attack upon Christianity in general (cf. Cassirer, 1968, p. 145-
148; Desné, 1972, p. 43; Pomeau, 1995, p. 233-234). Still, this interpretation 
sounds less than satisfying as little in the earlier letters’ way of argument appears 
to convincingly anticipate such a critique as the work’s essential agenda. 
“Tout le malheur des hommes vient d’une seule chose, qui est de ne savoir 
pas demeurer en repos dans une chambre” (“All of man’s misfortune comes 
from one thing, which is not knowing how to sit quietly in a room”), Blaise Pas-
cal states in one of Pensées’ well-known dictums. In the 25th letter Voltaire, on 
the contrary, insists that man is born to act in society, not to contemplate in an 
ivory tower:  
 
“Qu’est-ce qu’un homme qui n’agirait point, et qui est supposé se contempler? Non seu-
lement je dis que cet homme serait un imbécile, inutile à la société, mais je dis que cet 
homme ne peut exister.” (Voltaire, 1994, p. 173)  
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“What sort of thing is a man who doesn’t act and yet supposedly contemplates himself? I 
say not only that such a man would be an imbecile, useless to society, but that such a man 
cannot exist.” (Voltaire, 1961, p. 132) 
 
The citation activates two key motives not only in the Pascal letter, but also in 
the Lettres philosophiques as a whole: the importance and value of the civic vir-
tues action and usefulness. I will suggest that the insistence on the ability to act 
in society as the human being’s most fundamental quality is not only a rejection 
of Pascalian theology; in addition, Voltaire, from the viewpoint of political the-
ory, criticizes the notion of the passive subject. He argues that man is a political 
agent, defined by the liberty to take part in a political process. As such, the last 
philosophical letter invites its reader to consider the work on the whole as a   
discussion of the citizen’s relations to the polis. The letters discuss how England 
values certain social identities like intellectuals, merchants, and religious minori-
ties differently than France. They reveal how the citizens’ freedom always de-
pends upon how they are treated by their government. In addition to its insis-
tence on England’s superiority, Lettres philosophiques’ central message is this: 
that freedom results from actions which are located within a political sphere. 
From the point of view of the Pascal-letter, a chief question in the letters conse-
quently seems to be whether one is included in or excluded from the polis. 
It is on this point that Voltaire’s Quakers become an interesting case. Fol-
lowing Arendt’s concepts as well as the 18th century discourse on political and 
natural liberty, I will in the following explore a significant differentiation in the 
work’s treatment of the republican notion of freedom as non-domination, namely 
the differentiation between non-political and political societies, and, consequent-
ly, between natural and political liberty. An analysis of the so called “Quaker let-
ters” reveals that Voltaire seems to prefer the latter and it illustrates how he uses 
literary conventions to represent natural liberty as a state of unfreedom. 
 
 
THE QUAKER LETTERS 
 
Recent studies have demonstrated 18th century literature’s articulation and explo-
ration of the historical emergence of the notion of human rights (Hunt, 2007; 
Maslan, 2004). In discussing the opposition between natural and political free-
dom within fictional frameworks and from a pragmatic point of view, Voltaire 
participates in this investigation. His representation of ideal societies – such as 
Eldorado or the London Exchange – demonstrates the shortcomings of natural 
liberty. The introductory letters in Voltaire’s Letters philosophique reveal that 
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the kind of freedom such societies embody, turns out to be useless – and hence 
in fact it ceases to be freedom – when facing the real world. 
Voltaire entitled his first four philosophical letters “Sur les Quakers” (“On 
the Quakers”).3 Unlike the other letters, they constitute a continuous narrative in 
which the author explicitly becomes the personal narrator as well as one of the 
two main characters. The first letter opens in medias res as Voltaire visits a fa-
mous old Quaker who has retired to the countryside outside London. The old 
man invites the French philosophe into his home for a conversation. In the first 
and second letters, this particular Quaker and the Quakers in general are permit-
ted to represent themselves directly through the old man’s participation in the di-
alogue. The third and fourth letters leave this dialogue in favor of a narrative 
mode. Assuming the role of a historiographer rather than a conversation partner, 
the author of the last two letters gives an account of the historical background, 
the status quo, and even a prediction of the Quaker society’s future. 
In Voltaire’s discourse, the old Quaker is introduced in contrast to the Jew-
ish-Christian culture in general, and in particular to the French ideal of courte-
ousness. His physical appearance is noteworthy – he wears a strange hat and a 
coat without pleads or buttons – and he does not act in line with common social 
rules. While the author politely addresses the old man as “Vous” and “Mon-
sieur”, the Quaker replies by calling his guest “friend” (ami) and “son” (mon 
fils). Still, his eccentric manners come across as admirable and the author posi-
tively describes his remarkable health and extraordinarily noble and appealing 
attitude. Despite the fact that the Quaker receives his guest without the slightest 
hint of a bow, it seems to be “plus de politesse dans l’air ouvert et humain de son 
visage qu’il n’y en a dans l’usage de tirer une jambe derrière l’autre et de porter 
à la main ce qui est fait pour couvrir la tête” (“more politeness in the openness 
and humanity of his expression than there is in the habit of drawing one leg be-
hind the other, and of carrying in the hand what was made to cover the head”, 
Voltaire, 1994, p. 20; Voltaire, 1961, p. 3). The conventional rituals of politeness 
are revealed as ridiculous compared to this gentleman’s natural authority. 
                                                           
3  By introducing his letters with a story on the Quakers, a culturally significant but nu-
merically marginal Christian community in the English society, Voltaire was in line 
with a conventional maneuver within the genre of French travel writing on England. 
The eccentric English Quakers constituted an object of fascination in French 17th and 
18th century culture to such a degree that, as Edith Philips has put it, “[Q]uakerism 
was written of and defined in France almost before it was defined by its own people” 
(Philips, 1932, p. 2). The Quaker was thus already established as a literary type when 
Voltaire portrayed this peculiar group in Lettres philosophiques.   
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Nevertheless, the depiction of the old Quaker is eventually somewhat ambi-
guous, once the Quaker is subjected to Voltaire’s familiar ironic distance. The    
author admires the Quaker so much that the latter almost gains superhuman qual-
ities, explaining that the old man “n’avait jamais connu les passions ni l’intem-
pérance” (“had always been a stranger to the passions and to intemperance”, 
Voltaire, 1994, p. 20; Voltaire, 1961, p. 3), thus depriving him of two, in Vol-
taire’s opinion, essential human traits. The author emphasizes the old man’s ide-
alness at the expense of his realness. Additionally, he stresses both his arrogant 
indulgence towards and skeptical distrust of his conversation partner by calling 
him a “holy man” (saint homme) and an “enthusiast” (enthousiaste), epithets 
with clearly negative connotations in the author’s writings. Due to this distance, 
the glorified old Quaker simultaneously falls victim to the author’s mockery and 
(faint) praise. 
The ambivalence of the Quaker figure is echoed by the paradoxical effect of 
the authorial distance in the first letter, a distance which eventually allows the 
Quaker to give an uninterrupted speech. Consequently, the dialogue turns into a 
monologue while the conversation’s subject changes. From discussing curious 
theological and cultural historical details, the Quaker turns his attention to poli-
tics and ethics. The old man regards his French guest’s polite manners as the    
direct consequence of a hierarchically structured community and explains that 
his own habits, on the other hand, imply a rejection to such a notion of society. 
He informs the reader that the Quakers’ society is truly egalitarian. Due to this 
sense of equality, they always use the familiar forms, whether addressing kings 
or shoemakers, and it also explains why everyone, even women, is allowed to 
speak during services. The Quakers consider all human beings their brethren, he 
claims, and respect no authority but the law. 
Through the old man’s disapproval of anti-democratic norms, it is as though 
the distance between the author and the Quaker character disappears. In arti-
culating the idea of a democratic (all human beings are equal), ethic (all human 
beings should be treated with respect and charity), and juridical (the authority is 
the law, not the Prince) society, the retired Quaker gradually becomes the im-
plied author’s mouthpiece. In consequence, the author and his manners, rather 
than the Quaker and his eccentric society, turn out to be the proper object of sa-
tire. The irony thus works two ways in the first two letters, as the ridicule strikes 
the Quaker, a superstitious freak, and the narrator himself, a representative of a 
hypocritical and hierarchical culture that the Quaker opposes. 
Within the framework of Lettres philosophiques’ dominating comparative 
figure, the contrast between England and France, the question is, however, 
whether or how the Quakers’ societal ideal corresponds with the greater English 
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society. Rather than being an England in miniature, the Quaker society intro-
duces a third alternative to the dichotomy between France and England, allowing 
a critical representation of England as well as of the Christian sect.  The Quaker 
society functions as a vehicle for a double critique: On the one hand, by consti-
tuting a contrast to English politics, it reveals that England is not a righteous de-
mocracy. The Quakers point to a kind of unfreedom within the polis, that is, the 
fact that English politics brutally subordinates important democratic prin-ciples 
in order to enrich and expand its political territory. In this, England resem-bles 
France; it gains its strength through domination. On the other hand, the re-
presentation of the Quakers accentuates the necessary association of freedom 
and politics, showing the shortcoming of ethical ideals such as egalitarianism as 
long as they are not situated in a political sphere. 
This double critique – of English politics and of the utopian aspect of the 
Quakers’ ethical ideals – becomes acute in the letters’ discussion of colonial  
politics. In the last paragraph of letter number one, the old Quaker expresses his 
egalitarian and cosmopolitan ethics within a specific political and historical con-
text: the British colonization of America. The Quakers are a peaceable people; 
they refuse to engage in wars not because they fear death, but, as he explains, 
because:  
 
“[…] nous ne sommes ni loups, ni tigres, ni dogues, mais hommes, mais chrétiens. Notre 
Dieu, qui nous a ordonné d’aimer nos ennemis et de souffrir sans murmure, ne veut pas 
sans doute que nous passions la mer pour aller égorger nos frères, parce que les meurtriers 
vêtus de rouge, avec un bonnet haut de deux pieds, enrôlent des citoyens en faisant du 
bruit avec deux petits bâtons sur une peau d’âne bien entendu; et lorsque après des batailles 
gagnées tout Londres brille d’illuminations, que le ciel est enflammé de fusées, que l’air 
retentit du bruit des actions de grâces, des cloches, des orgues, des canons, nous gémis-
sons en silence sur les meurtres qui causent la publique allégresse.” (Voltaire, 1994, p. 24) 
 
“[…] we are not wolves or tigers or watchdogs, but men and Christians. Our Lord, who 
has commanded us to love our enemies and to endure without complaint, certainly does 
not wish us to cross the sea and cut the throats of our brothers because some murderers 
dressed in red, and wearing hats two feet high, are enlisting citizens by making a noise 
with two little sticks on the tightly stretched skin of an ass. And when, after battles won, 
all London glitters with lights, when the sky blazes with fireworks, and the air resounds 
with the noise of thanksgiving, of bells, of organs, and of cannon, we mourn in silence  
over these murders, the cause of public gaiety.” (Voltaire, 1961, p. 7)  
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According to the old man, the Quakers are first and foremost human beings 
(hommes) and Christians (chrétiens) and, thus, they regard Native Americans as 
their brothers (nos frères) instead of barbaric foreigners. Consequently, they dif-
fer from the ideal of the patriotic British citizen whose primary civic virtue is the 
love of his own country and fellow citizens. Instead of representing the Quakers 
as a part of British society and the English national character, the old man em-
phasizes their place outside of, and in opposition to, England and its politics – 
they refuse to take part in the conquering of the New World. In this passage, the 
Quakers become the incarnation of an ethical ideal and as such, they reveal the 
unethical aspects of colonial politics by showing that the British Empire is far 
from unfamiliar with domination, and, indeed, dependent on subordination of 
other people. 
Voltaire’s Quakers have occasionally been compared to another ideal people 
in French 18th century literature, the Troglodytes in Montesquieu’s Lettres per-
sanes (1721). Both Montesquieu’s archaic people and Voltaire’s religious sect 
are associated with a moral ideal of humanity, and both groups are configured as 
enclaves outside of the greater society. There is, however, an important dif-
ference between the two ideals. Montesquieu situates his Troglodytes in a pre-
historic, mythological and allegorical context, letting them represent a number of 
different social organizations, while Voltaire takes the Quakers out of the realm 
of the ideal and shows that the moral which they represent may be realized in a 
historical context (cf. Wellington, 1994, p. 37). In other words, the Quakers’  
ethics become a matter of politics. This “politicization” takes place in the third 
and fourth letters, which have resemblances to the genre of historiography, par-
ticularly in the representation of the Quaker colony. 
We are told that, in 1680, William Penn, the son of a wealthy English Vice 
admiral, became the sovereign of a Quaker state: Pennsylvania, a truly ecu-
menical society and an exceptional American colony. As its chief-legislator Penn 
actually made a political alliance with the natives, stating they were brothers and 
equals:  
 
“Il commença par faire une ligue avec des Américains ses voisins. C’est le seul traité entre 
ces peuples et les chrétiens qui n’ait point été juré, et qui n’ait point été rompu.” (Voltaire, 
1994, p. 38) 
 
“He began by making an alliance with the Americans, his neighbors. This is the only trea-
ty between these people and the Christians that was never sworn to and has never been 
broken.” (Voltaire, 1961, p. 18) 
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Pennsylvania becomes the historical manifestation of an actual polis where all 
inhabitants enjoy both natural and political liberties. The old Quaker’s cosmo-
politan ethics – his ideal of democracy as well as his imperial critique – merge in 
the Quaker colony, wherein the egalitarianism of the Quaker Church seems to be 
implemented in a political community. 
Pennsylvania resembles a kind of cosmopolitan state. It is built neither on a 
differentiation of citizens and foreigners nor social hierarchies. This is a histo-
rical innovation, the author claims:  
 
“C’était un spectacle bien nouveau qu’un souverain que tout le monde tutoyait, et à qui on 
parlait le chapeau sur la tête, un gouvernement sans prêtres, un peuple sans armes, des    
citoyens tous égaux, à la magistrature près, et des voisins sans jalousie.”  (Voltaire, 1994, 
p. 38) 
 
“It was quite a new sort of spectacle: a sovereign whom everyone familiarly thee’d and 
thou’d, and spoke to with one’s hat on; a government without priests, a people without 
weapons, citizens all of them equals – magistrates excepted – and neighbors free of jeal-
ousy.” (Voltaire, 1961, p. 18-19) 
 
Pennsylvania is perfectly democratic and tolerant. Its inhabitants feel secure. 
And it also seems like the colony is fulfilling the rights of man and the natural 
liberty that Jaucourt defined in the Encyclopédie; a liberty implying that the in-
dividuals “ne sont pas soumis à la puissance d’un maître, & que personne n’a sur 
eux un droit de propriété” (“are not subject to the power of a master, and no one 
else has a proprietary right over them”, Encyclopédie, Louis de Jaucourt, 
LIBERTÉ NATURELLE). 
To Voltaire, the American colony appears almost too good to be true. The 
author emphasizes his incredulity by concluding that Pennsylvania – in contrast, 
we may add, to Candide’s well-known Eldorado – is a rare case of a historically 
realized utopia: “Guillaume Penn pouvait se vanter d’avoir apporté sur la terre 
l’âge d’or dont on parle tant, et qui n’a vraisemblablement existé qu’en Pennsyl-
vanie” (“William Penn could boast of having brought forth on this earth the 
Golden Age that everyone talks so much about, and that probably never was, ex-
cept in Pennsylvania”, Voltaire, 1994, p. 38; Voltaire, 1961, p. 19). Despite the 
state’s historical existence, Voltaire describes it as a Golden Age and thus as a 
cultural phantasm. This utopian description of Pennsylvania constitutes a turning 
point in the Quaker narrative. It hints at the conclusion of the Quaker letters, 
which makes clear that the Quakers’ community is not sustainable in real life. 
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Similarly to Montesquieu’s Troglodyte fable, Voltaire’s Quaker narrative is 
not only the story of a society’s rise and prosperity, but also of its degeneration. 
The fall is a consequence of isolation. Neither the English nor the Pennsylvanian 
Quakers exist in a vacuum. They are parts of the larger political community of 
18th century imperial England. In this historical context it is as if the Quakers are 
deprived of the right to existence. Despite the fact that the British Toleration Act 
(1689) gave all dissenters, and thereby the Quakers, political liberty, that is, ac-
cess to the Parliament, the Quakers continued to voluntarily exclude themselves 
from the polis. Their consequent resistance to act in Arendt’s sense of the word, 
to participate in the political society, causes their shortcomings in Lettres 
philosophiques. This self-imposed isolation puts their ethics – moderation, incor-
ruptibility, pacifism – in another, and more critical, light. These qualities are not 
only moral or ethical ideals; they also imply what we, following Arendt, may 
call a resistance to take part in the political community. The ideals are not situated 
and realized within a political sphere. Therefore they are morally deficient and 
even though the Quakers are certainly not dominated, they are not really free. 
The letter that succeeds the four Quaker letters opens by claiming that “un 
Anglais, comme homme libre, va au Ciel par le chemin qui lui plait” (“An Eng-
lishman, as a free man, goes to Heaven by whatever road he pleases”, Voltaire, 
1994; p. 42; Voltaire, 1961, p. 22).  But in spite of religious freedom, each indi-
vidual and each sect necessarily exists within larger communities: the nation and 
the world. The first four letters deal with a specific situation that defines the 
Quakers: the fact that they are a minority that only exist in the margins of the 
large polis of colonial England. This very situation, it seems, leads to their final 
setback in the Quaker narrative’s very last paragraph:  
 
“Par tout pays, la religion dominante, quand elle ne persécute point, engloutit à la longue 
toutes les autres. Les quakers ne peuvent être membres du Parlement, ni posséder aucun 
office, parce qu’il faudrait prêter serment et qu’ils ne veulent point jurer. Ils sont réduits à la 
nécessité de gagner de l’argent par le commerce; leurs enfants enrichis par l’industrie de 
leurs pères, veulent jouir, avoir des honneurs, des boutons et des manchettes; ils sont honteux 
d’être appelés quakers, et se font protestants pour être à la mode.” (Voltaire, 1994, p. 40) 
 
“In every country the dominant religion, if it does not actually persecute all the others, 
swallows them up in the end. Quakers cannot be members of Parliament, nor can they 
hold office, for in either case one must take oath, and they refuse to swear. They are reduced 
to making money by means of commerce. The children, made rich by the industry of their 
fathers, want to enjoy themselves, to acquire honours, buttons and cuffs. They are ashamed 
to be called Quakers, and are turning Anglican to be in style.” (Voltaire, 1961, p. 21) 
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In the four Quaker letters, the author presents a society that, despite its moral 
idealness and utopian conceptions, necessarily confronts the utterly prosaic laws 
of history. The Quakers are overtaken by the reality that they are a part of the 
English political sphere, and the ideal of an ethically motivated withdrawal from 
politics appears to be impossible. Denying modernization, development, and, 
most of all, action within a larger political context, collides with the notion of 
political liberty – the idea that, as Arendt claims, an individual’s freedom de-
pends on citizenship and the ability, or in this case, rather, the will, to act in the 
polis. The Quakers’ refusal to participate in colonial wars in the first letter may 
certainly express an ideal pacifism and an admirable rejection of imperial poli-
tics from the point of view of a cosmopolitan ethics. Nevertheless, it also implies 
a self-destroying passivity towards the larger political community in the sense 
that the rejection leaves the small Quaker society susceptible to the actions of 
stronger forces. Opposition to general European manners and customs, as well as 
refusal to act politically (to be politicians, or hold public positions in the English 
society), in fact, threaten their identity. 
Voltaire’s fourth philosophical letter, the last Quaker letter, concludes that, 
from an empirical point of view, the Quakers, with their ideal claims, have no 
chance to survive other than as a minor religious group with decreasing influ-
ence. Even their own children dissociate themselves from the Quaker identity by 
preferring the norms of wider society. And, with no political freedom to act, to 
take part in the general will of the polis they are a part of, the Quakers will, in 
the long run, be totally “swallowed up” by the outside world. In that case, their 
ideals of egalitarianism, tolerance, and pacifism become worthless. Their ethics 
have no political impact. From their location outside of the English polis, they 
appear to be just as “unreal” and just as excluded from historical reality as Can-
dide’s Eldorado, the land of gold and perpetual peace that Candide and his com-
panion chooses to leave in order to act within the global polis, i.e. to participate 
in the European politics of trade and colonialism.4  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Quakers have a double function in Voltaire’s Lettres philosophiques. They 
become a complex and ambiguous figure as they embody an ideal democratic 
society, while at the same time they illustrate the unfreedom that follows from 
                                                           
4  Cf. the discussion of colonial politics in my article “Cosmopolitan, slaves, and the 
global market in Voltaire’s Candide ou l’optimisme” (Kjørholt, 2012).  
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being excluded from and not taking part in the polis, i.e. the unfreedom of natu-
ral liberty as far as it is not situated in a concrete political sphere. Thus, the 
Quakers incarnate both a critical opposition to and a destructive exclusion from 
the polis they are related to: England and its colonies. The opposition makes 
them free in the sense that they actively refuse to behave according to the pre-
dominant societal constrains and norms. By turning their back on politics, the 
Quakers show that they are not dominated; they protest against status quo in a 
way that echoes Lettres philosophiques’s representation of the English political 
order as an alternative to that of France. However, the refusal to participate as 
citizens within the Commonwealth implies an unfreedom, as the Quakers thereby 
reduce themselves to a party without any influence on its surroundings. Their 
voluntary withdrawal from the polis makes them unfree in the sense that they 
never reach the level of the political agent, bios politikos, and instead remain 
passive subjects deprived of the right to act. 
Following Arendt’s concept of politics and 18th century discourses on poli-
tical and natural freedom, I have argued that the Quakers illustrate the shortcom-
ings of natural liberty. Their ethics and ideals of egalitarianism and pacifism are 
short-lived in the real world. The Quakers refuse to act and refuse to change, and 
are therefore a more or less meaningless part of the political England. They thus 
illustrate a general maxim in Voltaire’s work: the primacy of politics to ethics. 
The only freedom that matters in real life is political freedom, which allows the 
individual to act as a citizen in order to influence society’s constitution. Ethics 
have no functionality outside a political sphere, and according to Voltaire, in this 
respect politics is the premise of ethics. Ethical ideals should thus be pragma-
tically adjusted to political reality. 
A liberal concept of freedom as non-interference becomes inadequate in dis-
cussing Voltaire’s Quakers. The Quaker letters reveal the necessity to examine 
the author within a republican tradition, while they bring his political realism to 
the fore. Several scholars have discussed his realistic and pragmatic notion of 
politics which differs from the more well-known political thinkers of the French 
Enlightenment, Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (cf. Gay, 1965; Per-
kins, 1965; Pomeau, 1970). As one critic has put it: “as a political thinker he 
tended to respond to events rather than metaphysical abstractions” (Williams, 
1994, p. xiii). Voltaire’s pragmatic, realistic and situational approach to political 
subjects makes his literature an extraordinary archive for the study of early mod-
ern politics. To quote Nicholas Cronk:   
 
“True, no single one of Voltaire’s writings on political theory is as celebrated as Montes-
quieu’s De l’esprit des lois or Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Contrat social; on the other hand, 
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his voluminous political writings – and activities – had an immediate and practical impact 
which arguably the works of Montesquieu and Rousseau did not.” (Cronk, 2009, p. 4) 
 
The practical and immediate scope allows a focus on the functionality of repub-
lican concepts such as natural and political liberty, or the distinction between 
man and citizen, in the century that paved the way for the French Revolution and 
its Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789. Using Arendt’s 
concept of the political as an analytical tool, I have suggested that Lettres 
philosophiques’s main concern is the investigation of the relations between indi-
vidual identity, ethics, and politics, and thus my aim has been to call attention to 
this functionality.  
The Quaker letters reveal that it is only as political liberty that freedom may 
be realized in a historical society. Last, but not least, they demonstrate the cru-
cial importance of politics in Voltaire’s literary work. The representation of the 
Quakers is only one of numerous examples of the author’s tendency to empha-
size the constraints of reality at the expense of the ideal, or the historical fact ra-
ther than the utopian imagination.5 The focus on political reality thus affected 
Voltaire’s poetics, a fact that scholars seem to have surprisingly left unexplored, 
and which deserves further attention in academic research. Hopefully, this article 
provides one possible example of how this political poetics could be approached. 
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 Dependency, Corruption, and Aesthetics in 
Denis Diderot’s Le neveu de Rameau 
ANNE FASTRUP 
 
 
Denis Diderot’s posthumously published satire Le neveu de Rameau (probably 
written between 1761-1772) displays a complex network of references to some 
of the most difficult years, 1751-1759, in the history of the great Enlightenment 
project L’Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des 
metiers, of which Diderot was co-founder and chief editor. The 1750s consti-
tuted a period of ideological tension and increasing political paranoia in France, 
and from being a project of national prestige, the Encyclopédie was by then con-
sidered a threat to the religious, social, and political order of l’ancien regime. As 
was announced in Louis XV’s decree concerning the book trade in 1757, print-
ing and diffusion of text that “tends to attack religion, to stir up the spirits, to 
question Our authority, and to trouble the order and tranquillity of our states” 
was punishable by death (quoted from Israel, 2009, p. 14). The Encyclopedie 
project was suspended more than once by the courts and, as chief editor of the 
Encyclopédie, Diderot was in a permanently dangerous situation. The police had 
kept an eye on him since 1749, but from 1757 onwards he felt even more unable 
to express his views publicly. It is therefore hardly surprising that one of the 
most salient themes of Le neveu de Rameau is unfreedom. Normally, Diderot 
would discuss his writings in private correspondences, but Le neveu de Rameau 
was apparently composed in utter secrecy (Freud, 1967, p. 23). This silence has, 
of course, prompted much speculation. Why Diderot never mentioned the satire, 
no sure evidence can tell us. However, since it was first published in 1805 in 
German by Goethe, the satire, which consists of a long, digressive imaginary 
philosophical conversation between two half-fictional half-authentic characters, 
Lui and Moi, has been regarded as Diderot’s secret revenge on the opponents of 
178 | ANNE FASTRUP 
the Encyclopédie, the so-called anti-philosophers or anti-Encyclopaedists.1 In 
close cooperation with, if not simply on the orders of powerful figures of the 
court, parliament, and church, these enemies of the Encyclopédie tried to stop the 
publication of the great work through a mixture of negative publicity and regular 
smear campaigns. Of course, the attempt did not succeed. The Encyclopédie was 
published, but only just.  
Picking up on Goethe, the purpose of this article is to discuss Le neveu de 
Rameau in the context of the unfreedom that Diderot experienced while editing 
the Encyclopédie. As will be clear in what follows, the nature of his unfreedom 
goes beyond the mere fact of being restrained by the system of censorship regu-
lation. Furthermore, the characters in Le neveu de Rameau are only indirectly 
connected with the Encyclopaedists and the anti-Encyclopaedists. The one main 
character, who appears under the anonymous pronoun Lui, refers to Jean-
François Rameau, a poor musician and nephew of the great French composer 
Jean-Philippe Rameau, while Moi is a naïve and idealistic version of Diderot, 
himself. The central music and opera theme – which ranges far more widely than 
the reference to France’s then leading composer Rameau – has a crucial role to 
play in the satire’s interpretation of the anti-philosophers’ attempt to obstruct the 
publication of the Encyclopédie. There is a connection between what we, with 
Goethe, may call the vengeance function of Le neveu de Rameau, and the theme 
of unfreedom. However, there may be said to be a complex correlation. Le neveu 
de Rameau intervenes in its historical context in a number of ways and at many 
levels. In addition, Diderot is an inexorable dialectician. The subjects he takes up 
refuse to fall easily into stable categories and unequivocal meanings, just as  un-
freedom itself is dealt with in Le neveu de Rameau. 
The theme of unfreedom is signalled from the very beginning. The prologue 
is adorned with an epigraph by Diderot’s favourite poet Horace, which translates 
into English as: “Born under the evil influence of every Vertumnus.” Vertumnus 
was the Roman god of the change of the seasons, and it is inter alia in this mean-
ing – changeability – that we should look for the epigraph’s signalling effect on 
the first page of the satire.2 However, the Horatian satire cited is known as the 
Saturnalian satire, because it takes place during the period of Saturnalia, the   
                                                           
1  The anti-philosophers consisted of a large and quite powerful group of judges, jour-
nalists, poets, teachers, Franciscans, Jansenists, and Jesuits. All of these persons had 
close connections with wealthy patrons with great influence in the Court, among them 
Louis-August Bertin de Blagny, who plays a key role in Le neveu de Rameau. 
2  “every Vertumnus” refers, of course, to the fact that Vertumnus is never the same but 
constantly changes shape, like the seasons.  
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religious Roman feast and carnival celebrated around the winter solstice. What is 
remarkable about this feast and carnival is that the normal social hierarchy was 
turned upside down during the days of the carnival. The feast commenced with a 
procession led by a person of very low rank disguised as a king, which set the 
scene for the slaves to exchange role and place with their masters, the con-
demned with the judges, etc. By referring to Horace’s satire and the Saturnalia, 
Diderot not only introduces a theme of freedom and unfreedom, but also warns 
the reader that the contents of these concepts are by no means stable or clear. 
Who is free and who is unfree and what it means to be unfree is left open from 
the outset.  
Despite this openness, here Lui seems the unfree one, and in more than one 
sense. Firstly, he is slave to his “besoin” or his “appétit” – hunger, instinct, desire 
or lust. Secondly, he is a slave of those who can satisfy his needs and desires. 
Hence, Lui is both physically and socially unfree. As we shall see, Lui’s social 
unfreedom can be described on the basis of Philip Pettit’s definition of freedom 
(unfreedom, respectively) from his book Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom 
and Government (1997). In this book, Pettit states that freedom cannot be de-
fined exclusively according to Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction between posi-
tive and negative liberty in Two Concepts of Liberty (Berlin, 1969). Freedom 
must also be understood as the absence of dependency and domination, as “non-
domination” (Pettit, 1997, p. 5). In his introduction, Pettit makes it clear that un-
freedom as non-domination has nothing to do with being restrained by the laws 
of a legitimate government (ibid). Quite to the contrary, the “restraint of a fair 
system of law – a non-arbitrary regime – does not make you unfree” (ibid). The 
unfreedom that Pettit has in mind consists in being subject to arbitrary sway or to 
the “potentially capricious will or potentially idiosyncratic judgement of an-
other” (ibid). Although Pettit’s concept of unfreedom can be politically defined 
or politically legitimized (as in monarchy, for instance), he is first and foremost 
referring to non-formal, social, or intersubjective relations. Unfreedom as domi-
nation refers to a situation in which someone is or feels compelled to always take 
someone else’s will or desire into consideration.  
Pettit’s definition of unfreedom can be applied to the principal character of 
Le neveu de Rameau. The most striking feature of the nephew is that he lives in 
dependency and under the domination of others. People with money, influence 
and power can get him to do anything at all. In particular, Lui is at the beck and 
call of the wealthy and powerful, but also very capricious Bertin, an extremely 
affluent financier and a member of l’Académie des inscriptions et des belles-
lettres. The character is based upon the real Louis-August Bertin de Blagny, 
who, during the Encyclopédie’s most critical years, 1752-1765, played an im-
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portant role as patron of the Encyclopaedists’ enemies. In the fictional world of 
Le neveu de Rameau, the nephew gains entry to Bertin’s salon and well-filled 
dinner table thanks to a well-developed sense of being in service to the rich and 
– as he himself explains to Moi – service is about tracking the desire of the master. 
The nephew simultaneously functions as the carrier of the satirical view and 
tone of the dialogue. He commands the floor, and it is he who taunts and mocks 
and reveals what the world is like in reality. Le neveu de Rameau is a satire 
about society in general and polite society in particular, both described as being 
in a state of degeneration and corruption. And with his insider knowledge of 
Bertin’s circle, the nephew is eminently placed in terms of observing the corrupt 
nature of the rich and powerful, indeed of the whole tissue of society. For this 
reason, Moi – the philosopher – likes to talk to someone like the nephew: 
 
“[…] leur caractère tranche avec celui des autres, et [qu’]ils rompent cette fastidieuse uni-
formité que notre education, nos conventions de société, nos bienséance d’udage ont int-
roduite [referring specifically to the nephew Moi says:] Il secoue, il agite; il fait approuver 
ou blamer; il fait sortir la vérité; il fait connaître les gens de bien; il démasque les coquins; 
c’est alors que l’homme de bon sens écoute, et démêle son monde.” (Diderot, 1989, p. 72)  
 
“[…] their characters contrast sharply with other people’s and break the tedious unifor-
mity that our social conventions and set politeness have brought about [referring specifi-
cally to the nephew Moi says:] He stirs people up and gives them a shaking, makes them 
take sides, brings out the truth, shows who are really good and unmasks the villains. It is 
then that the wise man listens and sorts people out.” (Diderot, 1966, p.35)  
 
Already at this point it is clear that the “servant,” or “slave,” Lui, is superior to 
the philosopher, Moi. The slave sees the world in a clearer light than “the wise 
man,” who sees everything through the flattering prism of his moral ideals. This 
brings us to the central matter of this article. In Le neveu de Rameau unfreedom 
has some “advantages” in the shape of great intellectual broad-mindedness and, 
what is of particular interest to me here, great aesthetic sensitivity. The nephew 
knows everything about both French and Italian opera – prefering the latter – 
goes into ecstasies when he listens to or recalls a piece of music, and formulates 
a new poetics for the opera that breaks with classicist doctrine – which his      
uncle’s music respects. Diderot has, however, also equipped the nephew with a 
seemingly strange double competency: he has both a visionary aesthetic gift and 
he is a master of the art of flattery, or service. What is the logic behind this con-
nection between social unfreedom and aesthetic sensitivity? More precisely, 
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what is it about the nephew’s servitude that makes him able to break with the 
classicist aesthetic and its ideals of clarity, harmony, propriety, and moderation? 
  
 
LUI’S UNFREEDOM 
 
On the general level, Lui’s unfreedom consists in his being governed by “exter-
nal” or physical forces such as hunger: “Son premier soin, le matin, quand il est 
levé, est de savoir où il dînera; après diner, il pense où il ira souper” (“His first 
care when he gets up in the morning is to make sure where he will be dining; af-
ter dinner he thinks where to go for supper,” Diderot, 1989, p. 71; Diderot, 1966, 
p. 34). Lui appears to Moi to be “an eating subject” rather than “a fellow thinking 
subject” (Zalloua, 2003, p. 198). His day passes rushing hectically from house to 
house, ingratiating himself here, pleasing and enthusing there, in the hope of be-
ing invited to dine. In a way, he is a caricature of the physiological determinism 
that Diderot – if somewhat ambiguously – professed in his materialistic writings. 
The nephew is carried away by every outburst of desire or passion, and in that 
sense he may also be said to incarnate the typical Enlightenment concept of un-
freedom, understood here along with Isaiah Berlin as being governed by ”irra-
tional impulses, uncontrolled desires, my ‘lower’ nature […] my ‘empirical’ or 
‘heteronom’ self” (Berlin, 1969, p. 9). Lui may be regarded as a satirical person-
ification of the moral, human, and political imperfections from which the philo-
sophers of the Enlightenment wished to free the human race by lifting it up to the 
higher level of reason, autonomy, and self-control through upbringing and re-
forms. Moi makes several attempts to appeal to the nephew’s better nature by 
reminding him of how disgraceful, undignified, and unhappy his life is. Instead 
he should instil in himself “La connaissance de ses devoirs; l’amour de la vertu; 
la haine du vice” (”knowledge of one’s duties, love of virtue, hatred of vice”, 
Diderot, 1989, p. 137; Diderot, 1966, p. 82). Virtue, dignity and happiness come 
from helping one’s friends and fighting for one’s country. But the philosopher is 
wasting his breath, because according to Lui: ”Il n’y a plus de patrie. Je ne vois 
d’un pole à l’autre que des tyrans et des esclaves” (“There is no such thing left 
[as one’s country]. From pole to pole all I can see is tyrants and slaves”, Diderot, 
1989, p. 114; Diderot, 1966, p. 65). If one is wealthy, one should enjoy one’s 
good fortune; if one is poor, one must: 
 
“faire la sa cour, morbleu; faire sa cour; voir les grands; étudier leurs gouts; se prêter à 
leurs fantaisies; server leurs vices; approuver leurs injustices.” (Diderot, 1989, p. 115) 
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“Butter people up, good God, butter them up, watch the great, study their tastes, fall in 
with their whims, pander to their vices, approve of their injustices” (Diderot, 1989, p. 65)  
 
What Lui is really saying is that one can only maintain one’s dignity – under-
stood here as working for the common good, and not allowing oneself to be 
pushed around by physical impulses or powerful tyrants – if one is in relation-
ships characterised by equality. It is only if one can identify equally with others 
as fellow citizens that one can see common interests and a larger political com-
munity.3 But in a world where some are rich and others are poor, and where 
some dominate others, there exists no equality, no common interests, and no 
common good. In this world, all pursue their primitive impulses and private in-
terests with every means at their disposal.  
The involuntary gestures, spasms, and pantomimes that frequently accom-
pany the character’s words and thoughts also belong to the picture of Lui’s un-
freedom. These involuntary pantomimes, for which the nephew is famed, occur 
especially when he speaks about an intense desire for something – good food, a 
woman’s breast, a glass of good wine – or when he is seized by strong feelings, 
such as when he talks about or recalls music. In these states, consisting of primi-
tive impulsive desires and aesthetic emotions, all words and notions are accom-
panied by a gesture, thus giving us the impression of a primitive continuity be-
tween consciousness, language, and body. Lui cannot think, feel, or talk without 
leaving corporeal traces in the form of spasms, giving the feeling of a person 
who repeatedly travels back into the history of civilisation before language, back 
to the natural, gestural, and mimetic language that the philosophers of the time 
thought preceded conventional language. Thus, the unfreedom has connotations 
of belonging to a lower rung of civilisation, which may be turned into something 
more positive, as it is inter alia this spasmodic body that makes Lui the liberating, 
non-conformist character that he also is.  
Finally, Lui’s unfreedom manifests itself in the form of the domination exer-
cised over him by Bertin and his clique: 
 
“J’étais leur petit Rameau, leur joli Rameau, leur Rameau le fou, l’impertinents, 
l’ignorant, le paresseux, le gourmand, le bouffon, la grosse bête. Il n’y avait pas une de ces 
epithets familières qui ne me valût un sourire, une caresse, un petit coup sur l’épaule, un 
                                                           
3  Cf. Tue Andersen Nexø: “Materially Unfree. Corruption as a societal diagnosis and 
the political forms of unfreedom in Machiavelli, Davenant, and Bolingbroke”, in this 
book. 
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soufflet, un coup de pied, à table un bon morceau qu’on jetait sur mon assiette […] car 
moi, je suis sans consequence.” (Diderot, 1989, p. 88) 
 
“I was their dear Rameau, their pretty Rameau, their Rameau the lunatic, the impertinent, 
the ignorant, the lazy, greedy old fool. Not one of these pet names but earned me a smile, 
a caress, a tap on the shoulder, a box on the ears, a kick, a toothsome morsel chucked on to 
my plate during meals […] I could take without its being of any consequences, for I am a 
person who isn’t of any consequence.” (Diderot, 1966, p. 46) 
 
Lui is defined by others. He is nothing himself but a projection of the vices, 
characteristics, and faults of his surroundings. It was inter alia this aspect of Di-
derot’s character that caught Hegel’s interest and caused him to incorporate Le 
neveu de Rameau within Phenomenologie des Geistes. Hegel viewed the nephew 
as an image of a phase in the history of the development of consciousness, where 
the I has not yet found itself, and is alienated in external definitions. But instead 
of regarding Lui from the perspective of Hegelian alienation, we can see him 
from the perspective of republican liberty. As mentioned above, Philip Pettit – in 
contrast to Berlin and the liberal tradition – has argued that freedom should also 
be understood as ”non-domination,” that is, the absence of dependency and dom-
ination. ”Domination” should be understood here as the consequence of great in-
equality, of dependency relations that cause the powerless party to constantly 
consider the interests and wishes of the powerful (Pettit, 1997, p. 60-61). The 
nephew’s relationship to Bertin may be said to be prototypical for such a domi-
nation and dependency relationship, and it is in the light of this unfreedom – and 
not because the nephew has not yet found an authentic expression of his subjec-
tivity – that his change of identity, his “alienation”, should be understood.  
The relationship with Bertin implies several things, the first being that the 
nephew is not free to express his own honest opinions. That this is the case is 
shown when, in a surprising and singular attack on “dignité,” he expresses his 
honest opinion of Bertin and his mistress. He is immediately shown the door and 
told never to show himself again. Like the anti-philosophers, Lui only has access 
to Bertin’s food and hospitality as long as his behaviour pleases Bertin, in other 
words as long as Lui complies with the wishes of his master and mistress: ”[il 
faut] chercer son désir dans yeux, rester suspend à sa lèvre, attendre son or-
dre…“ (“we try to read her wishes in her eyes, hang upon her lips, wait for her 
orders…”, Diderot, 1989, p. 124; Diderot, 1966, p. 72). As a consequence of this 
asymmetry, the subject or servant is morally corrupted; he invariably becomes 
dishonest and insincere as he is forced to speculate in how he can cheat and    
deceive. Although Pettit does not directly write about moral corruption, it is   
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implicit in the quotes he uses to illustrate the social and moral effects of unfree-
dom. Pettit quotes John Milton, who, thinking of the monarchy, describes “the 
perpetual bowings and cringings of an abject people” (Pettit 1997, p. 61), and al-
so refers to Discourses Concerning Government (1689) whose author Algernon 
Sidney claimed that: ”slavery doth naturally produce meanness of spirit, with its 
worst effect, flattery” (ibid.). Both examples show the dissimulation, falseness, 
and servility, in short, the moral corruption that characterises an unfree people. 
The nephew himself formulates the unfree person’s (his own) moral character-
istics as the ability to flatter, lie, commit perjury, break promises, crawl, seduce 
and lead into depravity – without suffering qualms of conscience.  
We read many examples of the nephew’s skills at flattery. He knows pre-
cisely what to say and the posture he should adopt to satisfy his master’s and his 
mistress’s vanity. At the same time, being a flatteur requires great ingenuity and 
“versatility,” because neither Bertin nor his mistresses deserve praise. In addi-
tion, the flattery must show variation:  
 
“[…] il ne faut pas toujors approuver de la même manière. On serait monotone […] il faut 
savoir preparer et placer ces tons majeurs et péremptoires, saisir l’occasion et le moment 
[…] il faut être placé à l’écart, dans l’angle de l’appartement le plus éloigné du champ de 
bataille, avoir préparé son explosion par un long silence, et tomber subitement comme une 
comminge […] Personne n’a cet art comme moi […] j’ai des petits tons que j’accompagne 
d’un sourire; une variété infinite des mines approbatives; là le nez, la bouche, le front, les 
yeux entrent en jeu; j’ai une souplesse de reins; une manière de contourner l’épine du dos, 
de hausser ou de baisser les épaules, d’étendre les doigts, d’incliner la tête, der fermer les 
yeux, et d’être stupéfait, comme si j’avais entendu descendre du ciel une voix angélique et 
divin. C’est là ce qui flatte.” (Diderot, 1989, pp. 125-126) 
 
“[…] you mustn’t always gush in the same way. It would pall […] you must know how to 
prepare and where to bring these peremptory tones in the major key, how to seize the oc-
casion and the moment […] Then you must take up your position some way off in the cor-
ner of the room farthest removed from the battlefield, having prepared your explosion by a 
long silence, and you suddenly drop like a bomb […] Nobody has ever touched me in this 
art […] I have some soft notes which I accompany with a smile and an infinite variety of 
approving faces, with a nose, mouth, eyes and brow all brought into play. I have a certain 
agility with my lips, a way of twisting my spine, raising my head, shutting my eyes and 
being struck dumb as though I had heard an angelic, divine voice come down from    
heaven. That’s what gets them.” (Diderot, 1966, pp. 73-74)  
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This rather comic passage describes how the servant must have a feeling not on-
ly for the narcissism of his master or mistress, but also for the timing, dramatic 
structure, choreography, and effects of his own behaviour. The servant must be 
empathetic, sensitive, analytical, ingenuous, versatile, and a good actor too. It 
may seem strange that the body is emphasised to such an extent in connection 
with flattery, and one could ask why flattery seems to be communicated most  
efficiently in pantomime language. Diderot’s satire does not provide any direct 
answer to this, but in other works Diderot writes that gesture – and thus also pan-
tomime – has a sublime and in principle limitless meaning, because its expres-
sion cannot be translated into unequivocal content. In his writings on drama-
turgy, Diderot also recommends the use of pantomime onstage, as its affective 
impact on the spectators is far greater than that of spoken language (Diderot, 
1988, pp. 268-279). So, gesture and pantomime do not merely provide a limitless 
praise, they also affect the receiver on an emotional level which – one might 
claim – is under the radar of critical judgement. 
 
 
UNFREEDOM, CORRUPTION, AND POWER 
 
Towards the end of the dialogue, Moi, who would seem to have lost his illusions 
about patriotism and friendship, suddenly paints a picture of a society where eve-
ryone is unfree and where, consequently, everyone adopts a posture: 
 
“Quiconque a besoin d’un autre, est indigent et prend une position. Le roi prend une posi-
tion devant sa maîtresse et devant dieu; il fait son pas de pantomime. Le minister fait le 
pas de courtesan, de flatteur, de valet ou de gueux devant son roi […] Ma foi, ce que vous 
appelez la pantomime des gueux, est le grand branle de la terre. Chacun a sa petite Hus et 
son Bertin.” (Diderot, 1989, p. 191) 
 
“Whoever needs somebody else is necessitous and so takes up a position. The king takes 
up a position with his mistress and with God; he performs his pantomime step. The minis-
ter executes the movements of courtier, flatterer, flunkey or beggar in front of his king 
[…] Good heavens, what you call the beggars’ pantomime is what makes the whole world 
go round. Every man has his little Hus and his Bertin.” (Diderot, 1966, pp. 121-122) 
 
Everyone has desire and everyone is dependent on others to satisfy this desire. 
This is why everyone is unfree and why everyone stages pantomimes. What Moi 
describes is, in fact, a corrupt society, that is a society in which all are forced to 
constantly take the demands and interests of others into consideration. No one 
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dares to speak his honest opinion, no one dares to develop a free position, and 
everyone feels compelled to say something they do not mean. But the nephew 
knows that this dependency is experienced differently depending on one’s place 
in the social hierarchy. His experience shows that there is a great difference be-
tween being an unfree master and being a servant. In short, unfreedom manifests 
itself differently in Lui’s case and in the case of Bertin and his friends. If we first 
look at Bertin and the anti-philosophers, their lack of freedom shows itself in 
two similar ways, as mechanisation and animalisation. Several times Lui com-
pares Bertin to a mechanical puppet: “[il] a l’air d’une pagoda immobile à 
laquelle on aurait attaché un fil menton” (“[he] looks like a motionless image 
with a string tied to its chin”, Diderot, 1989, pp. 122-123; Diderot, 1966, p. 71). 
As for the anti-philosophers, they have according to Lui degenerated into ani-
mals, predators:  
 
“Nous paraissons gais, mais au fond nous avons tous de l’humeur et grand appétit. Des 
loups ne sont pas plus affamés; des tigres ne sont pas plus cruels. Nous dévorons comme 
des loups, lorsque la terre a été longtemps couverte de neige; nous déchirons comme des 
tigres, tout ce qui réussit […] Jamais on ne vit ensemble tant de bêtes tristes, acariâtres, 
malfaisantes et courroucées. On n’entend que les noms de Buffon, de Duclos, de Montes-
quieu, de Rousseau, de Voltaire, de d’Alembert, de Diderot, et Dieu sait de quelles 
epithets ils sont accompagnés.” (Diderot, 1989, p. 134) 
 
“We look Jovian, but in reality we are all foul-tempered and voracious of appetite. Wolves 
are not more famished, tigers no more cruel. We devour like wolves when the earth has 
been long under snow, like tigers we tear to pieces anything successful […] Never were 
there seen so many wretched, spiteful, malevolent and truculent creatures in one place. 
You hear nothing but names such as Buffon, Duclos, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Voltaire, 
D’Alembert, Diderot, and God knows what epithets are coupled with them.” (Diderot, 
1989, p. 80) 
 
The anti-philosophers are just as controlled by their instincts as Lui, just as much 
at the mercy of their desires and vices as he is. The difference is merely that they 
can afford to be so. Where Lui must always hide his desire to achieve his goal (a 
seat at the dinner table), the powerful can afford not to dissemble in this respect. 
The powerful unfree person can allow himself to indulge his natural condition, 
his natural impulses, while the powerless unfree person must constantly change 
identity, take on new roles, and work on his apparition to accommodate the de-
sire of the master. However, as indicated above, this situation means that the 
servant or the slave remains superior in a social and aesthetic sense. He is forced 
DEPENDENCY, CORRUPTION, AND AESTHETICS | 187 
to empathise with others’ desires, to understand the hidden motives, the un-
spoken rules, the invisible hierarchy, and games of power. He must observe,   
understand, and be strategic.  
We have now reached the point where we are able to explain why Diderot 
has equipped his character with this double identity of flatteur and musician;   
we are on the trail of the connection between his unfreedom and his aesthetic 
sensibility. 
 
 
THE DEGENERATION OF SOCIETY AND THE NEW MUSIC 
 
It has been said of Diderot’s depiction of Bertin’s circle (the anti-philosophers) 
that it appears as “une inversion du monde des salons” (Melancon 2000, p. 29). 
It may be viewed as a picture of the degeneration of la bonne compagnie. Be-
cause what Moi learns through Lui’s reports from Bertin’s circle is that “les 
honnêtes gens” have been replaced by “des gens de cour, des financiers, de gros 
commercants, des banquier, des gens d’affaires” (“court, high finance, com-
merce, banking, business of some kind”, Diderot, 1989, p. 111; Diderot, 1966, p. 
63), people who neither master the polite conversation of the salon nor live up to 
its social and moral ideal of self-control. Bertin’s circle, however – as we saw 
earlier – is only a symptom of the more extensive corruption and regression of 
the fabric of society, as the nephew says: “Dans la nature, toutes les espèces se 
dévorent; toutes les conditions se dévorent dans la société. Nous faisons justice 
les auns des autres, sans que la loi s’en mêle” (“In nature all the species feed on 
each other, and all classes prey on each other in society. We mete out justice to 
each other without the law taking a hand”, Diderot,1989, p. 111; Diderot, 1966, 
p. 63). No government, policy, or legislation interferes in this class warfare.   
Society has fallen back to a pre-political, natural state.  
Why does music – opera – play such a key role in this satire about the cor-
ruption of polite society and society’s general descent into a natural state? Why 
has Diderot created this nephew, who is both unfree and – in theory, anyway – a 
renewer of the opera? These questions cannot be answered within the framework 
of satire itself, but require an excursus on its historical context.  
As a literary character, the nephew acts as a link between social satire, un-
freedom, and music. Discussions of music within the satire span the nephew’s 
criticism of French opera’s tradition from Lully and Rameau, his defence of the 
Italian opera buffa, and his vision of new lyrical poetry. If we look at the satire 
in its historical context, there is nothing surprising in the coupling of the social 
and the aesthetic. Since the 17th century, “les grands,” that is the Court and the 
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urbanised nobility, have perceived themselves as the highest judges in matters of 
taste, and acted accordingly. It was their social, cultural and linguistic etiquette 
that had been elevated to the norm in the field of art. As Jolanta T. Pekacs 
writes: “the criteria of honnêteté in the social realm and those of a seventeenth-
century work of art based on the classical doctrine [were] difficult to separate” 
(Pekacs 1999, p. 279). But judging from Le neveu de Rameau, in the middle of 
the 18th century we are in a new situation. The ideals of honnêteté has been dis-
placed by the egoistic and vain private interests of financiers, patrons, and their 
allies. In Le neveu de Rameau Diderot thus asks what happens to aesthetic imi-
tation when the social segment, whose rules art must respect, is corrupted. What 
happens to the aesthetic norms when the social norms are no longer dictated by 
honnêteté, probity, and moderation, but by the greed of the financier and his 
lackeys? What art does this society generate? In the first instance, Diderot an-
swers by having the nephew expose classical French opera as a completely 
anachronistic genre consisting of: “les vols, les lances, les glories, les triomphes, 
les victoires […] féerie […] insipide mythologie…” (“rapine, lances, gloires, tri-
umphs and victories […] fairy-tale […] insipid mythology”, Diderot, 1989, pp. 
162-163; Diderot, 1966, p. 101), which, however, fortunately “est au diable […] 
l’Académie royale du cul-de-sac n’a que fermer boutique” (“will go to the devil 
and the Royal Academy in the cul-de-sac will have to shut up shop”, Diderot, 
1989, p.161; Diderot, 1966, p. 100), as the nephew so tersely formulates it. The 
days of the French opera are numbered, the audience is bored. But what should 
take its place? The satire gives two “answers” to this question. The first answer 
takes the form of a pantomime, and the second is the nephew’s poetics for new 
lyrical poetry.  
Let us observe the pantomime first of all, more precisely one of the nephew’s 
very famous pantomimes, called “l’homme-orchestre” in the reception of Diderot. 
Here Lui mimes not only a whole orchestra, but also scenes, conflicts, situations, 
music, and song from a great number of French and, in particular, Italian operas. 
Regarding Lui’s big orchestra or opera pantomime, performed at Café de la Re-
gence at Palais-Royale with the audience consisting of the café’s guests and ran-
dom passers-by, Moi states:  
 
“Il commencait à entrer en passion, et à chanter tout bas. Il élevait le ton, à mesure qu’il se 
passionnait advantage; vinrent ensuite, les gestes, les grimaces du visage et les contorsions 
du corps […] Il entassait et brouillait ensemble trente airs, italiens, français, tragiques, 
comiques de toutes sortes de caractères […] succesivement furieux, radouci, imperieux, 
ricaneur. Ici, c’est une jeune fille qui pleure et il rend toute la minauderie; là il est prêtre, il 
est roi, il est tyran, il menace, il commande, il s’emporte; il est esclave, il obéit […] Admi-
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rais-je? Oui, j’admirais! Étais-je touché de pitié ? j’étais touché de pitié; mais une teinte de 
ridicule était fondue dans ces sentiments, et les dénaturait. Mais vous vous series échappé 
en éclats de rire, à la manière don’t il contrefaisait les differrents instruments. Avec les 
joues renflées et bouffies, et un son rauque et sombre, il rendait les corps et les bassons 
[…] faisant lui seul, les danseurs, les chanteurs, les chanteuses, tout un orchestre, tout un 
theatre lyrique, et se divisant en vingt rôles divers, courant, s’arrêtant, avec l’air d’un 
énergumène, étincelant des yeux, écumant de la bouche […] il pleurait, il riait, il soupirait; 
il regardait ou attendri, ou tranquille ou furieux; c’était une femme qui se pâme de dou-
leur; c’était un malheureux livré à tout son désespoir…” (Diderot, 1989, pp. 166-167)  
  
“He began to warm up and sang, first softly, then as he grew more impassioned, he raised 
his voice and there followed gestures, grimaces, and bodily contortions […] He sang thirty 
tunes on top of each other and all mixed up: Italian, French, tragic, comic, of all sorts and 
descriptions […] in turn raging, pacified, imperious, scornful. Here we have a young girl 
weeping, and he mimes all her simpering ways, there a priest, king, tyrant, threatening, 
commanding, flying into a rage, or a slave obeying […] Did I admire? Yes, I did. Was I 
touched with pity? Yes, I was. But a tinge of ridicule ran through these sentiments and 
discoloured them. But you would have gone off into roars of laughter at the way he mi-
micked the various instruments. With cheeks puffed out and a hoarse, dark tone he did the 
horns and bassoons […] a one-man show featuring dancers, male and female, singers of 
both sexes, a whole orchestra, a complete opera-house, dividing himself into twenty dif-
ferent stage parts, tearing up and down, stopping, like one possessed, with flashing eyes 
and foaming mouth […] He wept, laughed, sighed, his gaze was tender, soft or furious: a 
woman swooning with grief, a poor wretch abandoned in the depth of his despair…” (Di-
derot, 1966, pp. 102-104) 
 
Lui’s body houses an insatiable appetite but also functions as a “medium of artis-
tic self-expression, the site of amazing and captivating visual performances” 
(Zalloua, 2003, p. 206). As a pantomime artist, Lui transforms the animal unit of 
body and consciousness into an artistic expression with which he creates a mo-
ment of sensus communis between himself and Moi. Here we are faced with the 
paradoxical element of the nephew’s body. On the one hand it forces him into 
dependency and social alienation, but on the other hand it serves him as an aest-
hetic means of expression with which he can make a personal sense experience 
public through his pantomimes, that is, accessible to sensory perception for Moi 
and the other guests at Café de la Regence.  
 But this does not exhaust the connection between unfreedom and the aes-
thetic pantomime. What we see in the impact of music on the nephew is, in reali-
ty, an aesthetic counterpart or aesthetic analogy to Bertin’s (and l’appétit’s) 
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domination. Music exercises the same domination over Lui as Bertin (and 
l’appétit) do. In both cases the body is both the source and the seat of the I’s   
divestment of authority and self-determination – of freedom. If this divestment, 
this unfreedom or heteronomy, represents a moral problem in the social world 
(as it clearly does), it is on the other hand a source of pleasure in the field of aes-
thetic experience. Or, as Diderot writes with a mixture of fascination and con-
demnation about people with the gift of a special musical sensibility in Lettre sur 
les sourds et les muets:  
 
“En musique, le plaisir de la sensation dépend d’une disposition particulière non seule-
ment de l’oreille, mais de tout système des nerfs. S’il y a des têtes sonnantes, il y a aussi 
des corps que j’appelerais volontiers harmoniques; des hommes, en qui toutes les fibres 
oscillent avec tant de promptitude et de vivacité, que sur l’expérience des mouvements 
violents que l’harmonie leur cause, ils sent la possibilité de mouvements plus violents en-
core et atteignent à l’idée d’une sorte de musique qui les ferait mourir de plaisir […] Ne 
croyez pas […] que ces êtres si sensible à l’harmonie soient les meilleurs juges de 
l’expression.” (Diderot, 1978, p. 582) 
 
“In music, the pleasure of the sensation depends on a particular predisposition, not only of 
the ear but of the entire nervous system. If we call some heads finely tuned, there are also 
some bodies that I’d have no trouble calling harmonic; men in whom the fibres oscillate with 
such promptness and liveliness that, from the experience of violent movement that harmo-
ny brings about, they sense the possibility of even more violent movements, and arrive at 
the idea of a kind of music that would make them die from pleasure [...] do not believe [...] 
that these beings who are so attuned to harmony are the best judges of expression.”4 
 
Before this, Diderot has compared the three art forms and pointed out that music 
is different from poetry and pictorial art in that it does not exhibit an object and 
thus does not function as an imitative art. Instead, its sounds, timbres and har-
monies play directly into the body’s nervous system, to the great pleasure of the 
music lover. Diderot’s theories about the three art forms all mark a break with 
classicist aesthetics, but music represents a particularly radical break in that it is 
thought to affect the subject on a pre-linguistic and pre-reflective physical level 
– beyond the control of will and consciousness. Lui has also exhibited music’s 
physicality in an earlier pantomime, where he mimes a musician performing a 
piece of music:  
 
                                                           
4  I thank Christopher Prendergast for his translation of this passage. 
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“[…] il se démène de la tête, des pieds, des mains, des bras, du corps. Comme vous avez 
vu quelquefois au concert spiritual, Ferrari ou Chiabran, ou quelque autre virtuous, dans 
les memes convulsions […]” (Diderot, 1989, p. 97) 
 
“[…] head, feet, hands, arms, body, all play their part. In this very way you would have 
sometimes seen Ferrari or Chiabran or some other virtuoso in similar convulsions at the 
Concert of Sacred Music […]” (Diderot, 1966, p. 53) 
 
The musician, as in a pantomime, constitutes “a representation of pleasure;” he 
is shaken by spasms, his hands move in convulsive jerks up and down the neck 
of the violin, and his face assumes “an expression of ecstasy.” No other art form 
demonstrates a similar connection between the body’s automatism and spiri-
tuality. On this basis it could be said that music is an art form whose aesthetic 
expression – whether beautiful or not – emanates from an animal and mechanical 
subjectivity. Interpreted through the nephew’s pantomime, music thus appears to 
be an art form that fits with an historical situation where civilisation has fallen 
back into a form of natural state and where l’honnête homme (and le philosophe) 
have been dislodged from the social scene by courtiers, financiers, great mer-
chants, stockbrokers, and their gang of mediocre poets and journalists. In the 
context of the satire, the anti-philosophers’ predatory automatism functions in a 
way – however paradoxical it may sound – as the moral or social argument for 
an aesthetics that is no longer bound to decorum, but instead lets the body loose 
in a mechanical, delightful development. The nephew’s various music and opera 
pantomimes expose what art could be in a society that has thrown off the masks 
of self-control and good breeding, and left itself at the mercy of its latent animal 
primitivism. Diderot seems to say that this constitutes a problem for society, but 
an opportunity for art.  
Diderot, however, did not create the opera-pantomime from his imagination 
alone. The pantomime contains several references to the Italian opera buffa, 
which Parisians had become acquainted with between 1752 and 1754, when the 
Italian composer and conductor Eustachio Bambini’s troupe made a guest ap-
pearance on the stage of the Académie royale de musique. The comic operas 
came as a shock to the Parisian audiences. Historians actually speak of the Ital-
ians’ guest appearance as an aesthetic earthquake in dominant French taste and 
listening culture. The dramaturgy was completely alien; the actors used move-
ments, grimaces, and gestures the like of which had never been seen on the 
academy’s “noble scene,” where the actors’ body language was supposed to    
respect the requirement of propriety (“bienséance”). The Italians’ appearance 
had to spark a feud – which it also did. In autumn 1752 one of these “guerre 
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pamphlétaire,” which France was famous for at that time, broke out: La Querelle 
des Bouffons, where adherents of the Italian opera buffa faced adherents of the 
French opera, tragédie lyrique (Fabiano, 2005, pp. 11-12). The supporters of the 
Italian opera, who included all the Encyclopaedists, among others, found the 
Italians’ physical dramaturgy liberatingly funny; opponents perceived the ges-
tures and grimaces as inappropriate “singeries” – a scandalous degradation of the 
respectable Parisian opera stage. L’opera buffa clearly constituted a break with 
the doctrine of classicism, which had formed the framework of French theatre 
and opera since the 17th century.  
Diderot’s point via the nephew’s pantomime could be seen as an attempt to 
lay bare, enlarge, and celebrate this break between la bonne compagnie and thea-
tre, or opera. Simultaneously, Diderot suggests a new connection between the 
social world on the one hand, theatre, music, and poetic lyrics one the other. 
Through Lui and his pantomime, Diderot seems to be saying that la bonne com-
pagnie, once the ideal or the norm of aesthetic imitation, has become merely an 
object of aesthetic depiction, or to be more precise of comic or satirical recrea-
tion. Judging from Le neveu de Rameau, this entails that theatre (and opera) will 
change radically, tragedy will be replaced by comedy and farce (like in the opera 
buffa), and heroism and honnêtété will have to make their way for low, simple, 
and primitive morals. Last, but not least, the body of the actor will be liberated 
from the rules of bienséance (decency) and become the instrument of expression 
– the mediator of the mechanical, animal movements, the desire, greed, and ag-
gression that now govern society. 
 
 
LYRICAL POETRY: POWER VERSUS DESIRE 
 
If Le neveu de Rameau has anything new to say about unfreedom in relation to 
common understandings of the concept, this stems from the interlinking of music 
and (moral) corruption, opera and the regression of civil society, as previously 
mentioned. The aesthetic potential of unfreedom is to be found in this interlinking, 
which we shall now examine by confronting the nephew’s vision for a new form 
of lyrical poetry (poetry that is sung, like in the opera). What is important to un-
derstand in the nephew’s poetics for the new lyrical poetry is that it tackles one 
of the points of contention in La Querelle des Bouffons, namely the extent to 
which song in opera is superior or subordinate to the poetical verse line. In 
French opera, song has to adapt to the verse line; in the Italian opera buffa, the 
opposite is the case. Not surprisingly, the nephew believes in the precedence of 
song. But, what is song, Moi asks. Song is an imitation of “the cry of animal    
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instinct,” and the nephew states that this cry must ”dictate the line which suits 
us.” An echo of the animal cry of passion can be heard in ”a beggar asking for 
alms in the street,” it can be heard in ”a man in a towering rage,” in a woman 
”mad with jealousy, a despairing lover, a flatterer – yes, a flatterer lowering his 
voice and dwelling on each syllable in honeyed tones” (Diderot, 1966, p. 107). 
Everyone has passions irrespective of rank and lineage, and the passions are ap-
parent in the tone of voice, but at the same time the individual passions have 
their specific accent or tone. It is these accents that the uncle Jean-Philippe Ra-
meau and the French opera, with its heroics and mythological universe, would 
seem to be deaf to:  
 
“C’est au cri animal de la passion, à dicter la ligne qui nous convient […] il faut que la 
phrase soit courte; que le sens en soit coupé, suspendu; que le musician puisse disposer du 
tout et de chacune de ses parties; en omettre un mot, ou le repeter; y en ajouter un qui lui 
manqué […] Il faut que les passions soient fortes ; la tendresse du musician et du poète ly-
rique doit être extreme […] Il faut les exclamations, des interjections, des suspensions, des 
interruptions, des affirmations, des negations; nous appelons, nous invoquons, nous crions, 
nous gémissions, nous pleurons, nous rions franchement. Point d’esprit, point d’épi-
gramme; point de jolie pensées. Cela est trop longue de la simple nature.” (Diderot, 1989, 
pp. 169-170) 
 
“It is the animal cry of passion that should dictate the melodic line […] phrases must be 
short and the sense cut off, suspended, so that the musician can utilize the whole and each 
part, omitting one word or repeating it, adding a missing word […] The passions must be 
strong and the sensibility of composer and poet must be very great […] What we want is 
exclamations, interjections, suspensions, interruptions, affirmations, negations ; we call 
out, invoke, shout, groan, weep or have a good laugh. No witticisms, epigrams, one of 
your well-turned thoughts – all that is far too removed from nature.” (Diderot, 1989, p. 
106) 
 
The struggle of primitive forces against the pressure of civilisation is recreated in 
this violent confrontation between the animal cry of passion and the syntax of 
the sentence. It is these forces that the nephew has felt smouldering within him-
self, which he has heard echoes of in the voices of ordinary people, and, last but 
not least, which he has seen fully developed at Bertin’s gatherings. And it is 
these forces that will dictate the melodic line and verse line in the new opera. 
The result will entail the liberation of passion, voice, and breathing from the 
rules of language, and from the defining, civilising shaping of thought.  
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The historical inseparability of the rules of polite society and art forms the 
background of Diderot’s invention of a literary figure who masters both the     
social game and music, whose depiction includes how changes in the social reg-
ister more or less automatically trigger changes in the aesthetic register. The 
moment when fashionable society is corrupted by unfreedom, the moment when 
the world of society is no longer governed by good manners, self-control, polite-
ness, propriety, and the like, is the moment when the rules that dictate art are   
also challenged. Diderot, it seems, exploits this situation in an almost diabolical 
manner, as though he celebrates the corruption of polite society as the emanci-
pation of art. When propriety, politeness, and rectitude do not exist, art does not 
have to conform to the respectful imitation of polite society’s social and cultural 
ideals. Then it is freed to perform functions other than reflecting and supporting 
the dominant elite and the existing order. Then it can show the world in many 
perspectives. Then it can speak the language not only of the lord, but also of the 
slave. 
 
 
AN AESTHETIC COUNTER-ATTACK 
 
Let us finally return to Goethe’s understanding of Le neveu de Rameau as a se-
cret revenge on the anti-philosophers. It seems obvious by now that Goethe was 
right. In Le neveu de Rameau, Diderot organises a literary counter-attack against 
the anti-philosophers’ smear campaigns by portraying them as unfree predators, 
and his need for retaliation seems all the more understandable given that the at-
tacks on the Encyclopdédie were not without consequences for Diderot and his 
team of writers. The problem for the Encyclopaedists’ opponents was that the 
censors, time and again, found no grounds to prohibit the articles in the Ency-
clopédie, and therefore had to resort to other, non-formalised, means of stopping 
its publication. As mentioned before, they came close to succeeding. In February 
1752, the king issued a decree prohibiting the publication of the Encyclopédie (it 
was later revoked), and, in January 1759, the procureur général of the Parlia-
ment of Paris alleged that the Encyclopédie was part of a large-scale conspiracy 
aimed at undermining both church and state. In March 1759, the Conseil d’Etat 
took away the Encyclopédie’s licence to print, and the work was placed on the 
Index together with d’Helvetius’s De l’Esprit (1758), a hyper-materialistic work 
with far-reaching moral and political implications. In September 1759, Pope 
Clement XII faced all who possessed copies of the Encyclopédie with the choice 
of discarding the book or being excommunicated from the Catholic Church. As 
Robert Darnton remarks: “it was hardly possible for a book to be condemned 
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more completely” (Darnton, 1979, p. 12). One could say that Diderot and the 
other Encyclopaedists composed the Encyclopédie within an atmosphere of un-
freedom in almost every sense of the word.  
The participation of the Encyclopaedists in La Querelle des Bouffons (1752-
1754), wherein they unanimously sided with the Italian opera, should be viewed 
in the light of this unfreedom. The opera feud began immediately after the king 
prohibited the Encyclopédie in February 1752, cf. above, and therefore many 
think that the Encyclopaedists’ participation in the feud was an attempt to coun-
ter royal prohibition. Their political indignation at l’ancien regime’s restrictions 
on freedom of thought and the press is thus transposed to an aesthetic critique of 
the French opera which – as formulated by Rousseau – was defended by “the 
great, the wealthy and the ladies” (Pekacz, 1999, p. 287).  
Nor is Diderot’s satire only directed at the factions that combated the Ency-
clopédie on ideological and personal grounds. Through references to the Que-
relle des Bouffons, the satire attacks the political order in l’ancien regime. The 
buffoon feud, as it appears, is not merely over the social side of taste, but also 
over its national political implications. As Elizabeth Cook writes, since the 
opera’s introduction to France it had functioned as “an overt celebration of abso-
lutism; enthusiasm for a rival, foreign style [as Italian opera] assumed a deeper 
symbolism […] threatening the fabric of Ancien Régime at the mid-point of the 
century” (in Fabiano 2005, p. 147). The Italians’ entry into the French cultural 
institution, known as an incarnation of royal authority and absolutist cultural pol-
icy, thus presented an obvious occasion to air criticism of l’ancien regime and 
the influence of certain powerful groups on the cultural institutions of the regime.  
As editor, Diderot could not afford to counter the assaults that the anti-
philosophers launched on the Encyclopédie, his team of writers, and his person. 
His enemies were too powerful. To a certain point this inequality in power ap-
pears analogous to the “bloody awful economy” to which the Nephew refers at 
the end of the dialogue when he complains that 
 
“[q]ue diable d’économie, des hommes qui regorgent de tout, tandis que d’autres qui ont 
un estomac importune comme eux, une faim renaissante comme eux, et pas de quoi mettre 
sous la dent. Le pis, c’est la posture contrainte où nous tient le besoin.” (Diderot, 1989, p. 
189) 
  
“some men bursting with everything, while others, with stomachs just as clamorous and a 
hunger just as unremitting, have nothing to get their teeth into. The worst thing is the sub-
servient posture in which you are kept by need.” (Diderot, 1966, p. 120) 
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Diderot was also in a somewhat subservient position, since the cost of expressing 
his honest opinion on the anti-philosophers, the king, court, and parliament in all 
likelihood would have been persecution or imprisonment. With Pettit, we could 
say that he was forced constantly to take the opinions, moves, and intrigues of 
others into consideration; hence he lived in a situation of domination. However, 
in this subservient position and all secrecy, he produced a literary work consid-
ered to be among the most audacious, vigorous, and progressive texts of French 
18th century literature. 
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 Baudelaire and the Government                      
of the Imagination 
CHRISTOPHER PRENDERGAST 
 
 
Let me begin by stating in summary mode the various frames of reference that 
inform the following remarks: first, an author (Baudelaire and his writings on 
criticism and aesthetics); second, a historical context (the insurrections of 1848, 
the failure of the short-lived Second Republic and the coup d’état of Louis-
Napoleon); thirdly, a topic (theories of the Imagination); and finally, two framing 
questions, which stand at the centre of an extraordinarily rich intellectual history 
running from the early eighteenth century through to the later nineteenth century.  
Simply put, the two questions are as follows: first, what did it mean or come 
to mean to be a free subject of aesthetic experience? I phrase the question in this 
way to make as clear as I can that by “subject” of aesthetic experience I do not 
primarily mean the artist, the figure of the sovereign creator that was so central 
an idea and a value in romantic aesthetics, theoretically formalized in German 
aesthetic thought but then travelling in various guises across much of the Euro-
pean romantic and post-romantic landscape. This emphasis on the sovereign art-
ist will in fact return in the later section of my remarks, with a lethal twist in the 
tale that takes us to freedom’s opposite, the condition of unfreedom. However, 
that is an endpoint. In the context of my initial framing question, by “subject” I 
understand not the sender but the receiver, that is, not the artist, but the spectator 
(or reader, or listener, etc; though here I will refer principally to the category of 
the spectator, mainly because, while Baudelaire’s thinking on this front evolves 
through his writings on nearly all the arts, including poetry and music, the pri-
mary or more extended source is his essays on the visual arts, crucially modern 
painting). The question then, slightly reformulated, is this: how was the work of 
art conceived as a space for the exercise of imaginative freedom by the spectator? 
This was not an entirely new question in Baudelaire’s time. It has an eighteenth-
century lineage and, in the context of French aesthetic thinking, is particularly 
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associated with Diderot (the Diderot of the Salons) and Diderot’s promotion of 
what Michael Fried described as a new kind of spectatorial subjectivity governed 
by what Fried called “a state of absorption” and the nineteenth century was to 
call, over and over again, the condition of “rêverie” (Fried, 1980). What happens 
to that category in Baudelaire’s thinking is very much at the heart of what I am 
here interested in. 
The second question concerns the ways in which answers to the first (what it 
meant to be an aesthetically free subject) mapped onto what it meant to be a poli-
tically free subject, understood broadly in terms of the different and often com-
peting currents of thought linking liberty and democracy. Concepts of freedom 
and imagination were natural bedfellows in European aesthetics from the early 
eighteenth century through to Kant, Romanticism and beyond. Freedom and im-
agination, the exercise of the one and the enjoyment of the other, typically came 
together in the notion of “imaginative free play”. What the latter consisted in 
was variously understood, involving all manner of themes deriving largely from 
Kant’s philosophy, to do with the subject’s transcendence of the realms of coer-
cion, necessity and instrumentality. But the notion was often inflected by, or at 
least related to, political conceptions of liberty, sometimes explicitly (as, for   
example, in the thought of Barry and Schiller), sometimes implicitly, such that 
there was often considerable overlap between my two questions – what it meant 
to be a free subject of aesthetic experience and what it meant to be free politicaly.  
However, at this point a methodological caveat, elementary, even naïve, but 
which in connection with an inquiry of this type needs to be entered: it cannot be 
a matter of implying any straightforward equivalence of aesthetic values and   
political values, whereby one can automatically read off or derive one from the 
other. When, to take an example from Baudelaire’s writings, in the poem 
“L’Idéal”, the poet-narrator speaks of his search for “une fleur qui ressemble à 
mon rouge idéal” (Baudelaire, 1961, p. 21)1, the adjectival noun ‘red” of the 
sought-for poetic flower (the poem is of course from Les Fleurs du Mal) cannot 
simply be taken to signify the red flags or the Phrygian hats of the revolutionary 
barricades in 1848. Indeed the entire history of aesthetics as a theoretical practice 
and then later a constituted discipline is not only directly bound up with, but also 
a distinctive manifestation of, a broader history of cultural specialization in 
which the aesthetic was explicitly assigned a form of “autonomy” designed to 
separate it off from other areas of thought and practice. This, however, should 
                                                           
1  All references to Baudelaire’s writings are to the 1961 Pléiade edition, except where 
otherwise indicated. Quotations of Baudelaire in English are from P.E. Charvet’s 
translation  (Baudelaire, 1972). 
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not discourage us, but merely alert us to a fairly obvious potential trap. If, bearing 
the caveat in mind, we were to map theories of the imagination in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, and in particular notions of imaginative freedom, onto 
a set of terms from the lexicon of politics, there are essentially two models of 
liberty directly pertinent to the inquiry – the republican and the liberal concep-
tions (to which in the later nineteenth century will be added the utopian, the 
communitarian and the mass-democratic).  
Republican conceptions of liberty (so-called “positive liberty”)2 impacted on 
aesthetics in different places at different times, but was perhaps most consistent-
ly a preoccupation of eighteenth-century English aesthetic thought (as described 
for instance by John Barrell in connection with eighteenth-century painting-
theory, above all in the Discourses of Joshua Reynolds). In this context “free-
dom” was tied to ideas and ideals of citizenship, the active, equal and freely    
assenting participation of the person in the self-governing republic. According to 
this model, art – both its production by the artist and its reception by the viewer 
– has a properly public function; and in subordinating private interests to public 
ones, it is a conception that encourages a focus on the general and the universal, 
what can be seen, held, and enjoyed in common. The free exercise of the Imagi-
nation in the virtuous republic of taste comes down to everyone concerned (let us 
say, before a painting in an exhibition) seeing and experiencing the same, as the 
aesthetic equivalent of the common good in the political sphere. One indication 
of what such an aesthetic can look like is Reynolds’ prohibition on ambiguity as 
encouraging “division” (its effect, in Reynolds’s words, is “to divide the atten-
tion”, both of the individual viewer and across the collection of viewers that make 
up a “public”). Ambiguous pictures are to be deplored because they encourage 
multiple seeing, different points of view, and thus the fragmentation of a com-
munity of shared taste into a collection of purely private interests and pleasures.3 
                                                           
2  The expression is famously Isaiah Berlin’s. In terms of contemporary re-thinking of 
republicanism, “positive liberty” is generally associated with Pocock’s version of re-
publican freedom, a version rooted in the “Aristotelian” conception (as distinct from 
Skinner’s ‘neo-Roman’ version, which Skinner describes as “third concept of liberty” 
situated in a space beyond or to the side of the narrow “negative/positive” polarity). 
3  “A painting that is ambiguous on the level of form will have one of two effects, either 
of which will disable it from performing the function of creating a public. Either it 
will divide the attention of the individual spectator, in such a way as to leave him at a 
loss as to how to respond to it – for he will not know where to look first, or in what 
proportion to bestow his attention on the various images it contains; or else it will   
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On the other hand, what the eighteenth-century republican or civic-humanist way 
of thinking deplored or feared as the enemy of true freedom (ambiguity and mul-
tiplicity), in the early nineteenth century acquired a different value under the in-
fluence of the other dominant model, historically and ideologically the great    
rival of the classical-republican conception, the one based on the liberal-
individualist idea, which Benjamin Constant placed at the very heart of what he 
called “modern” liberty. This was the version favoured by romantic liberalism 
(in the writings of, for example, Hazlitt and Stendhal), according to which free 
imaginative play is basically the freedom of individuals, often based on a modern 
notion of “rights” accorded to subjects in their particularity and their differences. 
One can see from even this schematic snapshot the outlines of a vast intellec-
tual-historical narrative, with many different chapters. The particular chapter that 
interests me is one that comes later, the one centred on the pivotal example of 
Baudelaire. Baudelaire is pivotal for several reasons. The first is that aspects of 
the history I have just summarized flowed, if sporadically, quirkily and non-
systematically, into his thinking about the fate of modern art in modern commer-
cial society. However, the second reason – and what for the purposes of this col-
lection I shall foreground here – concerns a set of developments that involve a 
radical break with the tradition linking freedom and imagination: developments 
which brought Baudelaire in his critical and theoretical writings to close down 
the spaces for the autonomous exercise of the imaginative faculty, in a manner 
which replaced an imputed condition of freedom with an imposed condition of 
unfreedom; where the “subject” becomes a subject in the sense familiar to political 
thought (namely as understood in relation to forms and agencies of subjection). 
  
 
ART AND IMAGINATIVE FREEDOM 
 
This however was an outcome, not a point of departure. Getting from one to the 
other means tracing a complex, uneven, and often darkly signposted journey. 
Baudelaire’s “politics”, and a fortiori their relation with both his aesthetic ideas 
and his poetic practice, present his biographers and critics with many problems, 
crucially three. The most basic concern factual gaps in the historical record, es-
pecially at the critical time of the 1848 insurrections (where he was when, with 
whom he was consorting, what he was thinking, whether or not contributions to 
ephemeral radical newspapers can be reliably attributed to him). A second diffi-
                                                           
divide one spectator from another, but permitting each to interpret it as he wishes” 
(Barrell, 1986, p. 101). 
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culty turns not just on the contradictory nature of the record of Baudelaire’s 
thoughts, opinions and allegiances, but on their wilfully contradictory nature. Let 
us not forget Baudelaire’s unusual way with that centerpiece of modern democ-
racy, the discourse of “rights”, his own distinctive contribution to it being that 
there are only two inalienable rights: the right to commit suicide and the right to 
contradict oneself (Etudes sur Poe, Baudelaire 1976, vol. 2, p. 306). The third 
general difficulty revolves around a number of irresolvable interpretive enigmas. 
In his writings Baudelaire is notoriously a man of masks. What is seriously (i.e. 
directly) meant and what is tongue-in-cheek provocation cannot always be dis-
tinguished. When, for example, Baudelaire speaks in praise of Robespierre, it is 
not at all obvious what is to be taken at face value and what is poker-faced iro-
ny.4 Similarly, when in later years he both recalls and reaffirms his earlier revo-
lutionary allegiances as if he were bizarrely drawing on the works of the reac-
tionary theocrat, Joseph de Maistre, there is an opaqueness that borders on the 
impenetrable:  
 
“Mais moi je ne suis pas dupe, je n’ai jamais été dupe! Je dis Vive la Révolution! Comme 
je dirais: Vive la Destruction! Vive l’Expiation! Vive le Châtiment! Vive la Mort! Non 
seulement je serais heureux d’être victime, mais je ne haïrais pas d’être bourreau, – pour 
sentir la Révolution des deux manières! 
Nous avons tous l’esprit républicain dans les veines, comme la vérole dans les os, nous 
sommes démocratisés et syphilisés […]” (“Pauvre Belgique”, Baudelaire, 1961, p. 1456)5 
 
“But me, I’m no dupe, I never was a dupe! I say Long live the Revolution! As I would say 
Long live Destruction!, Long live Expiation!, Long live Punishment!, Long live Death! I 
should be glad to be the victim, but equally I should not dislike the role of executioner – 
so as to experience Revolution in both its guises! 
Every one of us has the spirit of republicanism in his veins, like the pox in our bones; we 
are all democratized and syphilitic […]”  
 
Yet, while these are unsettling and unplaceable Baudelairian utterances, there are 
nevertheless certain broad lines of inquiry that enable us to situate Baudelaire – 
or more precisely the significance of Baudelaire – in relation to the two framing 
                                                           
4  For an interesting account of Baudelaire on Robespierre, cf. Pachet (1976), pp. 41-47. 
5  T.J. Clark summarises it thus: “The evidence does not add up, nor does it have to. The 
Baudelaire it suggests is shadowy, confused, open: fluid in his allegiances, hysterical 
in his enthusiasms, claiming the right to contradict himself” (Clark, 1982, pp. 141-
142).  
204 | CHRISTOPHER PRENDERGAST 
questions with which I began. Baudelaire’s early aesthetic formation in 1840s 
was strongly influenced by the emancipatory and democratising projects that 
flowered intellectually from eighteenth-century republicanism to nineteenth-
century liberal romanticism. His commitment to the idea of an art that would set 
the imagination free was reflected in his early and abiding promotion of the artis-
tic Sketch and the category of the Unfinished. In his first Salon (1845) and the 
subsequent one (the Salon of 1846, generally held to be Baudelaire’s most      
important theoretical intervention in the field of aesthetics), he described the 
painting of Corot and above all Delacroix (for Baudelaire the exemplary modern 
painter) as interestingly and productively “unfinished”, in the sense of assem-
bling colour masses which, when viewed from a certain distance, appeared 
somewhat indistinct and blurred: “un contour un peu indécis, des lignes légères 
et flottantes, et l’audace de la touche” (“shapes that are not too clearly defined, 
lines that are light and hesitant, and bold touches of colour,” Salon de 1846, 
Baudelaire, 1961, p. 892). Unlike the prescriptive, even coercive structures of 
the neoclassical canon, this was a style of painting that opened the mind and the 
imagination of the viewer to what Baudelaire, along with many of his contem-
poraries, called “rêverie” and “suggestion”, that is to say, an art which provokes 
the imagination into its own interpretive work. Delacroix, wrote Baudelaire, is 
“le plus suggestif des peintres” who “ouvre […] de profondes avenues à 
l’imagination la plus voyageuse” (“the most suggestive of all painters who […] 
creates deep avenues for the most adventurous imagination to wander down,” 
ibid., p. 889).  
The avenues down which the adventurous imagination, whether of poet or 
painter, would wander belong in various creative topographies. But one of the 
most important was the boundary-crossing landscape forged from the legacy of 
eighteenth-century “associationism”, and whose nineteenth-century formulations 
derived principally from the doctrine of correspondances and the new interest in 
synaesthesia. Despite the familiarity of its main outlines, this is in fact a complex 
idea in Baudelaire’s thinking, as it is in the nineteenth century generally. For 
present purposes, I emphasize the more radical aspect of Baudelaire’s use of the 
idea. The argument from synaesthesia entails a stress on the modern work of art 
as inherently mobile. For Baudelaire the modern is or should be based on the 
principle of movement, and as such is held to transgress the terms and relations 
of an inherited neoclassical conception of art, the conception we can perhaps 
schematically represent as a relation of domination and subordination holding 
between two categories: the fixed and the free. In its commitment to the mobile, 
the modern work of art is opposed to fixity. Modern art, according to Baudelaire, 
permits a “free” circulation of categories, sensations, energies, subjectivities. 
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Both within the individual art work and between different art works there is a 
mobile play of actions and impressions that breaks up fixed form, static line and 
arrested “identity” (in both the generic and the psychological senses of the term). 
In theory, modern art proclaims everything and everybody as “free”, free to enter 
into “association” (and that term too, at the heart of the doctrine of correspon-
dances, carries various senses, on a spectrum from the psychological to the poli-
tical). In the process of mobile circulation released by the modern art work, 
nothing and nobody is assigned any “proper” place or identity within a pre-given 
system of fixed and hierarchical relations. Or to put this in Baudelaire’s own 
characteristic vocabulary, modern art is fluid, sinuous and, perhaps above all, 
“tumultuous”. “Tumulte” is a key term that recurs throughout Baudelaire’s 
descriptions of modern art works, and notably the paintings of Delacroix and the 
music of Wagner. In one paragraph of the 1855 Exposition Universelle it appears 
three times in an account of Delacroix’s work, while the essay on Wagner both 
begins with an account of how Wagner’s music expresses “les tumultes de l’âme 
humaine” (“the turbulences of the human soul”) and climaxes in a rapid accumu-
lation of terms to do with the ideas of turbulence and excess (“Richard Wagner 
et Tannhäuser à Paris“, Baudelaire, 1961, p.1210).  
In reviewing the language of Baudelaire’s accounts of the synaesthetic pro-
perties of modern art, and of modern painting in particular, we may find oursel-
ves musing on two metaphors for colour, one in English and one in French: “riot 
of colours” and “orgie de couleurs”. If by reverse catachresis we reactivate what 
lies buried in these otherwise dead metaphors (the French is effectively dead in 
part by having been largely replaced by its semantic neighbour, “débauche de 
couleurs”), we come up with some interesting considerations. Both denote a  
mode of excess, forms of dangerous behaviour. “Riot” recalls, precisely, riotous 
behaviour, either in the taverns or, in the strictly political reference, in the streets 
and on the barricades. “Orgie” denotes another form of riotous behaviour, in the 
bed and the brothel. To my knowledge, Baudelaire himself does not use the ex-
pression “orgie de couleurs” in his discussions of painting and colour, although 
the expression does enter pictorial language in the course of the nineteenth 
century and is to be found, for example, in Hugo. The word “orgie” by itself, 
however, does have an interesting career throughout virtually the whole corpus 
of Baudelaire’s writings, as it does in the nineteenth century generally; the      
tracking of the term across nineteenth-century French writing is something of a 
fascinating lexical adventure (the high lexical scorers include Balzac, Michelet 
and Flaubert).  
Here are some examples from Baudelaire: in the projected epigraph poem for 
Les Fleurs du Mal he refers to his own book of poems as “ce livre saturnien,   
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orgiaque et mélancolique” (“this saturnine, orgiastic and melancholic book“); the 
great closing poem of the collection, “Le Voyage”, refers – though here the per-
spective is a self-ironizing one – to the “Orgie de l’imagination”; “orgie” and 
“orgiaque” occur crucially in Baudelaire’s account of Wagner’s Venusberg music. 
More appositely, there are two instances to which we might here pay special at-
tention. The first is from the prose poem “le Fou et la Vénus”:  
 
“quelle admirable journée […] l’extase universelle des choses ne s’exprime par aucun 
bruit […] c’est ici une orgie silencieuse. On dirait qu’une lumière toujours croissante fait 
de plus en plus étinceler les objets; que les fleurs excitées brûlent du désir de rivaliser avec 
l’azur du ciel par l’énergie de leurs couleurs […]” (Le spleen de Paris, Baudelaire, 1961, 
pp. 236-237) 
 
“What an admirable day [...] the universal ecstasy of things expresses itself noiselessly 
[…] this is a silent orgy. It is as if a constantly expanding light makes objects glitter more 
and more; as if the aroused flowers burn with the desire to rival the blue of the sky 
through the energy of their own colours […]” 
 
It will be noted how “orgies” generates and links a series of associations between 
sexuality, light and colour, a chain that is reproduced in the second example with 
a further extension into a fourth term, that of political rebellion. The example is 
from the famous poem of intoxicated rebellious fantasy, “le Vin des chiffon-
niers”. Recall the scene of this poem: the ragpicker lurches drunkenly down the 
Parisian streets, surrounded by the spies (“mouchards”) of the Second Empire 
regime, recalling the lost glories of the Napoleonic battlefields, dreaming of poli-
tical revenge for betrayed promises (probably of 1848). The fantasy climaxes by 
bringing the political into contact with terms drawn respectively from the voca-
bularies of colour and sexuality: “orgie lumineuse” (Les Fleurs du Mal, Baude-
laire, 1961, p. 101). 
This metaphorical crossing of the themes of colour, politics and sexuality 
may well remind us of many things, specifically of that particular emphasis in 
traditional aesthetic systems (which, in the conservative imagination, last well 
into the nineteenth century) whereby two of the key terms of Baudelaire’s   
modernist aesthetics – colour and metaphor – are commonly associated with the 
idea of an unregulated sexuality, a form of aesthetic “licence” held to be cognate 
with “licentiousness”. More precisely, it is the association with the idea (or, in 
self-defeating paradox, the metaphor) of the Fallen Woman, the prostitute and the 
whore. Thus painted colours (especially in oil), by virtue of their assumed close-
ness to the turbulence of sensual life, are frequently compared to the make-up of 
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the Harlot, the face and body daubed in alluring but deceptive cosmetics, sugges-
tive of irresponsible and promiscuous sexual activity. Similarly, metaphor and 
more generally figurative discourse, as Todorov notes in Théories du symbole 
(1977), are from classical antiquity onwards often assimilated to the figure of the 
painted prostitute, producing relations or “couplings” transgressive of the stern 
proprieties of rational discourse and therefore appropriately an object of censure 
and control. 
 
 
THE ARTIST AS DESPOT 
 
Thus to praise colour and, moreover, to praise it in terms that are systematically 
metaphorical is to enter dangerous territory; it is to speak of and release energies 
(another key Baudelairian term) that are disruptive of traditional taxonomies and 
orderings of reality. The mobilities of the modern art work are seen by Baude-
laire – to put the point in terms we are more likely to use – as radically decentering, 
tearing the subject out of all fixed “identity” and relation to the world, as neces-
sarily involving excess, transgression of given proprieties and a certain violence 
done to fixed and fixing representations. Yet even as he championed this view of 
the nature and function of modern art, he had reservations. The wandering imagi-
nation, served by an art setting the imagination free from a normative body of 
rules to construct its own landscape of the mind, could all too easily wander 
dangerously far from appropriate controls. In the 1846 Salon there is a section on 
sculpture with the wonderfully nonchalant title “Pourquoi la sculpture est ennuy-
euse”, which recalls Reynolds disapproval of ambiguity. As a three-dimensional 
object in space, sculpture licences the body of the viewer to move around, to 
look at it from different points of view, thus permitting a form of free imagina-
tive play seen as wanton and random free association, crucially of a spectator 
breaking free of the point of view selected by the artist:  
 
“La sculpture a plusieurs inconvénients qui sont la conséquence nécessaire de ses moyens. 
Brutale et positive comme la nature, elle est en même temps vague et insaisissable, parce 
qu’elle montre trop de faces à la fois. C’est en vain que le sculpteur s’efforce de se mettre 
à un point de vue unique; le spectateur qui tourne autour de la figure, peut choisir cent 
points de vue différents, excepté le bon [...]” (Salon de 1846, Baudelaire 1961, pp. 943-4) 
 
“Sculpture possesses various disadvantages that are the consequence of its medium. Bru-
tally material like nature, sculpture is at the same time vague and elusive, because it dis-
plays too many aspects at one and the same time. It is in vain that the sculptor tries to    
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position himself from a single point of view; the spectator who moves around the figure, 
can choose a hundred different points of view other than the right one […].” 
 
The viewing scene described here does not display the autonomy of a person 
participating in a rational community of equals, but an anarchy of individual 
taste and appetite, an instance of what towards the end of the Salon Baudelaire 
denounces as “le chaos d’une liberté épuisante et stérile,” (“the chaos of an ex-
hausting and sterile freedom,”) and the “liberté anarchique qui glorifie 
l’individu,” (“anarchic liberty that glorifies the individual,” ibid., p. 948), and 
which was to be countered by the ideal sketched in the penultimate section of the 
1846 Salon, “De l’école et des ouvriers”, which revives the older model of the 
Master’s studio and adapts it to the sponsoring of a new collective-corporatist 
spirit. It would, however, be a mistake to interpret this denunciation of rampant 
individualism as a resurrection of eighteenth-century republicanism or civic  
humanist thinking. Nor is it a self-affiliating with the more recent strains of nine-
teenth-century utopian and proto-socialist thought, both at a very general level 
sharing a stress on the priority of common values and shared tastes over purely 
individual and private ones. There were of course brief, fragmentary glimpses of 
these ideas and values in Baudelaire’s reflections on painting and literature be-
fore and during 1848. Yet, while definitely important, they are very difficult to 
map as terms of a coherent outlook, and often – as in this last section of the 1846 
Salon – they appear to anticipate what after 1848 were to become essentially 
terms of contempt. The denunciation of the liberal-individualist view of human 
liberty and what it implied for the forms in which art would be produced and 
consumed, became increasingly, and often hysterically, anchored in another way 
of thinking and feeling, authoritarian and – to use a term that will come to mean 
a very great deal to Baudelaire – “despotic”. 
In 1859, Baudelaire published the last of his Salons. In it are two chapters or 
sections on the nature and functioning of the Imagination (“La Reine des facultés” 
and “Le Gouvernement de l’imagination”). In the second of the two section 
headings, the preposition “of” is at once a subjective and an objective genitive; 
both active and passive, nominative and accusative. Government of the imagi-
nation is to be understood in the accusative sense of what governs it, the sense of 
the law-bound processes and disciplinary regimes to which the imagination, in 
order to function at all, must be subordinated. Baudelaire works hard to specify 
what he thinks these are, largely as a rule-governed form of mental discipline 
that distinguishes “imagination” from its weaker brother, mere “fancy”, subject 
only to the wayward free associations of the undisciplined mind (in many re-
spects this is a continuation of the line of thought that goes back to Coleridge’s 
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Biographia Literaria; Baudelaire refers to Catherine Crowe, a disciple of Cole-
ridge).6 But one is also to read the preposition as carrying the more active sense 
of government by, the imagination as governing rather than as governed. Imagi-
nation “governs” by virtue of being primordial and sovereign, originator and or-
ganiser of the synaesthetic and metaphoric unity of experience:  
 
“C’est l’imagination qui a enseigné à l’homme le sens moral de la couleur, du contour, du 
son et du parfum. Elle a créé, au commencement du monde, l’analogie et la métaphore.  
Elle décompose toute la création, et, avec les matériaux amassés et disposés suivant des 
règles dont on ne peut trouver l’origine que dans le plus profond de l’âme, elle crée un 
monde nouveau, elle produit la sensation du neuf. Comme elle a créé le monde (on peut 
bien dire cela, je crois, même dans un sens religieux), il est juste qu’elle gouverne […].” 
(ibid., pp. 1037-38). 
 
“It is the imagination that has taught man the moral significance of colour, contour, sound 
and scent. At the beginning of the world, it created analogy and metaphor. It decomposes 
all creation, and with the riches accumulated and arranged according to rules whose origin 
can be found only in the depths of the soul, it creates the sensation of the new. Since it 
created the world (one can, I think, maintain that even in a religious sense), it is right that 
it should govern […].”  
 
This is the metaphysical warrant (“même dans un sens religieux”) given to the 
regal place of the imagination in the hierarchy of the faculties (“the queen of the 
faculties”), at the apex of the division of mental labour, orchestrating the dif-
ferent tasks of the mind and their collaborative contribution to the whole: “Sans 
elle, toutes les facultés, si solides et si aiguisées qu’elles soient, sont comme si 
elles n’étaient pas [...] Aucune ne peut se passer d’elle, et elle peut suppléer 
quelques-unes,” (“Without her all the faculties, however firm and sharpened they 
might be, are as though they did not exist [...] None of them can do without her, 
but she can take the place of some of them,” ibid., p. 1038). 
Here then are two models or analogies for the work of the Imagination: a 
monarch and a government. These are terms that clearly resonate with political 
connotation. Baudelaire’s text does not itself assign explicitly political meanings 
to the terms. Their universe of reference is cognitive, psychological and aes-
thetic; and in order to be convincing, any attempt to carry these references over 
into the sphere of political discourse would obviously require far more than a 
simple analogy. On the other hand, the analogical web woven by Baudelaire’s 
                                                           
6  Salon de 1859, pp. 1040-41. On Crowe and Coleridge, see Clapton (1930). 
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text is very dense and massively overdetermined: in the two extracts from the 
1859 Salon, the personified imagination attracts, along with queen and govern-
ment, the images of a warrior, an army commander, a cardinal (with crimson 
robes), and a deity (with the power and authority conferred by having a divine 
origin). Above all perhaps, it attracts a term that recurs across the whole corpus 
of Baudelaire’s later writings: “despot”. Imagination, Baudelaire writes in 
L’Oeuvre et la vie d’Eugène Delacroix (Baudelaire, 1961, p. 1119), is “la grande 
faculté despotique” (“the great despotic faculty”). And it is despotic not only in 
ruling the potentially unruly life of the mind; but also in ruling the whole human 
and social universe of the experience of art.  
Baudelaire’s late theory of the imagination is expressly designed to ensure a 
form of “government” that will dominate a community of readers, spectators and 
listeners. The imagination as despot is crucially, and only, the imagination of the 
sovereign Artist, conceived as a Master-figure who guides, controls, and dic-
tates. Under this regime the Spectator is disenfranchised, robbed of all rights to 
the exercise of imaginative autonomy. The spectator is positioned as entirely 
subordinate to the will of the master, the passive recipient of a transmission from 
the Artist, the transmission of what Baudelaire calls the artist’s “intention”; the 
spectator is no longer imaginatively free (to dream, to interpret, to construct), but 
is the prisoner of the intentional disposition of another. Indeed it is not only that 
the Spectator’s autonomy evaporates under this regime, but even the reality of 
the created art work itself; as handmaiden to the artist’s intention, it becomes a 
mere vehicle of transmission, the dematerialized medium for the despotic pro-
jection of one state of mind onto another. The envisaged communicative scenario 
is stated thus: the Master artist is the one who says: “Je veux illuminer les choses 
avec mon esprit et en projeter les reflets sur les autres esprits,” (“I want to illu-
minate things with my mind and cast its reflection on other minds,” ibid., p. 
1044). In short, what had originally been conceived as an art of “suggestion” 
(“an art that would free the imagination”) is replaced by an art of suggestibility, 
an art of manipulation.  
This was an extraordinary place for aesthetic theory to end up in, with a hun-
dred-year history of attempted democratic emancipation of imaginative life 
reaching a dead-end, a point of exhaustion. I have not the slightest doubt that this 
was in part Baudelaire’s reaction (and I mean “reaction” in the sense of reac-
tionary) to the failure of 1848, in which the discourses of republic, democracy 
and liberty were stress-tested to breaking point, progressively hollowed out, and 
decisively routed by the counter-revolutionary coup d’état and the Napoleonic 
dictatorship of the Second Empire. It was an experience that in many ways  
broke Baudelaire. One consequence was a turning against the whole post-
BAUDELAIRE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE IMAGINATION | 211 
Enlightenment configuration of aesthetics and politics, whether liberal, repub-
lican or utopian, in favour of a new aesthetic, based on fear of freedom and ha-
tred of democracy, crucially a theory of the imagination which has no place for 
the active exercise of freedom by the viewer. Baudelaire, who himself sketched a 
version of artistic modernity, is often seen as one of the fathers of artistic 
modernism. That is correct, and it is also true that what he fathered for modern-
ism was varied, complex and contradictory. But one of the things he bequeathed 
was a contribution to the framework for the emergence of an anti-democratic 
modernism of the autocratic Right, the tradition of right-wing cultural critique 
that starts with Joseph de Maistre and runs through Dostoievsky, Nietzsche, to 
Heidegger (for suggestions along these lines, see Burton, 1991, pp. 356-366).  
As I have said, substantiating these claims demands a lot more work than an 
analogical move reading the political into Baudelaire’s use of the term “govern-
ment” in his theory of the imagination. Mere analogical reasoning is vulnerable 
to precisely the criticisms of Baudelaire and his predecessors of unregulated free 
association as a symptom of wanton individualism. Nevertheless, as a sort of  
coda (or prologue to further, more detailed investigations of text and context), let 
me conclude with an invitation to ruminate on the dense analogical dynamic sur-
rounding a further account of the operations of the imagination, in a passage 
from another late text, Le Peintre de la vie moderne, the essay that more than 
any other is Baudelaire’s programmatic statement of the aesthetic of “moder-
nité”. The passage concerns the “mutinous” claims of the “detail” on the modern 
art work, and in many ways its terms repeat (or evoke) the contrast drawn way 
back, in the 1845 Salon, between the “finished” and the “complete”. The invi-
tation is to consider whether or not, as he speaks unobjectionably of artistic mat-
ters, Baudelaire’s terms are such that he is also speaking of political matters, a 
set of terms gathered in a small textual space, all with a lineage in the discourse 
of art criticism and art history (the subordination of “detail” to a master-design), 
but which here, in their concentrated in-gathering, are also expressive of fears 
and anxieties manifestly centred on the political: “riot”, “mob”, “equality”, “jus-
tice”, “usurpation”, “anarchy”, “hierarchy” and “subordination”:  
 
“Un artiste ayant le sentiment parfait de la forme, mais accoutumé à exercer surtout sa 
mémoire et son imagination, se trouve alors comme assailli par une émeute de détails, qui 
tous demandent justice avec la furie d’une foule amoureuse d’égalité absolue. Toute jus-
tice se trouve forcément violée; toute harmonie détruite, sacrifiée; mainte trivialité devient 
énorme; mainte petitesse, usurpatrice. Plus l’artiste se penche avec impartialité vers le dé-
tail, plus l’anarchie augmente. Qu’il soit myope or presbyte, toute hiérarchie et toute su-
bordination disparaissent […]”  (Le Peintre de la vie moderne, Baudelaire, 1961, p. 1167) 
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“An artist with a perfect sense of form but particularly accustomed to the exercise of his 
memory and his imagination, then finds himself assailed, as it were, by a riot of details, all 
of them demanding justice, with the fury of a mob in love with absolute equality. Any 
form of justice is inevitably infringed; any harmony is destroyed, sacrificed; a multitude of 
trivialities are magnified; a multitude of little things become usurpers of attention. The 
more the artist pays impartial attention to detail, the greater does anarchy become. Whether 
he be short-sighted or long-sighted, all sense of hierarchy or subordination disappears […]”  
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Unfreedom and the Crises of Witnessing 
A Republican Perspective on the African American  
Slave Narratives 
CHRISTIAN DAHL 
 
 
At the end of his famous Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An Ameri-
can Slave (1845), Douglass writes about his first participation at an Abolitionist 
convention, in Nantucket four years after his flight from slavery in Maryland, 
where he was invited to tell about his former life in slavery:  
 
“I felt strongly moved to speak, and was at the same time much urged to do so by Mr. 
William C. Coffin, a gentleman who had heard me speak in the colored people’s meeting 
at New Bedford. It was a severe cross, and I took it up reluctantly. The truth was, I felt 
myself a slave, and the idea of speaking to white people weighed me down. I spoke but a 
few moments, when I felt a degree of freedom, and said what I desired with considerable 
ease.” (Douglass, 1845, p. 117) 
 
However brief and impersonal, the address marks a decisive moment in the sym-
bolic transformation of the author from slave to citizen as he enters a political 
arena for the first time. This transformation is symbolic in at least two senses, 
one strong and one weak. In the strong sense, the Nantucket address marks the 
beginning of Douglass’s life-long career as a political speaker and writer that 
made him famous as “The Representative Negro” in America and Britain. How-
ever, his transformation is also symbolic in the weak sense that it was neither   
effective nor binding from its beginning. In the 1840s the legal status of runaway 
slaves like Douglass was complicated and quite uncertain, and further aggra-
vated by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 which stipulated that fugitive slaves    
residing in the North were still the property of their owners who could legally  
214 | CHRISTIAN DAHL 
restore them to slavery. As a consequence, Douglass was forced to flee to Brit-
ain, having become vulnerable in his position as a person of public renown.  
In yet another sense, we can also interpret the situation of his witnessing, the 
act through which his civic transformation is performed, as symbolic in so far as 
it represents a certain conflict within the act of witnessing. By referring to his act 
of witnessing as “a severe cross,” Douglass symbolically addresses a constraint 
within the testimonial situation that has been the subject of much critical atten-
tion in studies of witness literature. It consists in the witness’s expectation or ex-
perience of estrangement towards his audience due to the content of his testimo-
ny. While Douglass apparently did not feel any inhibitions when he told his story 
to other blacks in the Massachusetts city of New Bedford, who were familiar 
with the experience of slavery, he instantly feels reduced again to the status of a 
slave at the prospect of a white audience on Nantucket, until his words finally  
restore him to “a degree of freedom.” This chapter will investigate the act of 
witnessing in the antebellum slave narratives as an attempt to transcend the con-
dition of unfreedom, and reach for a freedom that can be asserted only gradually, 
in the process of speaking. 
The Antebellum slave narratives constitute a body of literature centrally con-
cerned with the problems of unfreedom. First of all, they portray the deprivations 
of American slaves from an autobiographical point of view. Second, the narra-
tives were written and published with the explicit purpose of bringing an end to 
American slavery. Third, many of the slave narratives were authored by men and 
women who had escaped enslavement in the South but were not legally free and, 
therefore, remained dependent on the patronage and protection of white aboli-
tionists for publication. It is thus a body of literature which struggles to affirm 
the witness as a free person who is fit to invest his or her testimony in political 
agency. These factors can, I think, explain some of the peculiarities of the slave 
narratives in comparison to other testimonial or autobiographical literature. 
The slave narratives’ struggle with unfreedom as a political and personal 
condition is also decisive for their literary status today, which is a mixed one. On 
the one hand, the slave narratives are now recognized as not only important doc-
uments in a decisive chapter in American history,1 but also as the beginning of 
Afro-American literature. For these reasons, slave autobiography has become an 
integrated part of the American canon and is taught in most American schools. 
                                                           
1  In a wider perspective, abolitionist literature of the 18th and 19th century, to which the 
slave narratives contributes substantially, is responsible for changing the Western 
opinion on slavery, from accepting it as an unquestioned fact of life to considering it 
to be a violation of natural law (Davis, 2006, p. 331). 
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On the other hand, slave narratives have not benefitted much from the current 
critical prominence of witness literature, as they do not conform very well to the 
dominant critical demands of that genre. Contemporary discussions of witness 
literature have concentrated on testimony from the great political catastrophes of 
the 20th century, in particular the Holocaust, and reflect the so-called end of ide-
ology following the end of the Cold War. “The witness produces no theory, 
teaches no doctrine, does not attempt to convince one of his own world view” 
writes Renaud Dulong in his book Le témoin oculaire, and his view is repeated 
by Horace Engdahl, former secretary of the Swedish Academy, who, in a speech 
on witness literature delivered at the centennial of the Noble Prize, declared that: 
“the persona of witness literature demands a certain loneliness or at least a with-
drawal from ideological struggle” (Engdahl, 2002, p. 8).  
These criteria for witness literature are certainly not met by antebellum slave 
narrators who are quite explicit in their ideological struggle against slavery. 
Though slave testimonies essentially rely upon authenticity and truthfulness, 
they only rarely appear as self-authenticating publications. Instead, their veracity 
usually depends on prefatory statements from prominent representatives of the 
abolitionist movement. It is therefore quite obvious that many of the narratives 
had been filtered and conformed to a political purpose and must be regarded with 
a certain suspicion. It is an indication of the difficulties faced by slave narratives 
in living up to contemporary criteria of witness literature that Toni Morrison, the 
most critically acclaimed contemporary writer directly engaged with slave narra-
tive, in her famous novel Beloved draws on the experience of a historical refugee 
slave whose testimony was not and could never have been represented in the ac-
cepted slave narratives. The resistance to representation that follows traumatic 
experience is, in fact, a major theme in Morrison’s novel and her ongoing enga-
gement with the history of American slavery. 
The historical veracity of the slave narratives is of course to a certain degree 
destabilized by their political purpose, and for this reason the quality of the nar-
ratives as source material for the study of American slavery has been the subject 
of much discussion, though most historians now accept the overall validity of the 
narratives. However, instead of reading the slave narratives for particular histo-
rical or literary reasons, as documentation of a decisive chapter in American his-
tory and African American literary history, they deserve to be read in a wider 
perspective as demonstrations of what it means to be unfree and what it takes to 
assert oneself as a free person, in other words: as a touchstone for the conceptu-
alization of political freedom and its opposite.  I will therefore suggest a reading 
of slave narratives which introduces republican political thinking on freedom as 
an alternative perspective for the “crises of witnessing” than those offered by     
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psychoanalysis and trauma studies (for instance Felman & Laub, 1992; Caruth, 
1996). In particular, I will draw on Phillip Pettit’s republican theory of freedom, 
which stresses the importance of discursive control to the definition of personal 
freedom. As I will argue, the crises of witnessing in slave narratives are essen-
tially connected to questions of discursive control, a fact which has hitherto been 
insufficiently conceptualized by scholarship. 
 
 
SLAVERY, LITERACY, AND DISCURSIVE CONTROL 
 
The philosophical concepts I will use in this essay are taken from Pettit’s book A 
Theory of Freedom. From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (2001), 
which adds a social dimension to his more famous republican definition of poli-
tical freedom as non-domination.2 As such, his analysis of freedom as discursive 
control aims to demonstrate that freedom requires more than the mere absence of 
interference that liberal political theorists assume. Central to Pettit’s idea of 
freedom is the ability of agents to be held responsible for their actions. An action 
will be free in itself, Pettit argues, if it is underdetermined and thus materializes 
in a way that allows an agent to be held responsible. This agent can then be held 
responsible as a free self to the extent that his constitution allows him or her to 
choose in such a way so as to be fully responsible for the action (Pettit, 2001, p. 
21). Yet the agent will only be a free person, Pettit holds, to the extent that their 
position in relation to other people allows them to choose in such a way that they 
are fully responsible for what they do. Personal freedom, in other words, requires 
not only that we are fit to be held responsible, but that others acknowledge us as 
fit to be held responsible for our actions.  
This acknowledgment is naturally practiced through discourse, for agents can 
only be free persons insofar as they have the ability to discourse and access to 
discourse (Pettit, 2001, p. 70). In order to count as a free person, therefore, we 
must acquire discursive control through discourse-friendly relationships. Pettit’s 
                                                           
2  Pettit’s argument that republicanism involves a concept of negative liberty (i.e. non-
domination), which is essentially different from that of liberalism, which conceives of 
freedom as non-interference (Pettit, 1993a, 1993b, 1997), was inspired by Skinner (cf. 
Skinner, 1984 and 1986) who has added substantially to the historical understanding 
of polemic differences between republicanism and liberalism (see also Skinner, 1998). 
Though the current essay is much indebted to Skinner’s historical approach, I will   
focus here on Pettit whose conceptual framework of republican thought allows for a 
social perspective that is absent in the works of Skinner. 
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insistence on the importance of personal freedom through discourse control is 
leveled against philosophical theories that define freedom as only rational or vo-
litional control. A stoic philosopher like Epictetus, allegedly a manumitted slave 
himself, would argue that freedom of the self depends only on the agent’s ratio-
nal and volitional capacity, not on his relationship to other people. A stoic slave 
can, in principle, conceive of himself as a free self by alienating himself from the 
world of men. Accordingly, a rational choice theorist will hold that a person who 
is threatened by a robber to choose between giving his money or his life is a free 
agent in so far as he is faced with a rational choice between his money and his 
life. While the slave and the victim of a robbery may be regarded as free agents 
in the sense that they can choose rationally, and the stoic slave may even count 
as a free self, insofar as he exerts rational control over his own volitions, neither 
can be acknowledged as free as long as they are deprived of discursive control. 
Lack of discursive control is a problem familiar to all American slave narra-
tors. Along with the oblique descriptions of physical coercion such as flogging 
and beating in the narratives, we find numerous accounts of ways that slaves 
were deprived of discursive control and thus denied even the most basic forms of 
individual personhood. A very important feature of American slavery, which al-
most all slave narrators discuss, concerns the systematic attempt to prevent 
slaves from learning to write. Since colonial times laws prohibited teaching 
slaves in Georgia and South Carolina how to write, and after the Nat Turner up-
rising in 1831 further legislation arose in many slave states to prevent slaves 
from gathering, travelling, and educating themselves (Genovese, 1974, p. 562). 
Without the refinement of such formal education, most slaves relied upon the as-
sistance of white editors or ghost writers to produce their narratives. Though edi-
tors of antebellum narratives were eager to suppress any imaginative elements in 
the slave narratives in order to present slavery as authentically as possible, it is 
quite clear that the narratives’ amanuenses and publishers were not always the 
transparent documentarians they claimed to be. Tendencies to grandiloquence 
and sentimental description of slaves’ rustic plantation life are thus found in 
many narratives produced from oral statements, whereas they are absent from 
the autobiographies that were written by literate slave witnesses (Olney, 1984).  
The prospect of achieving discursive control was considerably better for 
slave fugitives who managed to learn to write. Among these, none is more aware 
of the importance of literacy to emancipation than Douglass. In his narrative, he 
describes how his mistress taught him to read when he was a child, while his 
master taught him the consequences of literacy by reproving his wife for having 
spoiled a slave by teaching him the ABCs (“It would forever unfit him to be a 
slave”, Douglass quotes his master). Concluding in a manner characteristic of his 
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dialectical thinking, Douglass therefore acknowledges, “In learning to read, I 
owe almost as much to the bitter opposition of my master, as to the kindly aid of 
my mistress” (Douglass, 1845, p. 33). Though Douglass conceives of literacy as 
a requirement for freedom more clearly than any other slave narrator, his view is 
echoed by several less eloquent writers, many of whom acquired literacy only af-
ter their escape to the North, and his insight is endorsed by most contemporary 
scholars. “Sheer literacy was the very commodity that separated animal from 
human being, slave from citizen, object from subject”, observes Henry Louis 
Gates, Jr. (Gates 1987, p. 24-25), while Olney stresses that literacy, identity and 
freedom are “altogether interdependent and indistinguishable as thematic 
strands” in the slave narratives (Olney, 1984, p. 53-54).3 
In a comparative historical perspective it is interesting to see that literacy has 
been invested with far more importance for the struggle against American slavery 
than in previous historical periods. Contrary to Douglass’s and his former    
owners’ views on literate slaves, educated slaves were thus seen as valuable    
resources in the ancient Greek and Roman slave economies and not as threats to 
society. However, it was much easier to physically exclude slaves from the public 
sphere in an assembly democracy like classical Athens than it was to prevent 
slaves from political interference in a 19th century public sphere of printed     
discourse.4  
We have seen that literacy and discourse-friendly relations to others were 
recognized as primary objectives for the enjoyment of personal freedom by the 
slave narrators. The dependence of many slave narrators on amanuenses and   
                                                           
3  The insistence on the importance of discursive independence, found both among slave 
narrators and contemporary historians, points to a distinction of discursive control, 
which Pettit ignores. According to his theory, the only real violation of discursive 
freedom consists in unfriendly coercion, and so Pettit grants that discursive control 
depends on discourse friendly relationship. In this respect the relationship between the 
illiterate slave narrators and their amanuenses can only be characterized as discourse 
friendly, in the sense that it depended on mutual agreement. However, we must 
acknowledge that illiterate narrators were not as free as the independent autobiog-
raphers to control their own discourse. Perhaps discursive independence is not a nec-
essary requirement for discursive control, but it is certainly valuable to it. 
4  It must be added that abolitionists and slave narrators have a tendency that has persist-
ed to this day, to overemphasize the restrictions on slave education, which were not 
practiced in all slave states. Since freedom of speech was in no way as advanced as in 
the North, the association of literacy and emancipation was never universal in the 
South (cf. Webber, 1980). 
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editors was biased in many cases (Olney, 1984), but should on the other hand not 
be seen as something compromising their status as testimony. Though the tone 
and style of the narratives were often manipulated or distorted by editors and 
amanuenses (who rarely wanted the narratives to be as “unvarnished” as they pre-
tended), historians of American slavery accept today that the factual statements 
of the narratives are relatively truthful, and it has been recognized that the edi-
tors often went at length to authenticate the veracity of the narratives (Blass-
ingame, 1977).  
 
 
RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
 
As we have seen, Pettit argues that our capacity to exercise discourse control is 
dependent on discourse-friendly relations to other people. However, discourse 
control also depends on the capacity of the agent to count as a continuous person 
and self. Not only must I be able to relate to the actions I perform as owned by 
me, I must also be able to relate them to my previous doings. This is the reason 
why autobiography becomes such an important genre in the slaves’ struggle for 
discursive freedom. Since Augustine’s Confessions, autobiography has been 
concerned with the question how agents can change and still remain the same 
person. How can consciousness be continuous while the self changes over time?  
Though Augustine does not talk of personal identity, it is from his Confes-
sions that we have come to think of personal identity as something established 
by subjective acts of imaginative memory relating the past to the present. For 
this reason, memory often becomes the very subject of autobiography, as when 
writers conjure past moments in acts of present imagination. James Olney, a dis-
tinguished scholar of autobiography, has noted that such authorial acts by which 
the autobiographer relates past events to the moment of recollective writing (“I 
can see even now”) are curiously absent from the slave narratives whose status 
as autobiography he denounces (with the sole exception of Douglass). Because 
the slave narratives were written to document slavery rather than the personal 
lives of narrators, the ex-slave was, in Olney’s words “debarred from the use of a 
memory that would make anything of his narrative beyond or other than the 
purely, merely episodic, and he is denied access, by the very nature and intent of 
his venture, to the configurational dimension of narrative” (Olney, 1984, p. 150).  
Though it would be tempting to explain the lack of imaginative subjectivity 
in the slave narratives by reference to the reification of slaves, Olney is right to 
argue that the imaginative deficit in the narratives derives from their deliberate 
rhetorical purpose, which was to document slavery rather than recollect and     
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interpret individual lives. However, we must add that there is a real struggle for 
personal identity (between the slave’s former and present self) in many of the 
narratives, which Olney ignores because he is too concerned with a traditional, 
hermeneutic understanding of selfhood and identity.  
This struggle concerns the accountability of the narrators for past actions. 
For while slaves may alienate themselves from actions they were coerced to per-
form (since their lack of freedom is equivalent to a denial of responsibility), the 
slave narrators, in their insistence on their accountability as free persons, are of-
ten eager to confess transgressions they performed or suffered as slaves in order 
to avoid coercion. Harriet Jacobs (1861) felt so ashamed of the sexual harass-
ments she had suffered as a slave that she could only publish her narrative pseu-
donymously, but her most daring confession is found in her account of how she 
debased herself morally by taking a black lover in order to cool her master’s 
sexual desire for her. William Brown Wells (1847) confesses how he tricked a 
fellow slave into receiving flogging intended for him, but only much later re-
gretted his deception. And Henry Bibb (1849) blames himself for having bred 
children to slavery and betrayed his family back in Kentucky by fleeing to the 
North. That discussions of the slaves’ personal responsibility are required in the 
narratives is perhaps best attested by Douglass’ discussion of why he did not re-
gret having stolen another man’s horse during his flight. 
Clearly, these moral considerations are meant to prove the narrators’ status 
as responsible agents over time in spite of conditions that forced them to trans-
gress their own moral standards. If the slave narrator is not permitted to lapse into 
imaginative reconfigurations of his former life, he can instead affirm his status as 
a continuous person who is responsible for both his present and past actions. 
Again, Pettit’s theory demonstrates why this element in the narratives must be 
seen as an attempt to assert freedom on the side of the slaves. In his attempt to 
avoid a definition of freedom that is rooted in the mind, Pettit discards the defini-
tion of personhood as continuity of consciousness in favour of a forensic defini-
tion of personhood. In order to count as a person, Pettit holds, an agent must be 
recognized as capable of being held responsible. For without the capability to 
square their feelings and doings over time agents cannot be fit for discursive con-
trol, Pettit argues. This definition of personal identity he derives from John Locke 
who in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding argues as follows: 
 
“Where-ever a Man finds what he calls himself, there I think another may say is the same 
Person. It is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only 
to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery. This personality ex-
tends it self beyond present Existence to what is past […] it becomes concerned and ac-
UNFREEDOM AND THE CRISES OF WITNESSING | 221 
countable, owns and imputes to it self past Actions, just upon that same ground, and for 
the same reason, that it does the present.” (Locke, 1975, p. 26) 
 
I have quoted Locke at length because his definition of personhood gives a clear 
description of what is at stake in the slave narrators’ attempt to assert themselves 
as persons who must “impute” their past actions in order to count as responsible 
and free persons in the present. The forensic definition of personhood is espe-
cially relevant for our present case because slaves were not accepted as full legal 
subjects. Colonial slave laws defined slaves as the chattel of their owners, thus 
refusing any rights of legal protection to slaves, and, though slaves in the ante-
bellum period were allowed a minimal protection by the law and could in some 
cases even defend themselves in court, the idea that slaves were mere chattel 
persisted in antebellum law, where slaves could not witness against white men in 
court (Finkelman, 2010, p. 437). Correspondingly, the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850 permitted slave owners and their representatives to arrest fugitive slaves in 
free states without having to prove the identity of their prisoners in court. Some 
abolitionists therefore encouraged trials against fugitive slaves, as in the case of 
Margaret Garner (famous thanks to Toni Morisson’s account, Beloved) who 
committed infanticide in a desperate attempt to save her children from slavery 
when she and her children were arrested by their owner. Abolitionists who saw 
her case as an extreme proof of the desperate condition of slaves were eager to 
have her tried for infanticide, but eventually Garner was returned without trial to 
her owner who restored her to slavery. Like other fugitive slaves, she was not 
granted the legal status of personhood and was legally debarred from giving evi-
dence in her own case (see Reinhardt, 2002 for a detailed discussion of the Gar-
ner case). As Morrison reminds us, Garner was never permitted the minimal dis-
cursive control to tell her own story, which only survives through external 
sources. 
From a theoretical perspective, it is important to notice the difference be-
tween the forensic definition of personal identity found in Locke and Pettit on 
the one hand and the more traditional Augustinian understanding of personal 
identity on which Olney draws on the other. While the latter bases personal iden-
tity on our internal mental capacity to recollect past experiences, the former of-
fers an external and social definition of identity which relies on our capacity to 
answer to past actions. The former concerns only the continuity and change-
ability of the self, while the latter concerns the person in his or her relation to 
other people.  
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PERSONAL FREEDOM 
 
The question of personal identity as a requirement for freedom is further compli-
cated in the case of fugitive slaves, for, after their escape, they had to change 
their names and hide their previous identity in order to avoid slave searchers. 
Taking a new name and a new identity is a commonplace climax in the narra-
tives which marks the transition from bondage to freedom. Often the slaves bore 
the names of their masters, and for this reason they detested their family names. 
In some cases, as that of the mulatto William Wells Brown, the slaves were even 
fathered by their masters. In his narrative, Wells Brown describes how he was 
forced by his owner and biological father to change his first name to Sandford 
when the latter begot a legitimate son who, for inscrutable reasons, was also bap-
tized William. Here is Brown’s sardonic comment:  
 
“It is sometimes common at the south, for slaves to take the name of their masters. Some 
have a legitimate right to do so. But I always detested the idea of being called by the name 
of either of my masters. And as for my father, I would rather have adopted the name of 
“Friday,” and been known as the servant of some Robinson Crusoe, than to have taken his 
name. So I was not only hunting for my liberty, but also hunting for a name.” (Brown, 
1847, p. 98) 
 
Douglass changed his name several times in the immediate aftermath of his 
flight, thus skipping from Frederick Bailey to Frederick Stanley and Frederick 
Johnson. Upon his arrival in New Bedford, he discovered that Frederick Johnson 
was such a common name that he asked his host to give him a new name, finally 
settling on Douglass (Douglass, 1845, p. 112). More self-consciously, Henry 
Box Brown promoted his own fugitive narrative by choosing a middle name re-
ferring to the legendary three-foot container in which he was mailed to the North. 
If the fugitive slaves saw their new names as a promise of freedom, the 
change of identity was also a challenge to their freedom for reasons that must be 
fairly obvious from our argument. In order to be accountable as a free person and 
enjoy discursive control, one must, as we have seen, be able to endorse the le-
gacy of one’s accumulated personal history.5 However, this also means that hid-
ing or losing one’s previous identity becomes a predicament for personal freedom. 
“It is common for slaves to answer to any name, as it may suit the humours of 
                                                           
5  This explains why the slave narrative was always more than just a weapon to fight 
slavery. In fact autobiography has remained a decisive means in African-American 
literature to affirm the free self. 
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the master,” remarks one John Brown, not the infamous abolitionist of Harpers 
Ferry, about his dizzying past (Brown, 1854, p. 1).  
Because the personal identity of fugitive slaves was so fragile, slave narra-
tors make extraordinary paratextual efforts to prove their identity in their books. 
The typical slave autobiography of the 1840s and 1850s contains signed photo-
graphs or engraved portraits of the narrators and testimonials and letters by    
persons of public renown, such as editors, writers, abolitionist politicians, and 
clergymen, who validate the identity and reliability of the narrator. Without this 
external bestowal of discourse control, the narratives were simply not taken seri-
ously by the public, whereas narratives introduced by major public figures like 
William Garrison, Wendell Phillips or Harriet Beecher Stowe easily became 
bestsellers. Douglass’ autobiography, prefaced by both Garrison and Wendell 
Phillips, was issued in 13 editions in between 1845 and 1847, and by 1860 sold 
30,000 copies, while William Wells Brown’s autobiography from 1847, en-
dorsed by the antislavery leader Quincey Jones, went through four editions in its 
first year of publication. The best selling narrative by far, however, was The Life 
of Josiah Henson (1849) whose sale figures rose to 100,000 copies after Harriet 
Beecher Stowe claimed she had based Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1851) on Henson’s 
autobiography (cf. Foster, 1979, p. 22). 
Alongside these paratextual efforts, we also find substantial efforts by slave 
narrators to identify themselves in the narrative texts. The very opening sentence 
of the vast majority of narratives begins with a statement locating the place and 
(lack of) known circumstances of the narrator’s birth: Case in point, Douglass’s 
introit: “I was born in Tuckahoe, near Hillsborough, and about twelve miles 
from Easton, in Talbot county, Maryland. I have no accurate knowledge of my 
age, never having seen any authentic record containing it” (Douglass, 1845, p. 1). 
As slaves were often separated from their closest family early in life, the only 
record that could identify the slave narrators’ past was the names and locations 
of previous masters.  
The scarcity of evidence of the slave narrators’ past identity explains the use 
of declarative speech acts with which the narrators identify themselves, as when 
Douglass solemnly ends his narrative with the words: “I subscribe myself, Fred-
erick Douglass [facsimile of signature], LYNN, Mass., April 28, 1845” 
(Douglass, 1845, p. 125). As Olney correctly insists, the slave narratives distin-
guish themselves from all other autobiographical writings by their unusual in-
sistence that their authors actually exist. We should perhaps add that this is also a 
distinguishing feature in respect of other pieces of testimonial literature which is 
usually more concerned the veracity of its testimony than proving the actual    
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existence of the witness.6 It only stresses that the writing self in slave autobiog-
raphy is defined in legal rather than subjective terms. What matters even more 
than the veracity of the narratives’ content (which is certainly important too), is 
the witness’ capacity to assert him- or herself as a person capable of discursive 
control, a person who can witness and publicly answer to his or her testimony. 
 
 
A BLACK ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION? 
 
As we have seen, Pettit’s theory of freedom is largely compatible with the expe-
rience, thoughts and intentions found in American slave narratives. There can be 
no doubt that slave narrators took considerable and conscious efforts to assert 
discursive control by establishing their identity as responsible agents. Respec-
tively, the slave narrators’ political struggle for freedom is driven by a concep-
tion of freedom which is consistent with Pettit’s republican understanding of 
freedom as non-domination rather than non-interference. While proponents of 
slavery protested against limitations of slavery as an illegitimate interference  
(either as federal interference with state legislation or as governmental interfer-
ence with private liberty), the slave narrators and black abolitionists protested 
against the arbitrary domination that was forced upon slaves as a violation of 
their freedom.  
Does this suggest that we can distinguish a black Atlantic tradition of repub-
lican thought? Or to put the question differently: does the fact that the slave nar-
ratives can be read in accordance with republican ideas of freedom suggest that 
the narratives were consciously written along republican figures of thought? 
There is no straightforward answer to this question. With the exception of 
Douglass, the poorly educated slave narrators were not political thinkers and 
spend little time on political and constitutional reflections in the narratives which 
are, as we have seen, closely bound to personal experience. Nonetheless, there 
are distinctly republican elements in the rhetorical exposition of slavery. First of 
all, massive descriptions of arbitrary coercion and its corruption of virtue are 
                                                           
6  This is not a categorical distinction, however, but one of degree. Thus, the fear that 
traumatic experience may lead to social death is not unusual in witness literature, es-
pecially among Holocaust survivors. Primo Levi writes of his worst nightmare as a 
prisoner in Auschwitz, in which he survives and is restored to his former life but real-
izes that even his closest relatives are indifferent to his story and act as if he still was 
not there (Levi, 2008, p. 66). Still, the efforts taken by the slave narrators and their 
supporters to prove their very existence is quite exceptional. 
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found in all narratives, which invoke a deep-seated concern in American poli-
tical ideology and rhetoric that is intimately connected with the Atlantic repub-
lican tradition (Pocock, 1975; Dickson D.B. Jr., 2007, p. 38). Second, slave nar-
rators persistently define themselves by their lack of civic and legal status, and 
their exposure to arbitrary domination, not by their race or cultural identity. 
Though the fugitive slave writers were well aware that racism persisted in the 
abolitionist North, the defining category for them concerns their civic status ra-
ther than colour or socio-cultural background. For strategic reasons, questions of 
black identity are played down in the narratives which were primarily intended 
for a broad white audience. After the Civil War, however, freedom in the repub-
lican sense as non-domination was replaced by racial equality as the primary   
political objective of black writers, who found the freedoms of emancipation 
slowly eroded by the implementation of depriving Jim Crow laws. By then the 
republican notion of freedom had lost its rhetorical sway. 
If we look from a broader perspective at the antebellum slavery debate, it 
furthermore becomes clear that the slave narratives were also rhetorically influ-
enced by proslavery pamphlets, even as they sought to refute them. Recently, the 
historian Carl J. Richard has observed how advocates of slavery like John C. 
Calhoun, leader of the pro-slavery faction in the Senate in the 1830s and 1840s, 
drew extensively on classical political philosophy. In particular Aristotle’s defi-
nition of the “natural slave” as a person who is intellectually and morally inca-
pable of liberty appealed to southern arguments and was twisted racially (pace 
Aristotle) to become a vindication of white supremacy (Richard, 2009, p. 189). 
In this way, Aristotle’s political philosophy was used as evidence against the hy-
pothesis of the state of nature, seen by many southern intellectuals as the root of 
abolitionism, in which modern political thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, and Rous-
seau had argued that men were originally free and equal individuals (Richard, 
2009, p. 192). 
The slave narrators were not in a rhetorical position to dispute the “neo-
Aristotelian” vindication of natural slavery among writers like Calhoun by argu-
ing in terms of the state of nature hypothesis, bound as they were to statements 
of experience rather than theoretical convictions. However, what they could do 
instead, and with greater authority, was rebuke the very idea of the natural slave 
by portraying their own struggle for freedom, and, secondly, portray the morally 
and economically corrupting power of slavery that they had witnessed. Douglass 
speculates that it was slavery which brought about the fall of classical Athens 
(Richards, 2009, p. 194), and in the narratives we find several reflections on the 
ways in which domination depraves the slaveholders, who are portrayed as un-
productive, hypocritical, and victims of their own desires. Interestingly, the     
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antebellum slave narrators, in contrast to their white abolitionist allies, rarely 
conceive of freedom as an inalienable right. Instead they are consistent in their 
criticism of the corrupting power of domination and their conception of freedom 
as the opposite of domination. In this sense, they furnish the Atlantic republican 
tradition with a valuable appendix. 
In relation to the republican tradition, it is interesting to find republican fig-
ures of thought among the slave narrators expressed from a perspective which, 
for once, is the very opposite of that of the free citizen. Nonetheless, there is, as 
we have seen, a thorough convergence between the modern republican concep-
tion of freedom as non-domination and the beliefs and experiences found in 
slave testimony. I see this as an argument that Pettit’s theory of freedom is not 
only philosophically, but also empirically, valid. However, there is another con-
clusion we might draw from the present analysis, which concerns the under-
standing of the witness as an autobiographical person. There is a tendency in 
much scholarship on autobiography and witness literature to emphasize the in-
ner, psychological, and mental aspects of the witness’s memory at the expense of 
its external agency. The aim of the slave narratives, however, was not to recover 
or represent the minds of the slaves but to fight slavery by asserting the discur-
sive freedom of the slave narrators as witnesses. Their notion of personal identity 
is therefore a legal one which urges us to acknowledge the witness as a respon-
sible agent rather than a mere victim. Certainly, this is an aspect of witnessing 
that antebellum slave narratives can help us recognize and understand in other 
kinds of autobiography where it appears less obvious. 
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